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Abstract
The security guarantees provided by digital signatures are vital to many modern
applications such as online banking, software distribution, emails and many more.
Their ubiquity across digital communications arguably makes digital signatures one
of the most important inventions in cryptography. Worryingly, all commonly used
schemes – RSA, DSA and ECDSA – provide only computational security, and are
rendered completely insecure by quantum computers. Motivated by this threat, this
thesis focuses on unconditionally secure signature (USS) schemes – an information-
theoretically secure analogue of digital signatures.
We present and analyse two new USS schemes. The first is a quantum USS
scheme that is both information-theoretically secure and realisable with current
technology. The scheme represents an improvement over all previous quantum USS
schemes, which were always either realisable or had a full security proof, but not
both. The second is an entirely classical USS scheme that uses minimal resources
and is vastly more efficient than all previous schemes, to such an extent that it could
potentially find real-world application. With the discovery of such an efficient clas-
sical USS scheme using only minimal resources, it is difficult to see what advantage
quantum USS schemes may provide.
Lastly, we remain in the information-theoretic security setting and consider two
quantum protocols closely related to USS schemes – oblivious transfer and quan-
tum money. For oblivious transfer, we prove new lower bounds on the minimum
achievable cheating probabilities in any 1-out-of-2 protocol. For quantum money, we
present a scheme that is more efficient and error tolerant than all previous schemes.
Additionally, we show that it can be implemented using a coherent source and lossy
detectors, thereby allowing for the first experimental demonstration of quantum coin
creation and verification.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since its discovery in the early 20th century, quantum mechanics has been the fun-
damental theory used to describe nature. Though strange and counterintuitive, the
postulates of quantum mechanics have been tremendously successful in describing
physical systems and their evolution, despite the fact that a true understanding of
the meaning of these postulates remains elusive. Perhaps the most striking feature
of quantum mechanics is the uncertainty principle, which places absolute limits on
the precision with which we can measure two non-commuting observables. Origi-
nally formulated by Heisenberg in 1927 [2], and extended by Robertson in 1929 to
the now well-known form [3], the uncertainty principle has profound consequences
for nature. Together with entanglement theory, it has sparked many of the most
well-known and controversial debates in the history of quantum mechanics [4, 5].
On the face of it, the uncertainty principle seems to be an inherently negative result,
severely limiting our ability to accurately resolve certain observables. Nevertheless,
physicists are nothing if not resilient. What was originally considered to be a strict
limitation has since been transformed into a useful cryptographic resource, becoming
the cornerstone of the exciting field of quantum cryptography.
In the late 1940’s the mathematical foundations of information theory and cryp-
tography were established by Shannon in his seminal papers [6, 7]. Though seemingly
separate from physics, Shannon’s insight was to define and introduce the concept of
information entropy to quantify uncertainty1. With the progression of computing
technologies, information theory and cryptography flourished, proving themselves
essential for understanding core concepts in the communication, storage and manip-
ulation of data. Traditionally, cryptography has been associated solely with keeping
1The similarity to thermodynamic entropy was immediately apparent, revealing an intrinsic link
between the notions of physics and information, though the underlying reason for the connection
was not, and still is not, fully understood.
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information secret. In reality, the explosion of communication and computation
over the last few decades has seen the field of cryptography grow enormously to
encompass many different tasks and protocols.
Of central importance to this thesis is the cryptographic notion of a signature
scheme, first proposed in 1976 as a means of safeguarding the integrity, authenticity
and transferability of a message [8]. Signatures guarantee the identity of the sender
and ensure that the contents of a message have not been modified in transit. Impor-
tantly, they do so in a verifiable way so that participants can be held accountable
to anything they have signed, or can prove when a document has been forged. Digi-
tal signatures have since become ubiquitous across modern communications, finding
applications in online banking, software distribution, emails, legal documents, pho-
tography and many more. Their widespread applicability has led to them being
described as “one of the most important inventions in modern cryptography” [9].
With the benefit of hindsight, it is perhaps surprising that the inherent suitability
of quantum mechanics to cryptography remained largely overlooked for more than
30 years until the discovery of quantum key distribution (QKD) [10] in 19842. QKD
harnessed the power of quantum mechanics to achieve something that is provably
impossible to do in the classical world – distribute a secret key between two parties
with information-theoretic security3. The discovery highlighted the vast practical
potential that quantum mechanical effects have in cryptography, and founded the
field which is today called quantum cryptography. In the last 30 years, theoretical
and technological advances have seen this already rich field mature and expand at
an exponential rate. Nevertheless, despite their importance, signatures have until
recently remained relatively untouched by the quantum cryptography community.
In this thesis we will explore signatures from the viewpoint of a quantum physicist,
and try to discover what advantages uniquely quantum effects may provide.
1.1 Motivation
The most common signature schemes in use today are public-key schemes based on
the Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm [12], the Digital Signature Algorithm
(DSA) [13], and the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)[14]. These
schemes are believed to provide computational security, which means that there is
2Though pre-dated by Wiesner’s unpublished 1970 “Conjugate Coding” paper [11].
3In this thesis we will use the phrases “unconditional security” and “information-theoretic secu-
rity” interchangeably. If a protocol is called unconditionally secure and no conditions are explicitly
stated, then it means that within the assumptions of the protocol it has been proven secure against
all types of attack allowed by quantum mechanics.
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no probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm that can solve the underlying problems
upon which the scheme is built. In practice, this means that the schemes remain
secure assuming the adversary has bounded computational resources. In 1994, the
cryptography community was shocked by the discovery of a polynomial-time quan-
tum algorithm that solved both the factoring and discrete logarithm problem [15],
effectively rendering RSA, DSA and ECDSA completely insecure in the presence
of a quantum computer. While the threat from quantum computers may as yet
seem remote, in many cases it is necessary to keep data secure for years or decades.
Furthermore, government and corporate infrastructures can be hugely complex so
that structural changes take many years to implement. In security, preparation and
foresight are key; if one is truly concerned about long-term security, then one must
protect against both current and future threats. Indeed, in response to these future
threats, in August 2015 the National Security Agency in the USA recommended a
transition to post-quantum secure algorithms, hailing in the beginning of the era of
post-quantum security.
Broadly speaking, post-quantum secure algorithms fall into two categories:
1. Unconditionally secure algorithms. These provide the highest level of se-
curity – security that holds regardless of the computational resources available
to an adversary.
2. Quantum-safe algorithms. These provide computational security against a
quantum adversary, i.e. an adversary able to implement quantum algorithms.
This thesis is concerned with signature schemes in the first category, called uncon-
ditionally secure signature (USS) schemes, and addresses some of the many open
questions in this young and largely unexplored field, such as:
• Can we construct efficient USS schemes?
• What resources/assumptions are necessary for USS schemes to be possible?
• Does quantum mechanics allow for more efficient USS schemes? Does it allow
for schemes requiring fewer resources?
• Does the ability to perform USS schemes imply the ability to perform other
cryptographic protocols?
• What is the relationship between USS schemes and other cryptographic pro-
tocols such as QKD, Byzantine agreement and oblivious transfer?
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1.2 Thesis outline
In Chapter 2 we will introduce post-quantum signature schemes in more detail, with
an emphasis on USS schemes. We review the existing work in this field and finish
the chapter with an in-depth look at the “state-of-the-art” quantum USS signature
scheme which formed the starting point of the work in this thesis.
In Chapter 3 we provide an overview of some important definitions and results in
quantum cryptography that will be necessary to understand the results contained in
this thesis. Additionally, we introduce some useful concepts from classical cryptog-
raphy including message authentication codes, Byzantine agreement and oblivious
transfer.
In Chapter 4 we provide the formal security framework for quantum USS schemes.
In Chapter 5 we describe some simple attacks and resource considerations one
must take into account when creating practical USS schemes. We use these to
motivate the scheme presented and analysed in the following chapter.
In Chapter 6 we leverage modern techniques from QKD and apply them to
signatures. The result is the first practical quantum USS scheme with a full security
proof, and which does not rely on any undesirable assumptions that have been
present in all previous quantum schemes, such as “tamper-proof” quantum channels
or long-term quantum memory. As well as providing a rigorous security analysis, we
are also able to use the scheme to find interesting differences in resource requirements
between quantum USS schemes and QKD. Lastly, we mention various experimental
implementations of the scheme and comment on their efficiency.
In Chapter 7 we extend the protocol of the previous chapter to make it measurement-
device-independent (MDI). By removing side channels that are commonly hacked,
MDI schemes help to bridge the gap between the theory and real-world implemen-
tations, at the cost of a significant reduction in signing efficiency. The scheme also
enjoys some secondary benefits such as an increased transmission distance and a
possible reduction in cost.
In Chapter 8 we explore in more depth the question of exactly how quantum
mechanics can help to create USS schemes. We present a classical USS scheme
using only minimal resources and assumptions which, compared to all previous USS
schemes (both classical and quantum), is able to drastically increase efficiency while
also maintaining security.
In Chapter 9 we consider 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer (1-2 OT) schemes in the
information-theoretic security setting. Perfect 1-2 OT is known to be impossible in
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this setting, but it is possible to devise schemes in which the participants abilities to
cheat are restricted. We prove new lower bounds on the cheating probabilities that
must inevitably arise in any 1-2 OT protocol, and use these bounds to gain insight
into the potential use of imperfect 1-2 OT schemes in other cryptographic protocols,
including USS schemes.
In Chapter 10 we consider secret-key quantum money schemes with classical
verification in the information-theoretic security setting. We describe and analyse
a new scheme with a number of benefits over all previous proposals. We further
prove bounds on the maximum noise tolerance possible for a wide class of quantum
money schemes. Lastly, we show that our scheme can be mapped to one using a
coherent state source together with lossy and imperfect detectors. The resulting
scheme remains secure while also allowing, for the first time, for coins to be created
and verified with current technology.
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Chapter 2
Post-quantum signatures
2.1 Introduction
At a high level, signature schemes are often viewed primarily as a method by which
digital communications can be authenticated, i.e. they allow the recipient of a
message to deduce whether the contents of the message have been altered in transit.
However, they also provide other important guarantees. These are:
1. Non-forging: signatures can be used to authenticate not only the contents of
the message, but also the source of the message.
2. Universal verifiability/transferability: if a recipient accepts a signed message
from a source S, then she can be sure that any third party would also be able
to verify for themselves that the message is valid and originated with S.
3. Non-repudiation: a sender cannot send a signed message, and later deny having
done so.
As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two main classes of signature scheme
providing security in a post-quantum world: quantum-safe digital signature schemes
and USS schemes. The difference between the two classes lies in the level of security
they provide: quantum-safe schemes provide computational security whereas USS
schemes provide information-theoretic security. This difference in security level leads
to some subtle differences in protocol functionality, and as such security guarantees
specific to signatures in the information theoretic-security setting are provided in
Section 2.3.2.
Quantum-safe signature schemes have been widely studied, and we begin this
chapter by providing an overview of the research in that area. USS schemes on the
other hand have been investigated less, and are the focus of this thesis. Starting
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in Section 2.3, in this chapter we provide an in-depth introduction to USS schemes
and review the existing research in this field.
2.2 Quantum-safe signature schemes
Quantum-safe signatures are cryptosystems that are not yet known to be vulnerable
to quantum adversaries with bounded computational resources. In practice, this
means that there is no known polynomial-time quantum algorithm that breaks the
security of the schemes. Many of these schemes are quite new and have not yet stood
the test of time, but are nevertheless widely expected to be hard to solve, even for
quantum adversaries. It should be stressed that, even if the underlying problems
are proved to be hard, the security provided would still be computational, and the
systems would still be vulnerable to brute-force attacks.
Quantum-safe signature schemes have the important advantage of being public-
key schemes, meaning they have the “universal verifiability” property inherent to
standard digital signatures1. Below we summarise some of the most promising
quantum-safe encryption/signature schemes. Note that any public-key encryption
scheme can be used to create a public-key signature scheme. For example, a simple
way to do this is to apply a Fiat-Shamir transformation to a public-key identification
protocol [16].
Lattice-based cryptography
Lattice-based signature schemes are arguably the most promising and well stud-
ied class of quantum-safe schemes. In its simplest form, a mathematical lattice of
integers is just a discrete subgroup of the additive group Zn. The fundamental prob-
lem upon which lattice-based cryptography is founded is the problem of finding the
shortest non-zero vector within the lattice. It is called the Shortest Vector Problem
(SVP), and it is known to be NP-hard. However, as for many commercial schemes,
efficiency trumps security, and all practical systems are based on weaker variants of
the SVP, for which the computational difficulty is unknown. Two common families
of lattice-based cryptosystems based on weaker variants of the SVP are: Learning
With Error (LWE) schemes, such as Ref. [17]; and SS-NTRU schemes, such as Ref.
[18]. The security of both of these families of schemes can be reduced to the same
lattice problem.
1Digital signatures is a term often reserved for schemes exhibiting exactly this property. As
such, in this thesis we refrain from describing schemes as a digital signature scheme unless it
provides universal verifiability.
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Lattice-based schemes have found popularity due to their short signature size
and the relative computational ease of generating a signature. However, it is worth
noting that practical lattice schemes have not yet stood the test of time, and many
believe that the LWE problem is vulnerable to quantum attacks similar to Shor’s
algorithm2. Still, as of the present day, there is no known efficient algorithm solving
the LWE problem, and lattice-based schemes are considered by many to be the most
likely quantum-safe successor to the existing digital signature schemes. Currently,
the most efficient lattice-based signature scheme is BLISS [19].
Multivariate cryptography
Multivariate cryptography is the term given to cryptosystems where the trapdoor
one-way function is a multivariate quadratic polynomial map over a finite field. The
public key is usually given by a set of multivariate polynomials, and encryption
involves evaluating these polynomials with the message given as input. Decryption
involves inverting the multivariate quadratic map, a problem which can be shown
to be NP-hard [20]. Of course, to allow for a trapdoor one must provide additional
structure to the polynomials chosen as a public key. This means that the inversion
problem is no longer necessarily NP-hard, but only believed to be hard.
Nevertheless, multivariate cryptosystems are widely believed to remain secure
even in the presence of quantum computers. Despite this, multivariate cryptosys-
tems have not seen widespread use since they suffer from large public and private
key sizes, and are relatively computationally expensive to use. On the other hand,
the required signature length is very small, meaning there may be applications for
which multivariate schemes are preferable. The most popular multivariate signature
schemes are the Unbalanced Oil and Vinegar scheme (UOV) [21] and the Rainbow
scheme [22].
Code-based cryptography
Code-based cryptosystems were first proposed in 1978 by McEliece [23]. They use
efficient error correcting codes, such as Goppa codes [24], to scramble and decode
messages. The underlying problem upon which security is based is that of decoding
a general linear code, also called syndrome decoding, which is known to be NP-hard.
2Indeed, in November 2016 a paper authored by Lior Eldar and Peter Shor appeared which
claimed to make a significant breakthrough in the search for an efficient algorithm to solve LWE.
However, the paper was later retracted due to a mistake which invalidated the result. Nevertheless,
the work highlights that there is significant doubt regarding whether LWE lattice schemes are truly
secure.
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The private key is an error-correcting code which can efficiently correct up to t errors.
The public key is a random generator matrix of a randomly permuted version of the
private key. Encryption is performed by adding t errors to the message, where the
errors are chosen using the public key. Only the holder of the private key is able to
remove the errors generated by the public key.
The security reductions of code-based cryptosystems are well understood and
believed to be strong. Further, the McEliece scheme is very fast to use, as the com-
putational complexity of both encryption and decryption is low. However, McEliece
schemes have never become popular, mainly due to the large size of their public key
relative to competing schemes – often a public-key of several megabytes is necessary
for 128-bit security.
Hash-based cryptography
Hash-based signatures are created using any cryptographic hash function. A cryp-
tographic hash function is a hash function, h, exhibiting the following properties:
1. Pre-image resistance: Given h(x), it should be difficult to find x.
2. Second pre-image resistance: Given x1, it should be difficult to find x2 such
that h(x1) = h(x2).
3. Collision resistance: It should be difficult to find any distinct pair x1 and x2
such that h(x1) = h(x2).
The existence of a digital signature scheme that can sign multiple messages using a
single private key implies the existence of a hash-based signature scheme. Therefore,
cryptographic hash functions are a minimal requirement for the existence of any
secure digital signature scheme that can sign more than one message using a single
private key [20]. In this sense, hash-based schemes are the most important and
fundamental digital signature scheme.
The security of hash-based signatures relies solely on the collision resistance of
the underlying cryptographic hash function. This means that hash-based schemes
are extremely adaptable – if the underlying hash function is found to be insecure,
then it can simply be switched for another without overhauling the security systems
in place. This flexibility makes hash-based schemes good candidates for providing
post quantum security in an uncertain future [20].
Hash-based signatures are widely modelled on the Lamport-Diffe one-time sig-
nature scheme, which can be implemented using any one-way function f . To sign
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an n-bit message, the private key is a collection of 2n randomly chosen bit strings,
two for each of the bits contained in the message. The public key is the collection
of hash tags generated from applying f to each of the strings in the private key. To
sign a message, the sender attaches the n private keys corresponding to each of the
bit values in the message. Since the private key is partially revealed, it cannot be
reused, hence the name “one-time” (see Section 2.3.3 for a more in-depth discussion).
Finite reusability can be enforced by augmenting a one-time scheme with struc-
tures such as binary trees. This idea was first introduced by Merkle [25], but the
construction suffered many efficiency drawbacks such as large public and private
keys, long signature lengths and computationally intensive signature generation.
An additional disadvantage associated with finite reusability is that each use of a
Merkle-type hash-based scheme is not independent meaning one must keep track of
the state of the algorithm, i.e. which one-time keys have been used and the position
of the algorithm on the binary tree. In large-scale environments, statefullness is
difficult to manage [26]. Nevertheless, the techniques have improved over the years
and one of the current best schemes, XMSS [27], is less computationally intensive
and requires much smaller keys, though it is still stateful and the signature length is
a factor of 10 larger than schemes such as RSA. Stateless hash-based schemes also
exist [28], and this field is an active area of research.
2.3 Unconditionally secure signatures
For real-world applications, two highly desirable properties of digital signatures are
the fact that they are non-interactive (message recipients do not need to commu-
nicate for the message to be transferable), and they do not require participants to
share an initial secret key. In practice, this means that digital signature schemes
exhibit the “universal verifiability” property. To gain universal verifiability digital
signatures sacrifices security, and all schemes with this property are only computa-
tionally secure. USS schemes do not provide universal verifiability, but instead use
a set-up phase to ensure that messages are transferable to any recipient that was
part of the set-up phase.
Nevertheless, for particularly high-security applications it may be desirable to
use schemes providing unconditional security. USS schemes do just that, and are
provably secure even when the time and computational resources available to the
adversary are completely unknown. Unfortunately, such a high level of security
carries a cost, and to gain unconditional security one must sacrifice the universal
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verifiability property inherent to all currently used digital signature schemes. In-
stead, USS schemes always contain at least two stages: a distribution phase in which
the protocol is set up; and a messaging phase in which the message is actually sent.
Only those participants who took part in the distribution stage can later send and
receive signed messages. Moreover, we prove in Theorem 5.1 of Chapter 5 that the
distribution stage of all USS schemes is necessarily interactive (i.e. potential mes-
sage recipients must all be able to communicate either directly or indirectly with all
other recipients) and always requires a secret shared key between all participants.
This caveat means that USS schemes are functionally different to traditional digital
signatures, but maintain very similar goals. The interactive nature of USS schemes,
together with their requirement of shared secrets, exclude them from being a real-
istic replacement for many core applications of digital signatures, but does not rule
out their use in some high-security scenarios.
2.3.1 Generic USS scheme
Unlike many cryptographic primitives, USS schemes do not assume that any party
is honest. Instead, it is typically assumed that more than a threshold number of
participants are honest, but that the identities of the dishonest participants are
unknown to all. USS schemes are divided into two categories: quantum schemes,
whose security is derived from physical laws; and classical schemes, whose security
is derived from mathematical reasoning. Regardless of this, all USS schemes have
the same basic two-stage structure:
• The distribution stage: this is the set-up phase in which a finite number
of participants interactively communicate in order to distribute information
that will later be used to sign and/or verify messages. All participants who
may want to send/receive a signed message in future must take part in this
stage. This stage can involve quantum communication, in which case we call
the scheme a quantum USS scheme, or only classical communication, in which
case we call the scheme a classical USS scheme.
• The messaging stage: this is the phase in which the message is sent. This
stage can happen at any point in time after the distribution stage, and for
signatures to be useful it must be non-interactive (i.e. communication is only
required between the sender and the receiver of the message). The sender
(normally called Alice) sends the message together with the signature, set up
in the distribution stage, to the desired recipient (normally called Bob). Bob
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should be able to check the validity of the signed message locally, using no
interaction with other participants. If Bob wants to transfer the message to a
third party (normally called Charlie), then Bob simply forwards the message-
signature pair to Charlie, who can again check the validity of the pair non-
interactively.
P0
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P3
P4
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P8
(a)
P0 Pi Pj
(m, Sigm) (m, Sigm)
(b)
Figure 2.1: The figure shows the two stages – the distribution stage and the messaging stage
– of a generic USS scheme. Figure (a) shows the generic distribution stage for a sender and
N = 8 recipients. Note that communication is restricted to nearest neighbour for illustration
purposes alone. In reality, recipients will normally communicate pairwise with all other recipients.
Communication could be quantum or classical depending on the protocol. Figure (b) shows the
generic messaging stage showing a message-signature pair, (m, Sigm), sent to recipient Pi and
subsequently transferred to recipient Pj . The message m is always a classical bit string, and is
guaranteed to be transferable in sequence a fixed number of times (specified by the protocol).
It is important to stress that all USS schemes considered in this thesis are de-
signed to secure classical information, and we do not consider the various schemes
proposed to secure quantum information [29, 30]. When we refer to a “quantum”
or “classical” USS scheme, the distinction applies only to the resources required in
the distribution stage, not the information being signed. Although the resources
available may be highly application dependent, in many cases it will be desirable
to build schemes which make minimal resource assumptions. As such, we define
the standard resource model which contains the resources most commonly assumed
throughout this thesis.
Definition 2.1 (The Standard Resource Model). For classical USS schemes, we
assume that all participants are connected pairwise by both authenticated classical
channels and secret classical channels. For quantum USS schemes we assume that
participants are connected pairwise by both authenticated classical channels and
insecure quantum channels.
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Note that there is no physical difference between an authenticated classical chan-
nel and a secret classical channel – any insecure channel that can be used to trans-
mit classical information can be transformed into either an authenticated or a secret
channel without changing the channel itself, only the inputs to the channel. In
the information-theoretic setting, the difference between an authenticated classical
channel and a secret classical channel is the amount of secret shared key required.
To authenticate an n-bit message, the sender and receiver must share O(log n) bits
of secret key [31]. This key is used to append an authentication tag onto the mes-
sage which is inputted into the communication channel. To send the message in
secret the sender and receiver must share O(n) bits of secret key [7]. This key
is used to one-time-pad the input into the communication channel so that the ci-
phertext is transmitted rather than the plaintext message. Concretely, for an n-bit
message m and an n-bit key k, the one-time-pad simply outputs ciphertext m ⊕ k
[32]. Therefore, although it is often convenient to talk about resources in terms
of authenticated/secret channels, in some scenarios it is clearer to talk only about
secret-bit requirements, since these can be used to generate both authenticated and
secret channels.
Note also that the different resources assumed in classical and quantum schemes
(secret classical channel vs insecure quantum channel) is in some sense only a matter
of perspective. This is because, in the information-theoretic setting, creating a
secret classical channel requires a secret shared key. A secret shared key can only be
generated between two parties (separated by an unsecured distance in space) in a
provably secure way via QKD, which in turn requires an insecure quantum channel.
2.3.2 Security requirements of USS schemes
Recall that for USS schemes any participant could be dishonest. The motivations,
powers and strategies available to the adversary are highly dependent on the adver-
sary’s identity; for example, an adversarial coalition including the sender will never
try to forge a message, but will often have more power than a coalition not including
the sender. Therefore, when considering what it means for the protocol to be secure,
one must classify the different powers and attacks available to the adversary given
that the adversary could be any subset of the participants. Since the identities of
the dishonest participants are unknown, secure protocols must protect against all
types of dishonest behaviour simultaneously. Informally, security in the information-
theoretic setting means that the signature scheme has the following three properties
[33]:
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1. Unforgeability: Except with negligible probability, it should not be possible
for an adversary to create a valid signature.
2. Transferability: If a verifier accepts a signature, he should be confident that
any other verifier would also accept the signature.
3. Non-repudiation: Except with negligible probability, a signer should be unable
to repudiate a legitimate signature that she has created.
Formal security definitions for USS schemes are provided in Chapter 4 [34], and
similar definitions for classical USS schemes can be found in [33].
Since transferability is a security requirement of all signature schemes, the min-
imum number of participants in any USS scheme is three. USS schemes are always
unable to handle more than one half of the participants being dishonest (see Chap-
ter 4) without introducing additional trust assumptions such as a trusted authority,
something which is avoided in this thesis. Therefore, the simplest scenario to con-
sider is the three participant case in which at most one participant (whose identity
is unknown) is dishonest.
The development of practical USS schemes has progressed incrementally, with
new protocols being proposed to address specific issues in previous protocols. In the
following sections, we provide an overview of the most important such schemes in
order to motivate the design and development of later schemes.
2.3.3 Lamport-Diffie one-time signatures
An extremely useful resource in the development of practical cryptography is the
notion of a one-way function. Informally, this is a function whose output is easy to
compute given an input, but whose input is computationally difficult to compute
given an output3. A standard example is prime factorisation: given two large prime
numbers it is easy to compute their product, but given their product it is difficult
to find the prime factors. This asymmetric nature is the foundation of public-key
cryptography, and has been immensely useful in generating efficient cryptosystems.
Signatures are closely related to one-way functions, and indeed it has been shown
that one-way functions are necessary and sufficient for (computationally) secure
signatures [35].
3It is not known whether one-way functions actually exist. Despite there being many functions
which seem to be one-way, actually proving this is the case would imply P 6= NP , and as such all
currently used functions are only believed to be one-way.
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Figure 2.2: The figure gives a simplified schematic of how the Lamport scheme can be used to
sign a one-bit message. In Figure (a), for all possible future messages m, Alice randomly picks km
and computes f(km). She broadcasts (m, f(km)) to all possible recipients. In Figure (b), to sign
message m, Alice sends it together with the secret key, km, to the desired recipient. Of course,
since a secret key is now known, the scheme is not reusable.
Lamport signatures [36] are a particularly simple class of one-time hash-based
signature schemes which can be (computationally) securely implemented using any
one-way function. Although Lamport signatures provide only computational secu-
rity, many USS schemes are heavily based on the structure of Lamport signature
schemes, but use additional resources to create an information-theoretic analogue
of a one-way function, thereby generating unconditional security (see Section 2.3.5).
For this reason it is useful to provide a brief illustration of a Lamport signature.
Lamport scheme
Imagine that Alice wants to send a single signed bit, 0 or 1, at some point in the
future. In the distribution stage, Alice randomly chooses two inputs, k0 and k1,
to the publicly known collision-resistant one-way function, f . She computes f(k0)
and f(k1) and broadcasts4 the outputs, {(0, f(k0)), (1, f(k1))}, as her public key.
Since the function is assumed to be one-way, potential forgers cannot find an input
generating either f(k0) or f(k1). In the messaging stage, to sign message m, Alice
would send (m, km). The recipient would apply the publicly known f to km and
accept the message only if f(km) matches the public key. Clearly, if the participant
transferred the message-signature pair to a third party, they would also find it to
be valid. Once the message is sent, the public key cannot be re-used and must be
discarded, hence the name “one-time” signatures.
4The use of a broadcast channel is not strictly necessary, but simplifies the protocol statement.
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2.3.4 Classical USS schemes
The field of classical USS schemes has received relatively little attention. This is
largely due to public-key digital signatures being vastly more practical, both in terms
of efficiency and functionality, and therefore better suited to most applications. Nev-
ertheless, there may still be situations involving highly sensitive information in which
USS schemes are desirable due to the higher level of security they provide. Examples
might include high-value banking transactions, signing important legal documents,
or securing sensitive government communications. From a purely theoretical view-
point, the question of “what are the advantages and limitations of signature schemes
providing unconditional security?” is also interesting in its own right.
Existing schemes
The original classical USS scheme, proposed in 1988 by Chaum and Roijakkers [37],
had the same one-time structure as the Lamport signature outlined above. The
distribution stage required an authenticated broadcast channel as well as pairwise
secret authenticated channels between all participants. For each possible future
message that Alice could send, the participants make use of the untraceable sending
protocol [38] to send her a string of secret bits anonymously. In the messaging stage,
Alice’s signature for message m is simply composed of all of the secret bit values
that she received associated to m. Intuitively, security against forging is guaranteed
because all participants send their elements of the signature over secret channels
so that no one, except the sender, can reproduce the full signature. Transferability
is limited to a single transfer in this scheme and is guaranteed by the anonymous
channels, which means Alice is unable to bias a signature so that one party is more
likely to accept than another. The same arguments show that Alice cannot repudiate
a valid message.
Under the name of pseudosignatures, Pfitzmann and Waidner [39] generalised the
above scheme to make it significantly more efficient, as well as finitely transferable.
The recipients in this scheme use authenticated broadcast channels together with
the untraceable sending protocol to anonymously transmit universal hash functions,
rather than bit strings. In the messaging stage of the protocol, the hash functions
are applied to an arbitrary (but size-bounded) message and appended as a tag.
This change has the significant efficiency advantage of allowing longer messages to
be sent using a single set-up phase, but still suffers from the one-time use restriction
and requires expensive resources such as authenticated broadcast and anonymous
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channels.
Other notable classical USS schemes include the variants by Hanaoka et al. [40,
41], constructed using polynomials over finite fields. These schemes require a trusted
authority as well as secret channels. The inclusion of a trusted authority greatly
simplifies both the set-up phase and the security proofs for transferability. Impor-
tantly, the Hanaoka schemes are not one-time – they are finitely re-usable meaning
that the distribution phase does not have to be repeated for each message being
sent. Nevertheless, the length of both the signature and the secret keys needed to
generate signing/verification algorithms are still rather long, severely limiting its use
in practice. A later variation of this scheme was proposed by Hanaoka et al. in [42].
This scheme sacrificed the re-usability of the previous scheme to achieve a reduction
in the size of the secret keys needed to generate signing/verification algorithms by
approximately a factor of 10.
There is also protocol P2 [1], originally introduced as a quantum USS scheme,
but more properly classified as a classical scheme. For this protocol, in the three-
party setting, Alice holds two secret keys for each possible future message she could
send. In the distribution stage, for each possible future message she uses secret
classical channels to send one of her secret keys to Bob and one to Charlie. Bob
and Charlie then use a secret classical channel to exchange half of the bits they
received from Alice. In the messaging stage, Alice’s signature for message m is the
two keys associated with that message (one of which was sent to Bob, and one of
which was sent to Charlie). Though this simple scheme is less efficient than some
of the schemes above, it shows that classical USS schemes exist which use only the
resources available in the standard resource model.
Lastly, Ref. [43] considers classical USS schemes from an information-theoretic
achievability perspective, and provides a full characterisation of the initial correla-
tions required for signatures to be possible between three parties. This effectively
quantifies the aims of any generic distribution stage in the case of just three parties.
2.3.5 Quantum USS schemes
As discussed above, one-way functions are extremely useful in cryptography for
providing computational security. If we want unconditional security, is there a notion
of an unconditionally secure one-way function? Classically the answer is no, since a
brute force search will always yield all inputs leading to a given output. However,
if we allow the output of the function to be a quantum state, then the answer is yes
17
– unconditionally secure quantum one-way functions do exist5.
The one-way function we will consider was first introduced in the context of
quantum fingerprinting [45, 46], and maps a b-bit classical string, s, to a quantum
state of dimension d according to
s→ |ψs〉 = 1√
d
d∑
i=1
(−1)E(s)i |i〉. (2.1)
Here, E is an error-correcting code mapping b-bit strings to d-bit strings, where
d = cb for some integer c > 1. The right-hand side can be viewed as a state
containing q = log(cb) qubits. The one-way property follows from the Holevo bound
[47, 48]:
Theorem 2.2 (The Holevo bound). Suppose Alice prepares a state ρX , where
X = 0, . . . , n with probabilities p0, . . . , pn. Bob performs a measurement described by
POVM6 elements {Ey} = {E0, . . . , Em} on that state, with measurement outcome
Y . The Holevo bound states that for any such measurement Bob may do:
I(X : Y ) ≤ S(ρ)−
∑
x
pxS(ρx) (2.2)
where I is the mutual information, S is the von Neumann entropy and ρ =
∑
x pxρx.
Suppose that each ρx in the ensemble is a q-qubit state. A simple corollary of this
theorem can be proved by noting that ρ is also a q-qubit state, meaning S(ρ) ≤ q
and it is therefore impossible to retrieve more than q bits of information from a
q-qubit state. In relation to the one-way function above, this corollary means that
given access only to the output quantum state, it is impossible to derive the b-bit
input as long as b > log d.
The Gottesman-Chuang quantum USS scheme
The study of quantum USS schemes began with a paper by Gottesman and Chuang
[49], in which the authors outline a Lamport-type “public key” quantum USS scheme
relying on the information-theoretic one-way function described in Eq. (2.1).
To set up the scheme for a 1-bit message, Alice randomly chooses her private key
to be two b-bit classical strings (k0, k1). To generate the public key, Alice applies the
5This is not to be confused with the quantum one-way functions defined in [44] as a function
that is easily computable by a classical algorithm, but computationally hard to invert even by a
quantum computer.
6POVM’s are defined in Section 3.2.
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one-way mapping (2.1) to create the two q-qubit states (|φk0〉 , |φk1〉). The mapping
is known to all protocol participants, but the strings (k0, k1) are not. Alice sends t
copies of the public key to each recipient in the scheme. For security, it is necessary
to in some way authenticate these transmissions. The authors suggest using either
a trusted distribution centre or authenticated quantum channels7. The participants
then use t− 1 of their copies to perform distributed swap tests to ensure they each
received the same public key.
In the messaging stage, when Alice wants to send a signed message, m, she sends
the pair (m, km) to the chosen recipient, say Bob. With the identity of km revealed,
Bob can apply the known mapping to create as many copies of |φkm〉 as he likes, and
can compare them with the public key. The comparison could be implemented, for
example, using a swap test. If the created states match the public key, the message
is accepted, else, it is rejected. To forward the message, Bob simply forwards on
(m, km).
Security against non-transferability and repudiation is guaranteed by the sym-
metry enforced by the distributed swap tests performed in the set-up phase. To
provide security against forging, the number of recipients, N , must be limited so
that Ntq  b. This requirement, together with the Holevo bound, ensures that no
adversarial coalition can derive the private key even with access to all copies of the
public key. Longer messages can be signed by applying the above scheme bit-by-bit
to each bit of the message.
Limiting factors
In terms of efficiency and practicality of the Gottesman-Chuang scheme, there are
a few observations to make regarding its limiting factors. Consideration of these
drawbacks has motivated later work on quantum USS schemes.
(I) The fingerprinting states (2.1) suggested for use as the public keys are highly
entangled states, which would be experimentally difficult (or impossible) to
create with current technology.
(II) The protocol requires long-term quantum memory to store the public key from
the time the participants receive it, to the time (arbitrarily far in the future)
when the sender wishes to transmit a signed message.
7Contrary to classical channels which can be authenticated but not encrypted, for quantum
channels authentication implies encryption [29]. Therefore, authenticated quantum channels are
considered to be an expensive resource.
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(III) Since messages are signed bit-by-bit, the signature length scales linearly with
the length of the message. Considering that the signature must be appended
to the message, this scaling is highly inefficient8, and must be improved before
any protocol can be called practical.
(IV) The authors assume authenticated quantum channels which can be difficult
to realise in practice. It would be useful to find methods of relaxing this
assumption.
(V) When proving security against non-repudiation and transferability, the authors
make the simplifying assumption of there being only three participants in the
scheme. Additional participants add significant layers of complexity when
considering possible cheating strategies. A full analysis of these strategies
would be desirable.
(VI) This is a one-time signature scheme, meaning that the public/private key pair
can only be used once. It would be highly desirable to find some method of
making the keys re-usable.
Subsequent work
In light of the above efficiency and practicality limitations, a series of papers suc-
cessively improved upon this original and provided solutions to problems (I) and
(II). The first progress was made by a protocol suggested in 2006 [50], which used
sequences of coherent states as the public key, as well as optical multiports to im-
plement the distributed swap operations. Extending this protocol to more than
three participants would be both theoretically and experimentally challenging due
to the complexity of the required multiports. Nevertheless, based on this protocol
the first experimental demonstration of a quantum USS scheme was given in 2012
[51], albeit with the assumption that the messaging stage takes place immediately
after the distribution stage. This assumption was necessary since the protocol did
not remove the requirement of long-term quantum memory.
8In the context of computing algorithms, linear scaling is often seen as efficient. However, in the
context of signatures it is desired that the size of the signature is much smaller than the size of the
message, since appending the signature adds a communication overhead. The signature length of
most commonly used digital signature schemes (e.g. RSA, DSA and ECDSA) is small (a couple of
kilobytes) and constant with respect to the size of the message being signed. The signature length
of some of the most practical USS schemes (e.g. Ref. [42] which use a trusted authority) increases
logarithmically in the length of the message being signed. Ideally, our USS schemes would have
similar scalings.
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Progress on this front was made in Ref. [52], where a protocol was proposed in
which participants immediately measure the quantum states they receive and then
store only the associated classical information. The measurement suggested was an
unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measurement, the outcome of which either
identifies the state perfectly, or fails and gives no information.
The use of stored classical information is in some ways less efficient for verifying
signatures when compared to the original quantum states, but security can still be
shown to be exponential in the length of the sequence of coherent states sent by
the sender. The scheme could technically be called a secret-key scheme (as opposed
to public-key), since each participant holds a different secret classical key used to
check the signature received from the sender. However, this is not a disadvantage
when compared to other USS schemes, since all USS schemes are also necessarily
interactive and require shared secret keys, so do not have the universal verifiability
property. A three-party implementation of this scheme was performed in [53], though
authentication of the quantum channels used to transmit the key was not actually
performed.
Finally, protocol P1 in Ref. [1] simplified these protocols and removed the ne-
cessity of the multiport. Instead, the authors realised that the swap tests could
be replaced by a classical post-processing step in which participants exchanged a
pre-set number of their classical outcomes. The removal of the multiport, and con-
sequently the removal of the technical difficulties associated with keeping it aligned,
led to significant efficiency gains of approximately four orders of magnitude when
signing a 1-bit message over 1 km to a security level of 10−4.
Classical vs Quantum
Given the existence of classical USS schemes, one may wonder whether quantum
USS schemes are necessary, and what advantages, if any, they may offer over classical
schemes. To motivate the use of quantum mechanics, we first note that it provides
a unique toolbox that is proven to be well suited to cryptography. We have already
seen how unconditionally secure quantum one-way functions can be used to create
“public-key” quantum USS schemes. Further, we note that all USS schemes (classical
and quantum) require participants to share secret keys with information-theoretic
security. This cannot be done classically, but can be done via QKD, and so in a
sense all USS schemes are at least an application of quantum technologies and the
distinction can sometimes become blurred. For example, the classical USS protocol
P2, introduced in Ref. [1], was discovered as part of research into quantum USS
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schemes. There, the authors assume that participants distribute secret key using
QKD. However, unlike more distinctively “quantum” USS schemes, P2 could proceed
identically without using quantum mechanics if given a classical secret key as a
resource. In P2, quantum mechanics is only used to generate a secret key, and it
therefore seems more appropriate to consider it as a classical USS scheme, otherwise
all USS schemes would be quantum USS schemes.
Historically it was also believed that quantum USS schemes might be able to
achieve the same functionality as classical USS schemes while making fewer as-
sumptions. In any cryptographic protocol, assumptions are crucial to the practical
viability and security of the scheme. Refs. [37, 39] assume an authenticated broad-
cast channel, secret authenticated classical channels, and sufficient secret shared key
(required pairwise between all participants) to perform the untraceable sending pro-
tocol. These resources are expensive: the secret channels each require shared secret
keys of the same length as that of the messages being transmitted [7]; while the
authenticated broadcast channel incurs significant communication overhead and is
only achievable if fewer than 1/3 of the participants are dishonest [54]. Refs. [40–42]
assume secret channels and a trusted authority, whose role is to distribute the sign-
ing and verification keys to each participant. The inclusion of a trusted authority
is a large trust assumption, and makes the protocol vulnerable to targeted attacks
against the trusted authority, or even to dishonesty or incompetence on the part of
the trusted authority. For this reason, and since we want our schemes to be highly
secure, this thesis focuses on schemes that do not require a trusted authority.
The quantum USS protocols in Refs. [1, 50, 52] do not assume either a broadcast
channel, anonymous channels or the existence of a trusted authority, and are capable
of maintaining security as long as the majority of participants are honest. Further,
some quantum USS schemes are able to partially remove the need for secret classical
channels by employing untrusted quantum channels instead. This led to the belief
that quantum USS schemes could achieve the same security guarantees as classical
USS schemes while using fewer resources. However, protocol P2 [1] showed that
classical USS protocols exist using the same resources as all known quantum USS
schemes. In Chapter 8 of this thesis we further disprove this belief by describing
an extremely efficient classical USS scheme using significantly fewer resources than
even P2 – resources that we prove in Chapter 5 are minimal and necessary for any
USS scheme that does not use a trusted authority.
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2.4 Quantum USS schemes in detail
We use this section to outline in detail a variant of the scheme P1 proposed in Ref.
[1]. Throughout this thesis we will refer to this variant as Protocol 1. The scheme
forms the starting point for the work in this thesis and is helpful in motivating the
chapters to come.
As in all quantum USS schemes proposed in the literature up to 2014, the follow-
ing protocol describes and analyses the simplest case in which there are only three
parties – a sender, Alice, and two recipients, Bob and Charlie – who aim to sign
a single 1-bit message. However, unlike previous protocols, the authors move away
from coherent states, instead opting to phrase the protocol in terms of the single-
photon BB84 states: |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) and |−〉 := 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). The
reason for using these states is that they are finite dimensional, and thus they are
easier to work with from a theoretical viewpoint. Also, quantum cryptography using
single-photons has been widely studied in other contexts, as we shall see in Chapter
3. The switch allowed the authors to leverage existing techniques from relativistic
quantum bit commitment [55] to provide a full proof of security against forging
– something that in previous protocols [50, 52] had remained elusive. The disad-
vantage of using single-photon states is that they are experimentally challenging to
create, and their use greatly reduces efficiency in a practical setting.
2.4.1 Protocol 1
As usual, the protocol contains two stages: a distribution stage and a messaging
stage. The distribution stage sets up the protocol and allows for signed messages
to be sent securely at any future date. The authors assume the resources available
in the standard resource model, as well as authenticated quantum channels. More
concretely, the resources assumed for the security analysis of this protocol are:
• Authenticated classical channels between all participants: this means that all
participants (pairwise) must be connected by classical channels and share a
short secret key for use in an unconditionally secure message authentication
code (MAC), such as Wegman-Carter authentication [56]. The secret key re-
quired is normally logarithmic in the length of the message to be authenticated.
• Authenticated Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quantum channels: this means that
these participants must be connected by quantum channels and share a secret
classical key that is at least double the length of the message to be signed.
23
The secret key is used to encrypt and authenticate the quantum channel [29],
though in practice this can be challenging.
• A secret Bob-Charlie classical channel: this means that Bob and Charlie must
share a secret key for use in an unconditionally secure encryption protocol
such as the one-time-pad. The length of the required secret key is the same as
the bit length of the information being transmitted [7].
The messaging stage is much simpler and requires only authenticated classical chan-
nels between the senders and receivers of the message. Validation of the message is
non-interactive.
The distribution stage
1. For each future 1-bit message m = 0 and 1, Alice randomly chooses a secret
classical string of symbols to be her private key. PrivKeym = (bm1 , . . . , bmL ),
where each bml ∈ {0, 1,+,−}. The length L will depend on the desired security
level of the protocol.
2. For each private key, Alice generates two copies of the sequence of states,
QuantKeym =
⊗L
l=1 |bml 〉 〈bml |.
3. For each m Alice sends one copy of QuantKeym to Bob and one to Charlie.
4. For each incoming state, Bob and Charlie randomly and independently choose
a basis: either the Z basis {|0〉 , |1〉}; or the X basis {|+〉 , |−〉}. They measure
the incoming state in that basis. The effect of the measurement is to discover
what the state is not, e.g. an outcome of |0〉 definitively rules out |1〉, but
does not rule out either of the other three states as possibilities. This type of
measurement is called an unambiguous state elimination (USE) measurement.
Knowing what the states sent by Alice are not allows the recipients to check
her signature without being able to recreate it.
5. For each element of each quantum key, Bob and Charlie store the classical
description of the ruled out state. They therefore store the triplets {m, l, d},
where m ∈ {0, 1}, l ∈ {1, . . . , L} and d ∈ {0, 1,+,−}, with d recording the
excluded state. We call the L triplets held by Bob Bm, and the L triplets held
by Charlie Cm.
6. Once all states have been received and all triplets recorded, Bob and Charlie
each randomly split their keys into two equal parts to obtain the sets Bm1 , Bm2 ,
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Cm1 and Cm2 , each containing L/2 triplets. Using a secret classical channel,
they each forward the set indexed 2 to the other participant so that Bob holds
Bm1 and Cm2 , while Charlie holds Cm1 and Bm2 . These sets form their private
keys and will be used to check future message declarations.
The messaging stage
1. To send the signed 1-bit message m, Alice sends (m,PrivKeym) to the desired
recipient.
2. Suppose Alice sends the message to Bob. Bob checks whether (m,PrivKeym)
matches his stored private key. In particular, for each position (indexed by
l) in Bm1 and Cm2 , he checks that the excluded state, d, does not equal the
corresponding declared element in PrivKeym. A mismatch occurs in position
l∗ if (m, l∗, d∗) ∈ Bm1 and Alice declares bml∗ = d∗ in PrivKeym. This corresponds
to Bob having eliminated the state that Alice claims to have sent. Bob checks
for mismatches in Bm1 and Cm2 separately.
3. If the number of mismatches is below saL/2 for both Bm1 and Cm2 , where sa
is an authentication threshold9, then Bob accepts the message. If the number
of mismatches between PrivKeym and either Bm1 or Cm2 are more than this
threshold, he rejects the message.
4. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards to Charlie the pair (m,PrivKeym)
that he received from Alice.
5. Charlie tests for mismatches similarly to Bob but uses the sets Cm1 and Bm2
instead. To protect against repudiation and to ensure transferability, Charlie
uses a different threshold parameter, sv, such that sv > sa. Charlie accepts
the message only if both of his sets have fewer than svL/2 mismatches.
One can see that, if all participants are honest and the channels/detectors are of
sufficient quality, then the protocol works correctly – a message sent by Alice would
be accepted as valid by both Bob and Charlie.
9Of course, in the ideal setting we could choose sa = 0. We choose sa > 0 to allow for
channel/detector noise.
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Figure 2.3: The figure shows the distribution stage and messaging stage of Protocol 1. Figure
(a) shows a schematic representation of the distribution stage of Protocol 1. The grey Alice-Bob
and Alice-Charlie links represent the authenticated quantum channels through which Alice sends
QuantKeym. Upon receiving each state, Bob and Charlie perform an USE measurement (Step 3)
to obtain a classical outcome. They use the secret classical channel (represented by the double
lines) to exchange half of their measurement outcomes (Step 5). Figure (b) shows a schematic
representation of the messaging stage of Protocol 1 in which Alice chooses to send a message
to Bob and the message is subsequently transferred to Charlie. The thin black lines represent
authenticated classical channels. Bob checks the signature PrivKeym against Bm1 and Cm2 using a
tolerable error threshold of sa. Charlie checks the forwarded signature against Cm1 and Bm2 using
a tolerable error threshold of sv.
2.4.2 Security
In this subsection we outline the protocol security analysis. To do this, we consider
how a dishonest party, Eve, could seek to cheat. The protocol involves only three
participants and as such it is assumed that at most one of the participants is dis-
honest, since two colluding participants could trivially cheat. Since we do not know
who is dishonest, the security proof is separated into two parts and considers each
possible scenario.
First, we prove that the scheme is secure against forging attempts by imagining
that Eve is Bob. Of course, a potential forger could be an external party, but
since Bob has access to inside information it is easier for him to cheat than for
any external party. Therefore security against forging in the case when Eve is Bob
implies security against forging when Eve is an external party. The case when Eve
is Charlie is identical.
Second, we imagine that Eve is Alice and prove that she cannot make Bob and
Charlie disagree as to the validity of a message she sends. For the three-party
scenario we consider this implies both message transferability and non-repudiation.
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For now, we work with the informal notions of security provided in Section 2.3.2.
We say that a protocol is secure against a particular threat if the probability of an
adversary being successful in that dishonest behaviour decays exponentially in the
length of the signature, L. The security level of the protocol is defined to be the
minimum  such that
 ≥ max{P(Forge), P(Repudiate), P(Non Trans)}, (2.3)
where P(Forge) is the probability of Bob successfully forging a message, P(Repudiate)
is the probability of Alice successfully repudiating a message, and P(Non Trans) is
the probability of Alice sending a message that is not transferable.
Unforgeability
If Bob wants to forge, he wants to forward a valid message-signature pair to Charlie
pretending that it originated with Alice. To do this, he needs to declare a classical
string that has fewer than svL/2 mismatches with Cm1 .10 Remember, Cm1 is an
indexed list of the eliminations arising from Charlie’s measurements on the quantum
states sent to him by Alice in step 3 of the distribution stage. Helping Bob in his
desire to forge is the fact that he holds a valid copy of each of the states measured
by Charlie, since he received the same states directly from Alice in step 3 of the
distribution stage. A dishonest Bob need not make the measurements specified by
the protocol, and he can instead use these states in any way to help create a classical
string that does not contradict Charlie’s measurement outcomes contained in Cm1 .
The difficulty faced by Bob is that he does not know what measurements Charlie
performed, and as far as he is aware Charlie could have ruled out any of the three
states not sent by Alice. Therefore, to make declarations that will certainly not
cause a mismatch with Cm1 , Bob must know the exact identity of each state sent by
Alice. Since the states in the ensemble {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉} are non-orthogonal, it is
impossible for Bob to distinguish them with certainty. This is essentially the reason
why Bob cannot forge a message.
For the purposes of rigorously proving unforgeability, it is useful to categorise
the possible attack strategies available to Bob in a similar manner to QKD11. The
authors define the following types of attack:
10Of course, he also needs it to make fewer than svL/2 mismatches with Bm2 , but since he created
Bm2 , we assume this is easy.
11Since the stages and aims of a signature protocol are different to those in QKD, the definitions
are not identical.
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• Individual attacks – Bob measures each state received from Alice separately.
The choice of measurement is independent of all previous measurement out-
comes.
• Collective attacks – Bob measures each state received from Alice separately.
The choice of measurement can depend on previous measurement outcomes.
• Coherent attacks – Bob can make any measurement allowed by quantum me-
chanics on the global system of all states received from Alice and any auxiliary
systems he chooses to create.
The authors formalise the intuitive security arguments above and provide a full
proof of security against coherent forging attempts. The authors begin by assuming
that Bob is restricted to performing individual attacks. Using cost matrix analysis
techniques described in Ref. [57] it is shown that the optimal individual attack for
Bob is to use the honest measurement to attempt to determine the state received
from Alice. Using this strategy, each element of Bob’s forged signature will have
an error probability of 1/8 when checked by Charlie. A simple application of the
Hoeffding inequality [58] then shows that [59]
P(Forge) ≤ exp
[
−
(
1
8
− sv
)2
L
]
. (2.4)
Therefore, as long as sv < 1/8 it is highly unlikely that Bob is able to successfully
forge a message. Since the states sent by Alice are independently chosen, convexity
arguments show that, for this protocol, the optimal collective attack is actually the
same as the optimal individual attack. Lastly, the authors borrow the teleportation
strategy technique from relativistic bit commitment [55] to show that even coherent
attacks can do no better than individual attacks, meaning the bound derived for
individual attacks also holds for arbitrary coherent attacks.
Aside
In general, security is very difficult to analyse when Eve’s interaction is not sepa-
rable12 (i.e. individual or collective) and quantum USS schemes are no exception.
One may wonder why this is the case – since Alice selects and sends each bit inde-
pendently, is it not obvious that the optimal attack will be an individual one? In
12Indeed, for QKD it wasn’t until 1996 that a security proof against general coherent attacks
was provided [60].
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fact, this intuition is wrong, and coherent attacks can be much more powerful than
individual ones.
To help understand why, let us follow Ref. [1] and consider more carefully Bob’s
aims: Bob is trying to declare a signature that makes fewer than a threshold number
of errors with Cm1 . In that case, Bob’s optimal strategy may not be to try to guess
the exact identity of the states sent by Alice. For example, in a protocol where Bob
knows Alice sent one of the set {001, 010, 100}, if Bob was trying to guess what
Alice sent while making at most 1 error, then his best strategy is to guess 000,
even though this has a zero probability of being exactly what Alice sent. Similarly,
making individual measurements on each state received from Alice may lead to the
highest probability of guessing PrivKeym exactly, but not the highest probability of
guessing PrivKeym up to a certain threshold number of errors.
As a concrete example of when this may occur, consider again Protocol 1, but
modified so that the states Alice sends are selected from the non-orthogonal ensemble
{|0〉 , |+〉}. Suppose further that sv = 1/2 so that Bob is trying to make mismatches
at a rate smaller than 50%. If Bob performs an individual attack, then his optimal
strategy is to apply a minimum error measurement independently to each qubit,
leading to a mismatch probability of 0.32 per qubit. This can also be shown to be
Bob’s optimal strategy if his aim is to guess the states Alice sent exactly. Clearly,
there is a small but non-zero probability that Bob causes more than 50% mismatches
using this strategy. On the other hand, Bob could apply the coherent strategy,
introduced in [61], in which he groups each pair of states sent by Alice and measures
using the entangled basis
|φ++〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉)
|φ+0〉 = 1√
2
(|0−〉+ |1+〉)
|φ0+〉 = 1√
2
(|+1〉+ |−0〉)
|φ00〉 = 1√
2
(|+−〉+ |−+〉) .
(2.5)
The outcome determines Bob’s guess, e.g. an outcome of |φ00〉 implies Bob guesses
|0〉 |0〉 as the states sent by Alice. Using this strategy, the probability that Bob
gets both states wrong is zero for any pair of states sent by Alice. Therefore, Bob
will certainly not make more than 50% errors overall, and so this coherent strategy
allows Bob to forge with probability 1. This counter intuitive argument displays the
power of coherent strategies and highlights the difficulties faced in quantum USS
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schemes when considering coherent attacks.
In Chapter 6 we prove a general theorem relating an adversary’s smooth min-
entropy on PrivKeym to the minimum number of mistakes she is likely to make when
guessing PrivKeym. The theorem is very useful when considering coherent forging
strategies in quantum USS schemes.
Transferability
For proving that messages are transferable, Eve is assumed to be Alice. The aim of
a dishonest Alice in this case is to produce a message that will be accepted at the
level sa and rejected at the level sv. Proving security against this type of attack is
often simpler than proving unforgeability, as the argument is essentially classical.
Whatever states Alice sends to Bob, Bob makes his measurements and stores a
list of classical measurement outcomes. This classical list will have an error rate eB
with the signature that Alice later sends. Similarly, the outcomes stored by Charlie
will have an error rate of eC with Alice’s future signature. The error rates eB and
eC are unknown, and are totally within the control of Alice, but they are fixed. The
exchange process performed in step 6 of the distribution stage effectively means that
each recipient will test Alice’s signature against one set with mismatch rate eB, and
one set with mismatch rate eC . More concretely, the symmetrisation involves both
recipients selecting L/2 triplets from their outcomes without replacement, meaning
the number of mismatches selected follows a hypergeometric distribution. The mes-
sage is likely to be accepted by a recipient only if both eB and eC are below the
testing threshold (sa or sv). Since sv > sa, it is highly unlikely for the message to
be accepted at level sa by the first recipient and subsequently rejected at level sv by
the second (since passing the first test likely means eB, eC < sa < sv).
Existing results on hypergeometric distribution tail bounds [62] formalise this
intuition and show that Alice’s optimal strategy is to choose eB = eC = 12(sv − sa),
in which case
P(Non Trans) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
]
. (2.6)
Non-repudiation
If a dishonest Alice wants to repudiate a message, she wants to deny having sent a
message that she actually did send. The notion of repudiation is closely related to
transferability, but the exact details rely on the chosen form of dispute resolution.
Dispute resolution, formally defined in Chapter 4, can be thought of as a last resort
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for participants who do not agree. It should not happen in normal runs of the
protocol, and is akin to taking someone to court over breach of contract.
Suppose Charlie receives a message from Bob which is claimed to have originated
from Alice. If Alice denies (repudiates) having sent the message, how does one decide
who is telling the truth? In such a scenario, if neither party backs down the dispute
resolution process is triggered to decide who is telling the truth. Dispute resolution
should always decide in favour of honest participants. The dispute resolution pro-
cedure used throughout this thesis is “majority vote”, in which all participants get
together and vote whether the message is valid or not, with the final decision going
to the majority. In our scenario, if Alice actually did send the message, then trans-
ferability ensures both Bob and Charlie would find the message to be valid and so
the majority vote would be “valid”. If Alice did not send the message, then security
against forging would ensure that Charlie would find the message invalid, so the
majority vote would be “invalid”. Thus the protocol is secure against repudiation
attempts and
P(Repudiation) = P(Non Trans). (2.7)
2.4.3 Experimental implementation
The protocol above was implemented experimentally in Ref. [59] using the coherent
state ensemble {|α〉 , |iα〉 , |−α〉 , |−iα〉} rather than the single-photon states used for
the theoretical analysis. In switching to coherent states, the choice of the mean pho-
ton number α becomes important, since larger values reduce errors and loss, but also
allow for easier cheating as the states in the ensemble become more distinguishable.
The experiment found α = 0.4 to be optimal.
The protocol was performed over distances ranging up to 2 km, and required a
signature length of L ≈ 1010 to sign one bit over 1 km to a security level of  = 10−4.
Although this signature length is long, the switch to coherent states facilitates the
use of readily available high clock-rate sources, meaning messages can be signed at
the rate of approximately one bit every 20 seconds. This is a vast improvement over
the previous multiport schemes, which required L = O(1013) to sign a 1-bit message
over a distance of just a few metres, translating to a signing rate of roughly one bit
per eight years!
The implementation in Ref. [59] did not exactly recreate the theoretical model
analysed in Ref. [1]. Instead, a new security analysis was required and unfortunately
it did not prove information-theoretic security against all types of attack. Specifi-
cally, the implementation was not proven secure against coherent forging attempts.
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The security analysis contained in Ref. [1] depended heavily on the fact that Alice
sends single-photon states and it was not clear how one could modify the analysis
to cover the case of Alice sending coherent states. A further drawback of the im-
plementation was that due to the difficulty of implementing authenticated quantum
channels, they were not used in this experiment. Instead, the experiment made the
simplifying assumption that Eve does not in any way eavesdrop or tamper with the
states sent over the quantum channels to Bob and Charlie. Effectively, Eve (who for
the purposes of forging is either Bob or Charlie) is restricted to strategies where she
interacts only with the legitimate states received from Alice in step 3 of the distri-
bution stage. Of course, to claim that the implementation is fully unconditionally
secure these issues would need to be resolved.
2.4.4 Summary
The protocol presented in this section represents the culmination of research into
quantum USS schemes as of 2014. The protocol does not require quantum memory,
thereby removing issue (II) of the original Gottesman-Chuang scheme. Protocol 1
also partly alleviates drawback (I), as the theoretical model required only a source of
single-photon states, something that is achievable with current technology. In prac-
tice however, requiring a single-photon source would make the protocol extremely
inefficient and so the “public key” QuantSigm was instead implemented using a se-
quence of coherent states. Unfortunately, this compromise left a gap between theory
and experiment, and there was no longer a full security proof. Protocol 1 does not
address issues (III) - (VI).
Protocol 1 is also highly inefficient, and to reduce Eqs. (2.4), (2.6) and (2.7)
to be < 10−4 requires an extremely large signature length, L, and very large secret
shared key requirements between each pair of participants. More concretely, to
sign each and every 1-bit message over 1km recipients needed to share (pairwise)
approximately 1010 secret bits. In addition, the signature attached to each 1−bit
message would be 8 GB in size. This is wholly impractical, since to transmit a signed
1 MB message between just three participants over 1km would require attaching a
1 Petabyte signature!
2.5 Thesis goals
In light of the state of USS schemes and the discussions contained within this chapter,
we identify some clear research goals that will form the basis of this thesis.
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• We would like to find a scheme that is both experimentally implementable and
has a full proof of unconditional security. There are two possibilities: either
bring the experiment in line with the theory, or bring the theory in line with
the experiment. In Chapter 6 we do the latter; we present an unconditionally
secure error-tolerant quantum USS scheme that can be implemented using only
coherent states, and that does not rely on authenticated quantum channels or
additional trust assumptions. The resulting protocol fully addresses issues (I)
and (II). Chapter 7 goes one step further, and describes the first measurement-
device-independent quantum USS scheme, thereby removing common side-
channel attacks arising in real-world implementations.
• Continue to investigate what is possible with unconditional security in the
quantum setting, and where quantum mechanics may provide a benefit over
classical schemes. This question is addressed mainly in Chapter 8, where the
resource requirements and trust assumptions required in both classical and
quantum USS schemes are compared and considered in detail.
• Investigate the relationship between USS schemes and other cryptographic pro-
tocols such as oblivious transfer, Byzantine agreement and QKD. This is an
interesting open question with many possible avenues of research. In Chap-
ter 3 we outline the relationship of USS schemes to Byzantine agreement and
oblivious transfer. In Chapter 6 we consider the relationship between quantum
USS schemes and QKD, and find some interesting similarities and differences.
Finally, in Chapter 9 we investigate the potential application of imperfect
oblivious transfer to USS schemes.
• Increase the efficiency of USS schemes without making additional resource as-
sumptions. Specifically, we would like to decrease both the shared secret key
requirements and the length of the signature, while remaining within the stan-
dard resource model. Chapter 8 describes and analyses an N -party classical
USS scheme which is vastly more efficient than all previous USS schemes, both
in terms of signature size and secret shared key requirements. In terms of re-
source requirements, as well as falling within the standard resource model,
the secret shared key needed between participants scales similarly to message
authentication, meaning it is extremely cheap to implement compared to all
other USS schemes. Additionally, the scheme fully resolves drawbacks (I) -
(V) and can be considered practical.
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Chapter 3
Quantum cryptography
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter we introduce various concepts in quantum and classical cryptography
that will be useful for understanding the material presented in later chapters. Many
of the results we discuss emerged from the theoretical analysis of quantum key
distribution, and are therefore most naturally introduced in that context. As such,
we begin this chapter with a detailed look at QKD protocols. Nevertheless, the
analytic techniques developed are widely applicable and have been central to the
study of many other cryptographic protocols. One such example is the quantum
USS scheme presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis, whose security analysis partially
relies on two important and deep concepts in quantum information theory – the
data processing inequality and entropic uncertainty relations – both of which are
discussed here.
We also use this chapter to introduce classical authentication schemes providing
unconditional security. Though often overlooked, classical authentication is always
required for cryptographic protocols to be secure in the information-theoretic setting.
Authenticated communication is necessary to prevent powerful man-in-the-middle
attacks in which an adversary can intercept, modify or create information while
pretending to be a legitimate protocol participant. Authentication schemes, though
distinct from USS schemes, are closely related both in terms of their aims and their
construction. In Chapter 8 we modify authentication schemes to create a new and
highly efficient classical USS scheme using an almost strongly universal set of hash
functions. By design, almost strongly universal sets are well suited for use in one-
time USS schemes.
Lastly, we briefly introduce two concepts – oblivious transfer and Byzantine
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agreement – both of which seem closely related to signatures, though the relation-
ship has not been fully explored. Oblivious transfer is one of the most important
primitives in modern cryptography, with a variety of applications including secure
multiparty computation, oblivious sampling, e-voting and many more. The distribu-
tion stage of many USS schemes requires a sender to distribute partial information
out to many recipients, with security guarantees reminscent to those of oblivious
transfer. The potential application of oblivious transfer to USS schemes is consid-
ered. Byzantine agreement, also known as authenticated broadcast, is a problem
that often arises in the context of distributed computing and fault tolerance. The
aims of Byzantine agreement are similar to those of USS schemes, but there are
important differences which we highlight at the end of this chapter.
3.2 Notation
We describe a d-dimensional pure quantum state by a vector, |φ〉, in a d-dimensional
Hilbert space H. More generally, states can be described by density operators, ρ,
which are normalised (Tr(ρ) = 1) positive semi-definite Hermitian operators acting
on vectors inH. We denote the space of density matrices as D(H). In some cases, we
will refer to the space of sub-normalised (Tr(ρ) ≤ 1) positive semi-definite Hermitian
operators acting on vectors in H. We denote this space as D≤(H).
A measurement on a quantum system is described in general by a collection of
positive semi-definite Hermitian operators M = {Mx}x∈X which act on a Hilbert
space, and which sum to the identity operator on that Hilbert space, i.e.
∑
xMx =
1. A measurement M is called a POVM, while the individual operators Mx are
called the POVM elements. We denote the space of positive semi-definite Hermitian
operators acting on vectors in H as P(H). Note that D(H) ⊂ D≤(H) ⊂ P(H).
Often the scenarios we consider involve composite systems that have both a classical
and quantum element, and for this it is useful to define the notion of a classical-
quantum state.
Definition 3.1 (Classical-quantum states). A state ρXA is called a classical-quantum
state, or cq-state, if it has the form
ρXA =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxA, (3.1)
where {|x〉}x is an orthonormal basis and ρxA is a normalised density matrix for all
values of x.
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3.3 Quantum key distribution
A basic requirement of many unconditionally secure cryptographic protocols is that
two recipients share a secret key – i.e. they share a bit string that is kept secret
from everyone else. For encryption, Shannon proved that encrypting a message with
information-theoretic security requires a secret key that is at least as long as the
message being encrypted [7]. The one-time pad [32] is an example of an encryption
scheme providing information-theoretic security, as long as the key is kept secret.
As a result of Shannon’s theorem, sending messages with perfect secrecy requires a
large shared secret key.
Of course, for a scheme to provide information-theoretic security the encryption
key must be generated in an information-theoretically secure way. Classically this
is an impossible task; one cannot use purely classical means to generate shared
secret randomness with unconditional security. On the other hand, the inherent
randomness of quantum mechanics is a powerful cryptographic resource which allows
for protocols that accomplish previously impossible tasks, such as unconditionally
secure key distribution.
3.3.1 The protocol
QKD is a protocol run by two honest participants – Alice and Bob – to generate
a random and perfectly secret key known to each participant. For the purposes of
the security analysis, and since we are looking for unconditional security, we assume
there is an eavesdropper (Eve) who is completely unbounded, except for the physical
restraints imposed by quantum mechanics. We assume that Alice’s and Bob’s labs
are secure, but that Eve is free to operate everywhere else; specifically, this means
Eve cannot interfere with state preparation or measurement, but can interact with
anything transmitted between Alice and Bob. The goal of the eavesdropper is to
discover all or some of the secret key sent from Alice to Bob.
Prepare-and-measure BB84
A simple prepare-and-measure BB84 QKD protocol [10] can be described using
single-photons, with information encoded into one of two bases: theX basis {|+〉 , |−〉},
or the Z basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, where |±〉 = 1/√2(|0〉 ± |1〉). The protocol proceeds as
follows:
1. Alice selects a sequence of uniformly random bits x1, x2, . . . . This sequence is
Alice’s raw key.
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2. Alice encodes each bit into a quantum state using a basis chosen uniformly at
random, i.e. Alice encodes 0 as |0〉 or |+〉, and 1 as |1〉 or |−〉, depending on
her choice of basis.
3. Alice transmits the states over the quantum channel to Bob.
4. Bob measures each incoming state using a basis chosen uniformly at random,
either X or Z. The sequence of measurement outcomes forms Bob’s raw key.
5. Once all states have been measured, Alice and Bob each publicly announce
the bases they used for preparation/measurement. All outcomes arising from
states prepared and measured using different bases are discarded. The remain-
ing keys held by Alice and Bob are called the sifted keys.
6. Alice and Bob agree to sacrifice a subset of their sifted keys in order to estimate
the error rate between them. We call this procedure parameter estimation. If
the error rate is too high, the protocol is aborted.
7. Alice and Bob perform classical post-processing on their remaining sifted keys
to correct errors and enhance privacy.
Note that all classical communication is performed over authenticated (but not
secret) channels.
Entanglement-based BB84
From a security analysis perspective, the BB84 protocol above can be equivalently
described by a scheme in which maximally entangled states are distributed and
subsequently measured by each party [63]. These schemes are often referred to as
EPR schemes, or entanglement-based schemes, due to their similarity to the EPR
paradox [4].
In entanglement-based schemes, Alice prepares n copies of the two qubit state
∣∣Φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) = 1√
2
(|++〉+ |−−〉) , (3.2)
and sends the second qubit in each state to Bob. Once Bob has received all qubits
Alice uniformly at random selects a basis for each state, either X or Z, and publicly
announces her choice to Bob. They each measure the states using the publicly
chosen basis. The results of Alice’s measurements form a key, X, and the results of
Bob’s measurements form a key, X˜. These are the sifted keys, because they are the
keys held before the classical post-processing has taken place.
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The mathematical equivalence between this protocol and the prepare-and-measure
version of BB84 follows by noticing that Alice’s measurements on her states commute
with the transmission of Bob’s states over the quantum channel, and can therefore
be performed before transmission without altering security. The only remaining
difference is that, in the prepare-and-measure version of the protocol, Alice and
Bob must post-select only those states for which the correct basis was chosen (i.e.
they must perform basis reconciliation). For the theoretical analysis of QKD, it is
usual to work with the entanglement version of the protocol, while for experimental
implementations, the prepare-and-measure version is much more practical.
3.3.2 Security overview
Security follows from the monogamy of entanglement, together with the parameter
estimation procedure used to gauge the level of correlation between X and X˜. It
can be shown that |Φ+〉 is the only state for which Alice and Bob are guaranteed
to obtain perfectly correlated results when they measure in either the X or the Z
basis. Therefore, if they are able to ascertain that their results are always perfectly
correlated, they can deduce that, even after transmission, they must have shared the
state |Φ+〉. By the monogamy of entanglement, since |Φ+〉 is a maximally entangled
state it cannot be entangled with any other state. Therefore, Eve cannot have
any information on the generated key. Finite-size, noise tolerant versions of this
argument can also be shown to hold as long as X and X˜ are sufficiently correlated.
Classical post-processing
Real-world implementations of QKD inevitably involve errors in the preparation,
transmission and detection of states. This means Alice’s sifted key X will not equal
Bob’s sifted key X˜. As such, Alice and Bob perform a classical error correction
protocol on their sifted keys. The goal of error correction is for Alice to send a
minimal quantity of information, C, such that given X˜ and C, Bob can reconstruct
X exactly (with high probability) [64]. Following this, Alice and Bob each hold the
partially secret key X.
Channel imperfections leak information to the environment (Eve). Additionally,
the error correction protocol is performed over public classical channels, meaning the
extra information C is also available to Eve. The result is that X is only partially
secure, and the participants must perform additional post-processing to enhance
security.
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Privacy amplification is a form of randomness extraction. The goal is for Alice to
send information R to Bob so that both Alice and Bob can use X and R to generate
a shorter key Z. This is done in such a way that without knowledge of X (but
even with all other eavesdropped knowledge), the adversary has no information on
Z except with negligibly small probability [64]. For unconditional security against
quantum adversaries, privacy amplification is done via universal hashing (see Section
3.6.2).
Below we introduce various distance metrics and entropy measures which are
useful for examining the security and efficiency of error correction and privacy am-
plification.
3.3.3 The trace distance
In order to be able to say that QKD is unconditionally secure, we first need to define
in a rigorous way precisely what “unconditionally secure” means in this context.
To do this, we introduce a metric called the trace distance. This metric is used
extensively in quantum cryptography and quantum information theory.
Definition 3.2 (Trace distance). Let ρ, σ ∈ D(H) be two normalised density matri-
ces. The trace distance T (ρ, σ) is defined as half of the trace norm of the difference
of the two states, i.e.
T (ρ, σ) :=
1
2
||ρ− σ||1 = 1
2
Tr
[√
(ρ− σ)†(ρ− σ)
]
. (3.3)
This definition can also be extended to a metric on sub-normalised density ma-
trices, as in Ref. [65]. The trace distance is the quantum generalisation of the
Kolmogorov distance for classical probability distributions. A useful operational in-
terpretation of the trace distance is that it quantifies the maximum probability of
distinguishing between two states when using an optimal measurement. Specifically,
if one wants to distinguish between two states, ρ and σ, the optimal strategy for
doing so would have success probability 1
2
(1+T (ρ, σ)) [66]. The trace distance takes
values in the range [0, 1], with larger values meaning the states are more distinguish-
able. The trace distance is used to define the security of QKD.
Definition 3.3 (QKD security [67]). Suppose that the output of a QKD protocol
is ρZE, where Z is the classical key held by Alice and Bob, and HE is the Hilbert
space containing Eve’s potentially correlated information. The QKD protocol is
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called -secure if
T (ρZE, ρU ⊗ ρE) ≤ , (3.4)
where ρU :=
∑
z∈Z |z〉 〈z| is the maximally mixed state on the key space.
The meaning of this definition is that, except with probability , the protocol
outputs a state that is indistinguishable from a uniformly random key that is com-
pletely uncorrelated with Eve. In this case, Eve can do no better than to randomly
guess Z.
3.3.4 The purified distance
Another useful distance measure in quantum cryptography is the purified distance.
To define the purified distance, we first need to introduce the concept of fidelity.
Definition 3.4 (Fidelity). Let ρ, σ ∈ D(H) be two normalised density matrices.
The fidelity is defined via the trace norm as
F (ρ, σ) := ||√ρ√σ||1. (3.5)
Similarly to trace distance, the fidelity takes values in the range [0, 1], but now
larger values mean that the states are less distinguishable. The fidelity itself is
actually not a distance metric on the space of normalised states, but is closely
related to the trace distance according to the Fuchs-van de Graaf inequalities [68]
1− F (ρ, σ) ≤ T (ρ, σ) ≤
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2. (3.6)
The upper bound becomes an equality if the states are pure. The fidelity can be
used to define other useful distance metrics, one of which is the purified distance.
Definition 3.5 (Purified distance). Let ρ, σ ∈ D(H) be two normalised density
matrices. The purified distance is defined as
P (ρ, σ) :=
√
1− F (ρ, σ)2 = min
|φ〉,|ψ〉
T (|φ〉 , |ψ〉), (3.7)
where the minimisation in the second equality is taken over all purifications of ρ and
σ.
Note that the second equality in the above definition uses Uhlmann’s theorem to
express the fidelity as the maximum overlap of the purifications, and then the Fuchs-
van de Graaf inequality to replace the fidelity by the trace. The purified distance
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can be extended to a metric on the space of sub-normalised density matrices using
the concept of generalised fidelity [65]. This extension has established itself as an
extremely useful tool for proving important results in quantum information theory,
such as the duality of min- and max-entropies, and the related uncertainty relations
that we will see below. As long as one of the density matrices is normalised, the
form of the generalised purified distance stays the same as above.
3.4 Entropy
In this section we introduce various entropic measures that have proved particularly
useful in the study of many cryptographic protocols. Entropy is important because
it quantifies uncertainty, but there is no “one size fits all” measure. Rather, there is a
whole family of related entropic quantities, each of which is best suited to describing
different resources. The precise meaning of a particular entropic measure is often
unclear from the definition alone, and it is therefore always useful to provide an
operational interpretation of the measure defined.
3.4.1 The von Neumann entropy
One of the most well-known measures of entropy in a quantum system is the von
Neumann entropy.
Definition 3.6 (Von Neumann entropy). Let ρA ∈ D(HA) be a density matrix.
The von Neumann entropy of ρA is
H(A)ρ := −Tr[ρ log(ρ)]. (3.8)
Entropy defined in this way is equal to the Shannon entropy of the spectral
decomposition of the state. Specifically, if the spectral decomposition of ρ is
ρ =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x| , (3.9)
then the von Neumann entropy of ρ is equal to the Shannon entropy of a random
variable X distributed according to p(x). Therefore, in analogy to the Shannon
entropy, one can think of the von Neumann entropy as the expected information
gain upon receiving and measuring a state.
An alternative characterisation is provided by Schumacher’s noiseless coding the-
orem [69, 70], which is directly analogous to Shannon’s noiseless coding theorem for
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classical information. Suppose Alice chooses n states independently from the en-
semble E , and uses a quantum channel to transmit them to Bob. Suppose also
that
E =
{
{p(y1), |y1〉 〈y1|}, . . . , {p(yk), |yk〉 〈yk|}
}
, (3.10)
and that the states |yi〉 are not necessarily orthogonal. Note that, since Alice is
choosing many states independently from the same ensemble, we are in the realm
of asymptotic IID information theory. From Bob’s perspective, he receives σ⊗n =
σ ⊗ σ ⊗ · · · ⊗ σ, where
σ =
k∑
i=1
p(yi) |yi〉 〈yi| . (3.11)
Schumacher’s noiseless coding theorem states that, in the limit as n → ∞, if Alice
wants Bob to be able to decode all states perfectly, she must use the quantum
channel to transmit at least nH(σ) qubits. In other words, the ensemble contains
H(σ) incompressible qubits of information, since to transmit a single state in the
ensemble (so that it can be decoded without error) Alice must asymptotically send
an average of H(σ) qubits. In this way, just as the Shannon entropy gives rise to
the notion of an incompressible bit of information, the von Neumann entropy gives
rise to the notion of an incompressible qubit of quantum information.
3.4.2 The conditional quantum entropy
In analogy with the conditional Shannon entropy, the conditional quantum entropy
is defined as the difference between the entropy of a joint state and the entropy of
its reduced state.
Definition 3.7 (Conditional quantum entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB) and let
ρB ∈ D(HB) be the reduced density matrix of ρAB. The conditional quantum
entropy is defined as
H(A|B)ρ := H(AB)ρ −H(B)ρ. (3.12)
One must be careful when interpreting the conditional quantum entropy. The
definition suggests that it is the additional uncertainty contained in the joint system
over and above that contained in the reduced system, or the uncertainty in system
A given access to system B. However, a striking departure of quantum information
theory from classical information theory is that the conditional quantum information
can be negative, meaning this interpretation does not make sense in the quantum
setting1. Nevertheless, for cq-states the conditional quantum information is always
1Instead, the general operational interpretation of conditional quantum information is given by
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positive and the naive interpretation makes sense. Below we present three examples
of operational interpretations of the conditional quantum information for cq-states
in the asymptotic IID setting.
Private randomness extraction
Randomness extraction is closely related to the task of privacy amplification used in
QKD. Consider the asymptotic setting in which two honest parties, Alice and Bob,
share many IID copies of a classical random variable X, and an adversary holds
quantum side information E on each copy. Equivalently, suppose Alice, Bob and
Eve share many copies of the state
ρXE =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxE, (3.13)
where both Alice and Bob have access to the X system, and Eve has access to the
E system. The aim is for Alice to send a public message R to Bob such that, using
X and R, Alice and Bob can each compute a shorter key Z. The generated key
must contain uniform random bits that are uncorrelated with E. This problem was
considered in Ref. [72], and the maximum rate at which uniform random bits can
be extracted was found to be approximately H(X|E)ρ [73]. Intuitively, H(X|E)ρ is
therefore the amount of randomness in X that is independent to system E.
The classical-quantum Slepian Wolf problem
The classical-quantum Slepian Wolf (CQSW) problem was considered by Devetak
and Winter [74], and concerns classical data compression when the decoder has
access to quantum side information. Suppose Alice and Bob share n copies of a
cq-system Y B. Alice possesses full knowledge of the Y systems, so knows y1, . . . , yn,
but does not have access to the quantum B systems, which are locally described by
ρy1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρyn . Bob has access to the quantum B systems, but not the classical
Y systems. Alice aims to send Bob information at a minimal rate allowing him to
reconstruct the Y values.
In the case of asymptotically large n, Alice must send Bob information at a
rate of at least H(Y |B)ρ bits per copy for Bob to be able to perfectly reconstruct
the classical data y1, . . . , yn using only B and the information received from Alice.
Intuitively, Bob’s uncertainty on each Y system is therefore quantified as H(Y |B)ρ
the task of state merging [71]
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since, for Bob to know each Y with certainty, Alice must reduce his uncertainty on
each Y to zero, meaning she must send him at least H(Y |B)ρ bits of data per copy.
This result generalises the classical Slepian Wolf problem [75], which is relevant
to the classical protocol of error correction in QKD. Suppose the sifted keys held by
Alice and Bob are generated from n independent measurements on a state of the
form ρ⊗nAB. This assumption is commonly made in the analysis of (entanglement-
based) QKD protocols, and amounts to restricting the adversary to performing only
collective attack strategies. In QKD, a collective attack is one in which Eve interacts
identically and independently with each qubit sent over the quantum channel, so
that the state shared by Alice and Bob after transmission is in the product form
shown2. In this case, each of Alice’s and Bob’s n measurement outcomes can be
described by the random variables Y and Y˜ respectively. Alice’s sifted key X is the
concatenation of the n independent realisations of the random variable Y , and Bob’s
sifted key X˜ is the concatenation of the n independent realisations of the random
variable Y˜ . In the error correction phase, Alice sends Bob information to allow him
to deduce X using X˜. The CQSW theorem means that Alice must send Bob at
least nH(X|X˜) bits of information for error correction to be successful.
One-way secret key distillation
Consider the asymptotic IID setting in which three parties, Alice, Bob and Eve,
share many copies of the cqq-state
ρXBE =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxBE, (3.14)
where Alice holds system X, Bob holds system B and Eve holds system E. Again,
this scenario applies to QKD when the eavesdropper is restricted to collective attack
strategies. The Devetak-Winter bound [76] states that the rate at which Alice and
Bob can distill a uniformly random key using one-way communication, such that
the key is secret and independent to Eve, is at least
H(X|E)ρ −H(X|B)ρ. (3.15)
This is analogous to the Csiszár-K’´orner bound for the secrecy capacity of the mem-
oryless classical wiretap channel [77]. Intuitively, one can think of Alice extracting
randomness independent to Eve at a rate of H(X|E)ρ, as per the randomness ex-
2To deal with completely general attacks, also referred to as coherent attacks, one needs the
machinery of one-shot information theory which is introduced in the following sections.
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traction subsection, but having to reduce this rate by H(X|B)ρ to ensure Bob has
zero uncertainty on the generated key, as per the CQSW theorem.
3.4.3 One-shot quantum information theory
As can be seen from the sections above, the von Neumann entropy and the condi-
tional quantum entropy are useful for studying IID events in the asymptotic limit.
This is often a good approximation for communication protocols in which the sender
transmits many messages taken from the same ensemble, and when the channel is
approximately memoryless. For cryptography on the other hand, assuming that the
channel is memoryless is equivalent to assuming the adversary acts independently
on each state, which amounts to imposing a restriction on the adversary’s abili-
ties. Further, asymptotically large sample sizes are unrealisable in practice, and any
asymptotic analysis may gloss over finite-size effects that the adversary can exploit.
For practical cryptography in the unconditionally secure setting, channels are
used a finite number of times and cannot be assumed to be memoryless, since the
adversary has memory and can introduce arbitrary correlations between successive
states. Protocols in this setting are studied using the tools of one-shot information
theory, and for this the notions of min- and max-entropy have proved extremely
useful. The term “one-shot” is used to distinguish this setting from the asymptotic
IID setting. If n states are input into a channel with memory, one cannot treat
the inputs as separate events, and one must instead consider the whole process as a
single input into a larger channel.
Min-entropy
The min-entropy is the smallest Renyi entropy [78] and provides a lower bound on
the von Neumann entropy. The conditional min-entropy was first considered in the
quantum setting by Renner and Konig [67, 72] and has since been defined as follows.
Definition 3.8 (Conditional min-entropy [79]). Let ρAB ∈ D(HAB). The min-
entropy of A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
σ
sup{λ ∈ R : ρAB ≤ 2−λ1A ⊗ σB}
:= max
σ
Hmin(ρAB|σB),
(3.16)
where the maximisation is taken over all states σ ∈ D≤(HB). If the state ρAB is
obvious from the context, the subscript ρ on the min-entropy may be dropped.
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For finite dimensional Hilbert spaces, the min-entropy takes values in a closed
compact set, meaning the supremum value will always be attained and so can be
replaced by a maximisation. Although the conditional min-entropy seems difficult
to compute due to the maximisations involved in the definition, it is possible to
express the min-entropy as a semi-definite program (SDP), and so find its numerical
value efficiently.
Max-entropy
The max-entropy was originally defined by Renner in terms of the 0-order Renyi
entropy [67]. However, since then, the definition has been refined to one which is
more convenient by virtue of its direct duality with the min-entropy [80].
Definition 3.9 (Conditional max-entropy). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗HB) be a bipartite
density operator, and let ρABC be any purification. The max-entropy of A condi-
tioned on B is defined by
Hmax(A|B)ρ := −Hmin(A|C)ρ. (3.17)
Note that this definition is consistent because all purifications of ρAB onto system
C are related by a unitary transformation on C. Since Hmin(A|C)ρ is invariant under
local unitaries on C, the max-entropy is independent of the choice of purification.
Smooth min- and max-entropy
A useful feature of the von Neumann entropy is that it is continuous – if two states
are close according to the trace distance, then their entropies are also close. This
is a consequence of the Fannes–Audenaert inequality [81] and it has many useful
applications, such as proving converse theorems for quantum channel capacities [69].
The min- and max-entropies defined above have the undesirable property that small
changes in the state can cause large jumps in the entropy of the system. Often, we
are interested in scenarios and protocols that are only approximately correct, e.g.
with probability 1 − . In these cases, we may not be interested in the entropy of
the exact state, but rather, the entropy of states close to the exact state. As the
name suggests, the -smooth min/max-entropy “smooths” out the large variations in
the min/max-entropy by considering (respectively) the maximum/minimum entropy
over a ball of states -close to the original.
Definition 3.10 (Smooth min/max-entropy [79]). The -smooth min/max-entropy
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of A conditioned on B of the state ρAB is defined as
Hmin(A|B)ρ := max
ρAB
Hmin(A|B)ρ
Hmax(A|B)ρ := min
ρAB
Hmax(A|B)ρ
(3.18)
where the maximisation/minimisation is performed over all operators ρAB ∈ D≤(HA⊗
HB) that are -close to ρAB in terms of the purified distance, i.e. P (ρAB, ρAB) ≤ .
We will see that these smoothed quantities have useful operational interpreta-
tions in scenarios when only approximate correctness/security is required.
Min-entropy as a guessing probability
Expressing the min-entropy as an SDP provides a useful operational interpretation
on cq-states in terms of the optimal probability of guessing the value of the classical
system, given access only to the correlated quantum system [80]. Suppose Alice and
Bob share a single cq-state ρXB, with Alice holding the X system and Bob the B
system3. What is Bob’s optimal probability of guessing the value of X? For this
problem, it is helpful to express the min-entropy in a different but equivalent form
[79],
Hmin(X|B)ρ = − log min
σ
{Tr(σ) : σ ∈ P(HB) ∧ ρXB ≤ 1X ⊗ σB}. (3.19)
Expressed in this way, the minimisation corresponding to the quantity 2−Hmin(X|B)ρ
is in exactly the right form for evaluation via an SDP. The dual problem is [80]
max
EXB
{Tr(ρXBEXB) : TrX(EXB) = 1B}, (3.20)
where EXB ∈ P(HXB) and is classical on X. Slater’s theorem [82] can be used to
show strong duality, meaning the minimisation of the primal problem (Eq. (3.19)) is
equal to the maximisation of the dual problem (Eq. (3.20)). Therefore, to evaluate
2−Hmin(X|B)ρ it suffices to perform the maximisation in Eq. (3.20).
Notice that since EXB is non-negative and classical on X, we must have EXB =∑
x |x〉 〈x| ⊗ ExB, meaning
Tr(ρXBEXB) =
∑
x
p(x)Tr(ExBρ
x
B). (3.21)
3Notice the difference in this setting, in which there is only a single copy of the state available,
to the asymptotic IID setting, in which many copies of the same state are available.
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Lastly, since TrX(EXB) = 1B, the set {ExB}x must define a POVM on HB. Alto-
gether, Eq. (3.20) can be rewritten as
2−Hmin(X|B)ρ = max
{ExB}x
∑
x
p(x)Tr(ExBρ
x
B) := pguess(X|B)ρ. (3.22)
The middle term is exactly Bob’s probability of guessing X optimised over all pos-
sible measurements, hence the final equality. This interpretation will prove useful in
the context of quantum USS schemes, since the adversary’s goal is often to guess the
signature (a classical string) using her stored correlated quantum information. How-
ever, for signatures, Eve normally only needs to guess a string that is approximately
correct, so we modify these results in Chapter 6.
Private randomness extraction
Consider the scenario in which Alice and Bob have access to a single classical random
variableX, and Eve holds side information E. Again, Alice and Bob want to publicly
perform an operation on X to transform it into a shorter key Z, which is uniformly
random and secret except with probability . What is the maximum size of Z,
denoted Hext(X|E)ρ, that Alice and Bob are able to extract?
The optimal length of Z can be described in terms of the smooth min-entropy
when Eve’s information is either classical [64, 83] or quantum [67, 72]. In the case
of Eve holding quantum side information
Hext(X|E)ρ ≈ Hmin(X|E)ρ (3.23)
Similarly, the number of perfectly secret random bits that can be extracted is de-
scribed by the (non-smooth) min-entropy.
One-shot CQSW theorem
Suppose Alice and Bob share the cq-state ρXB or, equivalently, that Alice holds the
classical random variable X and Bob has access to quantum side information B.
Alice wants to compress X to the classical message C so that, with access to B and
C, Bob is able to perfectly reconstruct X except with probability . What is the
minimum length, denoted lenc(X|B)ρ, of C for which this is achievable? Bounds on
this length are given in terms of the smooth max-entropy as [84]
H
√
2
max(X|B)ρ ≤ lenc(X|B)ρ ≤ H1max(X|B)ρ + 2 log
1
2
+ 4, (3.24)
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where 1, 2 ≥ 0 such that  = 1 + 2. Similarly to the IID setting, this result is
very useful in the context of QKD error correction.
One-way secret key distillation
For QKD, consider the overall state held by Alice, Bob and Eve following the trans-
mission of the quantum states to Bob over the quantum channel. The state is the
cqq-state
ρXBE =
∑
x
p(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxBE, (3.25)
where Alice holds the X system, Bob holds the B system and Eve holds the E
system. What is the length, denoted lsecr(X;B|E)ρ, of the key that can be extracted,
such that the key is a uniformly random string that is uncorrelated with E, but
known to both Alice and Bob (with failure probability )? This corresponds to the
achievable key generation rate in QKD when the adversary is allowed to perform the
most general attacks allowed by quantum mechanics, i.e. coherent attacks. Upper
and lower bounds are given in terms of the smooth min- and max-entropy as4 [84]
l+
′
secr (X;B|E)ρ ≥ H
′
1
min(X|E)ρ −H1max(X|B)ρ − 4 log
1
2
− 3
lsecr(X;B|E)ρ ≤ H
√
2
min (X|E)ρ −H
√
2
max(X|B)ρ,
(3.26)
where  = 1 + 2 ≥ 0 and ′ = ′1 + 2 ≥ 0. The result can be intuitively understood
as Alice extracting randomness independent of Eve at a rate of H′min(X|E)ρ, as per
the private randomness extraction subsection, but having to reduce this rate by
Hmax(X|B)ρ to ensure Bob has zero uncertainty on the generated key, as per the
one-shot CQSW theorem.
3.4.4 Useful results
Equipped with the definitions above, we are able to present two fundamental and
widely applicable results that are used throughout quantum information theory. We
will use these results later to prove Theorem 6.1, a result which forms the backbone
of the security analysis of the quantum USS scheme presented in Chapter 6.
4This result can be improved via preprocessing performed by Alice on the X key. For simplicity
we have neglected that possibility.
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The data processing inequality
The data processing inequality (DPI) is an essential theorem in both classical and
quantum information theory. Intuitively, the quantum DPI states that it is impos-
sible to increase the information content of a state through local processing alone.
Various different forms of the DPI hold for different entropy measures, but it can
be generically stated as follows [69, 85].
Theorem 3.11 (Generic Data Processing Inequality). Let ρAB ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB)
and let E be a completely positive trace preserving (CPTP) map from B to B′. Set
τAB′ := E(ρAB). A generic entropy measure H satisfies the DPI if
H(A|B′)τ ≥ H(A|B)ρ. (3.27)
The DPI holds for the classical Shannon entropy, the von Neumann entropy and
the min- and max-entropies. Of particular importance to this thesis is the DPI for
the smooth min-entropy which, under the same conditions as above, states that
Hmin(A|B′)τ ≥ Hmin(A|B)ρ. (3.28)
Proof. Let λ = Hmin(A|B)ρ. By definition (c.f. (3.16) and (3.18)) there exists a
state ρ˜AB that is -close to ρAB (in terms of the generalised purified distance), and
a state σB ∈ D≤(HB), such that
ρ˜AB ≤ 2−λ1A ⊗ σB. (3.29)
Rearranging, we see that the operator 2−λ1A ⊗ σB − ρ˜AB is nonnegative. Since E is
a linear CPTP map, this implies
E
(
2−λ1A ⊗ σB − ρ˜AB
)
≥ 0, and so E(ρ˜AB) ≤ 2−λ1A ⊗ E(σB). (3.30)
Therefore, if we can show that (i) E(ρ˜AB) is -close to τAB′ and (ii) that E(σB) ∈
D≤(HB′) then by the definition of smooth min-entropy we will have shown that
Hmin(A|B′)τ ≥ λ, thus proving the DPI. The proof of (ii) follows immediately from
the fact that E is a CPTP map. To prove (i) we employ a useful property of the
generalised purified distance, namely, the monotonicity property [65] which states
that if two sub-normalised states are -close, then applying a CPTP map to each
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state can only decrease the distance between them. In our case
P (ρAB, ρ˜AB) ≤ ⇒ P (τAB′ , E(ρ˜AB)) ≤ . (3.31)
Entropic uncertainty relations
The uncertainty principle states that there is an unavoidable uncertainty in the
measurement outcomes of non-commuting observables. The standard Robertson
relation [3] expresses the uncertainty of the measurement outcomes of two observ-
ables, acting on a particular state, in terms of the standard deviation. The form of
this uncertainty relation is undesirable for two main reasons. First, the uncertainty
depends not only on the observables, but also on the particular state on which the
observables are measured. Often one wants to know the degree to which two ob-
servables are incompatible, without reference to any particular state. Second, the
standard deviation as a measure of uncertainty has no clear operational interpre-
tation, and so is less useful than quantifying uncertainty in terms of an entropic
quantity with a clear operational meaning [69, 79].
Entropic uncertainty relations remedy both of these issues. The first entropic un-
certainty relation was provided for the position and momentum observables in 1957
by Hirschman [86]. Later, in 1983 Deutsch highlighted the advantage of inequalities
that are state-independent, and provided the first general entropic uncertainty rela-
tion holding for any two non-degenerate observables [87]. Of particular importance
to this thesis is a generalisation of the entropic uncertainty relation proposed by
Deutsch to the smooth min- and max- entropy.
Consider any tripartite state ρABC ∈ D(HA ⊗ HB ⊗ HC) and any two POVMs,
X = {Mx}x and Z = {Nz}z, acting on system A. Following a measurement of A
with respect to X , define the reduced state of ρABC (tracing out system C) to be
ρXB :=
∑
x
|x〉 〈x| ⊗ τxB, where τxB = TrAC(MxρABC). (3.32)
Similarly, define ρZC as the reduced state of the system following a measurement of
Z on A, with system B traced out. Lastly, define
q := log
1
maxx,z ||
√
Mx
√
Nz||2∞
, (3.33)
where || . ||∞ is the spectral norm, or the Schatten ∞-norm, which in our case can
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be evaluated as the largest singular value of a matrix.
Theorem 3.12 ([88]). Let  ≥ 0, and let ρABC ,X ,Z, ρXB, ρZC and q be defined as
above. Then
Hmin(X|B)ρXB +Hmax(Z|C)ρZC ≥ q. (3.34)
This theorem quantifies the level of incompatibility of two measurements in terms
of the quantity q. It shows there is an unavoidable trade off to be made – an increase
in one’s ability to predict the outcome of measurement X is necessarily associated
with a decrease in one’s ability to predict the outcome of measurement Z, and vice
versa. Entropic uncertainty relations have become a powerful tool in many areas
of quantum cryptography and, for example, the above relation has been used to
provide a simple and elegant unconditional security proof for QKD [89]. Despite
this, entropic uncertainty relations are only understood in very limited settings and
many fascinating open questions remain [90].
3.5 Decoy state QKD
The QKD protocol described in Section 3.3.1 employs single-photon states to encode
and transmit information. Though convenient for the theoretical analysis, perfect
single-photon sources do not exist. Further, it can often be more convenient to use
coherent state sources due to the relative maturity of the technology when compared
to single-photon sources.
As such, phase-randomised coherent sources are widely used as an alternative
to single-photon sources. These sources emit light as a classical mixture of number
states [91]
e−|α|
2
∞∑
k=0
|α|2k
k!
|k〉 〈k| , (3.35)
where |α|2 is the mean photon number of the pulse. If the mean photon number is
chosen to be small, the majority of pulses will contain either 0 or 1 photon.
The exact number of photons in each pulse emitted by Alice’s source is not
directly observable by Alice or Bob. Nevertheless, when the pulse contains zero
photons neither Eve nor Bob receive any information. Conditioned on the pulse
containing exactly one photon, the state is exactly the single-photon state considered
by the normal theoretical analysis and so security is guaranteed. Problems arise
when the pulse contains more than one photon, in which case powerful photon
number splitting (PNS) attacks can be employed by Eve to gain full information on
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the state sent by Alice while causing no errors. Essentially, for a pulse containing
k > 1 photons, Eve can siphon off one of the photons and store it in a quantum
memory. She forwards all remaining photons and measures her stored state only
after the public basis announcements are made, thereby discovering the identity
of the state with certainty and causing zero additional disturbance. Even worse,
Eve can measure the number of photons contained in each pulse and selectively
suppress the single-photon states, thereby increasing the fraction of states reaching
Bob originating from multi-photon pulses. Since Eve can completely control the
channel losses, by decreasing the loss rates on multi-photon pulses she is able to
at least partially offset the additional losses caused by suppressing single-photon
pulses.
Despite this, protocols using phase-randomised coherent sources (and without
the decoy-state technique [92]) can still achieve unconditional security by reducing
the mean photon number of each pulse so that multi-photon events are rare. Worst-
case estimates can then be used to bound Eve’s potential information, even if Eve
performs the strategies outlined above (or any other strategy). The secret key rate
S, per pulse sent by Alice, can be expressed in terms of: Qα and Eα, the count rate
and quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the signal states, respectively; and Ω and
e1, the fraction and QBER of Bob’s detection events originating from single-photon
pulses, respectively. Ref. [93] finds
S ≥ Qα(−h(Eα) + Ω[ 1− h(e1) ]). (3.36)
Qα and Eα do not depend on the photon number and are easy to estimate directly
from the experimental data. Ω and e1 are harder to estimate, and the worst-case
estimates proposed in Ref. [93] were too conservative, leading to an unacceptably
large drop in the key generation rates.
To solve this problem, decoy-state QKD was proposed in order to find more
accurate estimates of Ω and e1. Let Yk be the conditional probability that Bob
detects a signal, given that a k-photon pulse is emitted by Alice. The count rate
can be expressed as
Qα = Y0e
−α + Y1e−αα + · · ·+ Yke−α(αk/k!) + . . . . (3.37)
Similarly, if we define ek to be the QBER arising from k-photon signal pulses, then
QαEα = Y0e
−αe0 + Y1e−ααe1 + · · ·+ Yke−α(αk/k!)en + . . . . (3.38)
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The essential insight of decoy-state QKD is that Yk and ek do not depend on the
intensity level of the pulses. Therefore, since Qα and Eα can be observed easily for
all values of α, the above two equations specify infinitely many linear equations in Yk
and ek. If Alice was to choose infinitely many different intensities to transmit, Alice
and Bob could accurately estimate Yk and ek for all values of k using the equations
above. If any of the estimated parameters are found to be significantly different to
those expected from the channel, the protocol is aborted. This additional testing
stage severely restricts the strategies available to Eve.
Looking back at Eq. (3.36), the only parameters we actually need to estimate
are e1 and Y1 (since it can be shown that Ω = Y1µe−µ/Qµ, where µ is the intensity
chosen for signal states). Therefore Alice does not need to choose infinitely many
different intensities. Instead, using a signal intensity and just two “decoy” intensities
allows us to find an accurate lower bound on Ω and an accurate upper bound on e1.
This means we are able to say with confidence that Eve has not suppressed more
than an insignificant number of single-photon states, and we also know Bob’s error
rate on single-photon pulses.
The experimental benefits of decoy-state QKD are enormous. It allows experi-
mentalists to use mature laser technologies as a light source, and to use signal pulses
with a relatively large mean photon number (α = O(1)) while still maintaining se-
curity.
3.6 Classical authentication
Man-in-the-middle attacks are powerful strategies in which the adversary intercepts
communications between two legitimate parties and resends an altered message pre-
tending that it originated with the legitimate sender. Without protection against
these attacks all cryptographic protocols, including QKD, would be insecure. Clas-
sical authentication schemes using message authentication codes (MACs) are one
way of eliminating this type of attack. A MAC is a two-party protocol used by
honest participants, Alice and Bob, to authenticate the contents of a message that
is sent. To authenticate the message, Alice appends a tag (the authentication code)
that depends on the contents of the message. Bob is able to check that the tag is
correct based on the contents of the message. To provide unconditional security,
MACs require the two legitimate communicating party’s (Alice and Bob) to share
a secret key. For this reason, quantum key distribution should more accurately be
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called quantum key expansion5.
MACs will be useful to us in Chapter 8 in which we use them to create a par-
ticularly efficient classical USS scheme. At first glance, MACs may seem similar
to signatures since they both aim to provide authentication of messages. How-
ever, there are significant differences in both the problem setting and the protocol
aims. The most obvious difference is in the setting: MACs, formally defined be-
low, are a two-party protocol in which both the sender and receiver are assumed
to be honest; USS schemes are an N ≥ 3 party protocol in which any participant
could be dishonest. Another difference is the protocol aims. As stated in Section
2.3.1, signatures aim to provide unforgeability, transferability and non-repudiation
of messages. Transferability is a requirement with no MAC analogue, since MACs
are a two-party protocol. As we shall see, even if one considers external parties,
MAC schemes are not designed to provide transferability since they are symmetric
key schemes. More concretely, both Alice and Bob have the ability to send authen-
ticated messages since both have full access to the secret key. Therefore, a message
can be authenticated as having originated from either Alice or Bob, but there is
no way of proving to an outsider exactly which party sent the message. This is
fine for the MAC setting, in which two honest parties want to authenticate mes-
sages between themselves only. For signatures on the other hand, where there are
N mutually distrustful participants, this would not be sufficient to provide either
unforgeability or non-repudiation, since all participants with access to the key could
produce “authenticated” messages, and MACs provide no mechanism to distinguish
exactly who sent the message.
3.6.1 Message authentication codes
To use a MAC, Alice and Bob must choose a secret key, k, in advance of their
communication. When Alice wants to send a message m, she computes a tag t from
the message and the secret key k. She sends (m, t) to Bob who, using m and k, is
able to verify whether t is the correct tag for the given message. Without access to
k, an adversary cannot find the correct tag for a different message m′, and so cannot
alter the message in an undetectable way.
Definition 3.13 (Message authentication codes [94]). A MAC is defined by three
algorithms (Gen, Mac, Ver) such that:
5Importantly, the secret key required for unconditionally secure authentication is small, and
QKD generates more secret key than it consumes meaning it is still a very useful protocol. In fact,
if we assume the existence of a small initial shared secret key (used to authenticate the classical
channels), QKD can be used to expand it arbitrarily.
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1. The key generation algorithm Gen takes the input security parameter and
outputs a uniform random key k ∈ K, where K is the key set.
2. The message authentication code generation algorithm Mac takes as input the
key k and a message m ∈M, and outputs the tag t ∈ T , whereM and T are
the message and tag set respectively.
3. The verification algorithm Ver takes as input the key k, a message m and a
tag t and outputs either 1 meaning valid or 0 meaning invalid.
Since it is always possible for the adversary to randomly guess the tag, the
highest security level we can hope to achieve is that the adversary cannot guess
a valid tag except with probability 1/|T |. This security level is achievable in the
information-theoretic security setting, but only if we restrict the number of messages
authenticated using the MAC. We consider the case of a one-time MAC, whereby
Alice and Bob use the scheme to authenticate only a single message.
Definition 3.14 (One-time MAC). A one-time MAC is -secure if, given access to
a message-tag pair of her choosing, (m, t), the adversary cannot output a message
tag pair, (m′, t′) with m 6= m′, such that
Verk(m′, t′) = 1, (3.39)
except with probability .
This definition means that, even when provided with a valid message-tag pair of
her choice, the adversary cannot substitute in a distinct message with a valid tag,
except with probability .
3.6.2 Strongly universal functions.
In this section we consider how to construct a MAC. To be secure, the MAC must
be such that knowledge of a single message-tag pair gives almost no information on
the tag of any distinct message, or, in other words, distinct message-tag pairs should
be essentially independent. Suppose Mac was simply a function chosen completely
at random from the set R = {f :M→ T }, i.e. Mac = fk(m), where the secret key
k is used as an index to specify which function is chosen from R. In this case, the
protocol would proceed as follows:
1. Alice and Bob would agree in advance on a secret key k, chosen uniformly at
random, specifying a function fk ∈ R.
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2. To communicate an authenticated message m, Alice sends (m, t), where t =
fk(m) is the message tag.
3. To verify the message, Bob checks that t = fk(m). Bob rejects the message if
t 6= fk(m).
A MAC generated in this way would clearly satisfy the tag independence property.
An adversary with no knowledge of k would gain no benefit from holding a valid pair
(m, t) when trying to generate the correct tag for m′ 6= m. In fact, even knowing
(m, t) for all values of m 6= m′ would not help the adversary to find the correct tag
for m′. The problem with this construction is that to specify a completely random
function requires a key exponentially larger than the message being authenticated
(there are 22n Boolean functions with input size n), meaning Alice and Bob would
need to share a key exponentially larger than the message being signed! Clearly,
this would be extremely impractical. For this purpose, we introduce the notion of a
strongly universal function.
Definition 3.15 (Strongly universal). A set of functions H = {h : M → T } is
strongly universal (SU) if for all distinct m,m′ ∈M and for all t, t′ ∈ T
|{h ∈ H : h(m) = t ∧ h(m′) = t′}| = |H||T |2 . (3.40)
The meaning of this definition is that, even after the adversary has seen a single
message-tag pair, the tag for any other message is uniformly distributed across T ,
and so the adversary can do no better than to randomly guess the tag for any
distinct message. In this case the scheme achieves the maximum security level of
1/|T |. In this sense, a function chosen at random from a SU set is indistinguishable
from a truly random function given only a single input/output pair, i.e. generating
the MAC using a function selected from a SU set provides the same security as
using a truly random function, given that the MAC is used to authenticate only
a single message. The benefit of using SU sets is that the key needed to specify a
function in the set is much smaller than the key needed to specify a truly random
function. Nevertheless, to specify a SU function still requires a number of bits
approximately equal to the size of the message being authenticated (see for example
the construction in [95]). Is it possible to do any better? Fortunately, the answer is
yes.
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3.6.3 Almost strongly universal functions
By relaxing the requirements of SU sets, we are able to find much smaller sets that
still approximate truly random functions when used only once.
Definition 3.16 (Almost strongly universal functions [96]). A set of functions H =
{h :M→ T } is -almost strongly universal (-ASU2) if for all distinct m,m′ ∈ M
and for all t, t′ ∈ T
1. |{h ∈ H : h(m) = t}| = |H|/|T |,
2. |{h ∈ H : h(m) = t ∧ h(m′) = t′}| ≤  |H||T | .
The meaning of this definition is that, after seeing a single message-tag pair, the
adversary gains almost no information on the identity of distinct message tags, and
so cannot do much better than to randomly guess the tag of a distinct message.
Note that the cost of increased efficiency (i.e. k being smaller) is that security is
no longer perfect. The probability of the adversary guessing a correct tag when
Mac uses an -ASU2 set is at most  ≥ 1/|T |. ASU2 sets were first introduced in
Ref. [31], in which the authors choose  = 2/|T | and propose an -ASU2 set built
from polynomials over finite fields. In this construction a key size of approximately
4 log |T | log log |M| is required to specify a function within the set, i.e. the key size is
approximately logarithmic in the bit size of the message being authenticated. Given
a single message-tag pair of her choice, the adversary is only able to guess the tag of
a distinct message with probability  = 2/|T |. Therefore, just as before, the protocol
can be made arbitrarily secure by increasing the length of the tag. Since the original
Wegman-Carter construction, many other -ASU2 sets have been proposed [96–100],
each tailored to provide different benefits depending on the desired application6.
Application to signatures
In Chapter 8 we modify the generic MAC protocol using -ASU2 functions to make
it suitable for use in the USS setting. Essentially, for the case of a single sender
and many possible recipients, we provide each sender-recipient pair with multiple
keys specifying independently chosen functions from an -ASU2 set. Each recipient
distributes a selection of his keys to all other recipients in a manner similar to the
secret sharing scheme introduced by Chaum, Crépeau and Damgard [101]. This dis-
tribution effectively breaks the sender/receiver symmetry and provides all recipients
6For example, different constructions place different levels of importance on features such as
key length, tag length, ease of computability, etc.
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with partial information on the overall key held by the sender – enough to verify the
tags (the signature), but not enough to reproduce them. In this way, we are able to
maintain the efficiency of unconditionally secure MACs while also guaranteeing the
unforgeability and transferability of messages. Full details are provided in Chapter
8.
3.7 Oblivious transfer
Oblivious transfer (OT) is one of the most important and well known primitives in
modern cryptography. Its prominence stems from the fact that it can be used as the
foundation for all secure two-party computations – with OT, all secure two-party
computations are possible [102, 103]. OT comes in many different flavours, but in
this thesis we consider only information-theoretically secure stand-alone protocols
for 1-out-of-2 OT (1-2 OT). Formal definitions of 1-2 OT are provided in Chapter
9.
Informally, 1-2 OT is a two-party protocol in which there is a sender who aims
to provide a receiver with exactly one out of two possible messages, such that the
receiver chooses which message to receive. In other words, Alice inputs two bits,
x0 and x1, and Bob inputs a single bit, b. The protocol outputs xb to Bob with
the guarantees that Alice does not know b, and that Bob does not know x1−b. A
dishonest Alice aims to find the value of b, and her optimal probability of doing so
is denoted AOT . A dishonest Bob aims to correctly guess both x0 and x1, and his
optimal probability of doing so is BOT . Ideal 1-2 OT, in which AOT = BOT = 1/2,
is known to be impossible in the information-theoretic setting [104, 105].
OTAlice Bob
x0
x1
b
xb
Figure 3.1: 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. Alice has two inputs, x0 and x1, and receives no outputs.
Bob has one input, b, and receives one output xb.
Relation to signatures
Oblivious transfer is a two-party protocol performed between mutually distrustful
participants. It is therefore fundamentally different to USS schemes which always
contain N ≥ 3 participants. However, the distribution stage of USS schemes is often
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reminiscent of OT. For example, consider the distribution stage of the three-party
USS scheme P2 described in Ref. [1]. It proceeds as follows:
Distribution Stage V1
1: For each possible future message m = 0 and 1, Alice selects two n-bit keys, AmB
and AmC .
2: She uses a secret channel to send AmB to Bob and AmC to Charlie.
3: Bob splits his key into two equally sized sets, Bm1 and Bm2 , and sends Bm2 to
Charlie using a secret channel. Similarly, Charlie creates Cm1 and Cm2 , and
forwards Cm2 to Bob.
To sign message m Alice’s signature is the 2n-bit string formed from the con-
catenation of AmB and AmC . If Alice sends the message to, say, Bob, he checks her
signature against both Bm1 and Cm2 independently, and records the number of mis-
matches. The message is accepted if both sets contain fewer than a threshold rate
(sa) of mismatches with Alice’s signature. To forward the message, Bob forwards to
Charlie exactly what he received from Alice. Charlie checks the message similarly
to Bob, but uses Cm1 and Bm2 and the verification threshold sv > sa. The protocol
is secure for two reasons.
1. Security against forging. Bob cannot learn the bit values in Cm1 , which means
he is unable to produce a valid signature.
2. Security against repudiation and transferability. For each position in Alice’s
signature, she is completely unaware whether Bob (or Charlie) will be checking
that bit, i.e. each bit of her signature has a probability of 1/2 of being checked
by Bob and a probability of 1/2 of being checked by Charlie. This means Alice
cannot bias a signature to contain more errors for Bob than for Charlie (or
vice versa).
These security guarantees are very similar to those required by 1-2 OT – namely,
Bob cannot discover all of Alice’s inputs (i.e. AmB and AmC ) and Alice cannot discover
any of Bob’s inputs (i.e. the index positions of Bm1 and Cm2 ). To make the connection
more explicit, suppose the participants had access to a black-box implementation
of (possibly imperfect) 1-2 OT with cheating parameters AOT and BOT . Then the
distribution stage of P2 might proceed as stated below (note that the protocol below
is not meant as a full signature protocol, and serves only to highlight how imperfect
OT might be applied to signatures. A rigorous security analysis of a fully stated
scheme would be necessary before it could be claimed secure).
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Distribution Stage V2 Sketch
1: For each possible future message m = 0 and 1, Alice selects two n-bit keys, AmB
and AmC .
2: Bob and Charlie both uniformly at random select the n-bit strings B and C,
respectively.
3: For each i = 1, . . . , n, Alice and Bob use the black-box implementation of 1-2
OT. Alice’s inputs are the i’th bits of AmB and AmC and Bob’s input is the i’th
bit of B. Alice and Charlie do the same, except Charlie uses C to specify his
inputs.
4: Bob and Charlie sacrifice a small portion of their outputs to ensure Alice’s inputs
are the same for each of them.
A protocol of this form would remove the need for the exchange process between
Bob and Charlie seen in Step 3 of the distribution stage V1. The security guarantees
of the black-box 1-2 OT imply that Bob can guess at most a fraction BOT of Alice’s
inputs. As long as BOT < 1, Bob cannot perfectly reproduce Alice’s signature and
so the protocol should be secure against forging.
On Alice’s side, the protocol ensures that she can only correctly guess a fraction
AOT of the indices in B and C. This is more problematic, since the gap between the
authentication and verification thresholds (sa and sv) is often small. By guessing the
indices held by each participant, Alice can bias the expected error rate so that one
participant has an expected error rate AOT −1/2 higher than the other7. As such, if
imperfect OT schemes are to be used in constructing USS schemes, then the security
guarantees on the sender (Alice) must be stricter than the security guarantees on
the receiver.
Direct vs indirect 1-2 OT
It is not surprising that USS schemes can be created using 1-2 OT, since 1-2 OT
can be used to perform any secure multiparty computation. However, as stated
above, perfect 1-2 OT is known to be impossible in the information-theoretic setting.
Precisely what security parameters are attainable for imperfect protocols remains
an interesting open question (which we consider in depth in Chapter 9), but it is
known that [106]
max{AOT , BOT} ≥ 2/3. (3.41)
The distribution stage V1 can be thought of as allowing Alice and Bob (and Alice
and Charlie) to effectively perform an imperfect version of OT in which AOT = 1/2
7For example, if AOT = 1, Alice knows exactly which bits were selected by Bob and Charlie.
Therefore, for the cases when Bob selected a different bit to Charlie (which happens with probability
1/2), Alice can ensure that her signature matches Bob’s chosen bit, but not Charlie’s. In this way,
if Bob sees an error rate of eB , then Charlie will see an error rate of 1/2 + eB .
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(since Alice has no information on which bits Bob kept) and BOT = 3/4 (since Bob
learns 3/4 of Alice’s bit values). However, there are also results (again contained in
Ref. [106]) which show that these cheating parameters are impossible to achieve for
1-2 OT in the standard information-theoretic setting. The reason that Alice and Bob
are able to beat the known impossibility bounds is that they use an untrusted third
party (Charlie) as an additional resource, over and above the resources normally
available in the two-party information-theoretic setting. In other words, in the
distribution stage V1, Alice and Bob can be thought of as performing OT indirectly
using Charlie as a facilitator.
Nevertheless, the use of Charlie as an additional resource has one main disad-
vantage: it requires a high level of recipient-recipient interaction. Especially for USS
schemes with larger numbers of protocol participants, the additional pairwise inter-
actions required to facilitate this indirect form of OT between each sender-recipient
pair become onerous and reduce the viability of the protocol. Accordingly, it might
instead be desirable to perform direct OT, as in the distribution stage V2. In these
schemes, it may be possible for the majority of communications to take place only
between the sender and each receiver. The attainable cheating probabilities AOT
and BOT will be worse than for indirect OT schemes, but may still be sufficient to
construct a secure USS scheme.
In Chapter 9 we explore direct implementations of imperfect 1-2 OT, and derive
new bounds on the attainable cheating probabilities in the standard information-
theoretic setting. Our results have the advantage of parametrising AOT and BOT in
terms of a single variable, thereby allowing us to derive bounds on BOT when AOT
is kept close to 1/2, as seems necessary for USS schemes.
3.8 Byzantine agreement
Byzantine agreement is a problem that has found many applications in fault-tolerant
distributed computing systems. Its name is derived from an analogy with a Byzan-
tine army laying siege to a city [54]. The army contains multiple detachments: one
led by the commanding general (the sender), and all others led by subordinate gen-
erals (the recipients). The commanding general is supposed to coordinate his army
and give an order of either “attack” or “retreat”. Importantly, any number of the gen-
erals, including the commanding general, could in fact be traitors (dishonest). The
generals can only communicate pairwise via messenger (the messengers are always
honest), and they want to devise a system such that:
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1. All loyal generals agree on a common plan of action.
2. If the commanding general is loyal, then all loyal generals agree on the com-
manding general’s plan.
For computing applications, the commanding general corresponds to a single node
transmitting a message, and the subordinate generals are simply the other nodes
contained in the network. Finding a protocol which satisfies the above two points
would mean that, for distributed computing applications, correct nodes would be
able to work together coherently even in the presence of faulty nodes. More precisely,
Byzantine agreement is defined as follows.
Definition 3.17 (Byzantine agreement [107]). Byzantine agreement is a protocol
with a sender and N receivers such that any number of the participants can be
dishonest. The sender chooses an input value x ∈ {0, 1} and the receivers must
decide on an output value. The protocol should ensure that all honest receivers
agree on the same output value y ∈ {0, 1}. Additionally, if the sender is honest, the
protocol should ensure that y = x.
In the standard setting, all participants are connected pairwise via authenticated
classical channels. As can be seen from the definition above, a more descriptive
name for the Byzantine agreement problem is authenticated broadcast. Authenti-
cated broadcast resembles USS schemes in many ways: both protocols aim to send
messages that honest participants will accept and agree on; both are multiparty pro-
tocols containing an adversary who works within the scheme; and neither scheme
aims for secrecy. The similarities are such that if participants are all able to sign
messages with unconditionally security, then a scheme for authenticated broadcast
exists no matter how many participants are dishonest [54], i.e.
Ability to sign messages⇒ Authenticated broadcast. (3.42)
However, there are differences between USS schemes and authenticated broadcast,
with the two main ones being:
1. In authenticated broadcast all recipients interact to agree on the validity of
a message. For USS schemes on the other hand, the sender sends a message
only to a single recipient, who can non-interactively check the validity of the
contents and be guaranteed to be able to transfer the message a finite number
of times. Transferability does not make sense in the context of broadcast.
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2. Authenticated broadcast does not allow participants to abort the protocol,
whereas abort is a valid option in USS schemes.
These differences are significant, and lead to different impossibility results in the
two schemes. For example, authenticated broadcast between three participants is
impossible to achieve unless all participants are honest. More generally, authenti-
cated broadcast is impossible unless t < 1/3 of the participants are dishonest [54].
On the other hand, USS schemes are possible between three participants even in the
presence of a single dishonest participant. Immediately then, we see that there are
settings in which USS schemes are possible yet authenticated broadcast is not. At
first glance, this statement seems to contradict (3.42). The reason there is in fact
no contradiction is that USS schemes allow an abort option, whereas authenticated
broadcast does not. Therefore, although an USS may exist, this only implies that
participants can either sign a message with unconditional security, or about the
protocol. Nevertheless, the existence of a USS scheme does allow for a very similar
version of broadcast, known as detectable broadcast.
Definition 3.18 (Detectable broadcast [107]). Detectable broadcast is a protocol
with a sender and N receivers such that any number of the participants can be
dishonest. The sender chooses an input value x ∈ {0, 1} and the receivers must
decide on an output value or abort the protocol. If all participants are honest, the
protocol should achieve authenticated broadcast. Otherwise, the protocol should
either achieve authenticated broadcast or have all honest players abort.
Detectable broadcast, though weaker than authenticated broadcast, is still pow-
erful enough for many applications. Importantly, the existence of a USS scheme
allows participants to perform detectable broadcast, i.e.
USS schemes⇒ Detectable broadcast. (3.43)
The converse implication does not hold in general8.
In this subsection we introduced Byzantine agreement (authenticated broadcast)
and discussed its relevance to USS schemes. We found that USS schemes are more
closely related to a slightly weaker notion of broadcast, namely, detectable broadcast,
which allows participants the option of aborting if necessary. The existence of a
USS scheme implies the ability for the participants to perform detectable broadcast,
8For example, if 2N participants are connected by a detecable broadcast channel, and N + 1
participants are dishonest, they can always cheat in the protocol simply by forcing the majority
vote dispute resolution process.
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but not authenticated broadcast. Since authenticated broadcast is an expensive
resource, and stronger than detectable broadcast, in this thesis we have avoided
USS schemes which assume authenticated broadcast as a resource, such as those
presented in Refs. [37, 39].
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Chapter 4
USS security framework
4.1 Introduction
In Chapter 2 we introduced and motivated the concept of USS schemes. Our defi-
nitions were colloquial and aimed to provide an insight into the spirit of signatures
rather than set out their formal requirements. Nevertheless, rigorous security def-
initions are essential to modern cryptography, and are a basic requirement for the
study of any cryptographic protocol [94]. Their use facilitates a more logical research
strategy and helps to distill the true goals of a scheme. This structured approach
also helps to evaluate and compare different schemes, stripping away superfluous
or unnecessary features. The definitions stated in this chapter are taken from the
quantum USS security framework proposed by Arrazola et. al in Ref. [34], which
generalises the security model existing for classical USS schemes proposed in Ref.
[33].
4.2 USS schemes
To specify a security model, we must first define what an USS scheme is and the
core elements it should contain.
Definition 4.1 (Unconditionally Secure Signature Scheme). An USS scheme Q is
an ordered set {P ,M,Σ, L, Gen, Sign, Ver} where
• The set P = {P0, P1, ..., PN}, is the set containing the signer, P0, and the N
potential receivers.
• M is the set of possible messages.
• Σ is the set of possible signatures.
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• Gen is the generation algorithm that gives rise to the functions Sign and Ver,
used respectively to generate a signature and verify its validity. More precisely,
the generation algorithm specifies the instructions for the communication that
takes place in the distribution stage of the protocol. Based on the data ob-
tained during the distribution stage, the generation algorithm instructs how
to construct the functions Sign and Ver. The generation algorithm includes
the option of outputting an instruction to abort the protocol.
• Sign: M → Σ is a deterministic function that takes a message m ∈ M and
outputs a signature σ ∈ Σ.
• L = {−1, 0, 1, ..., lmax} is the set of possible verification levels of a signed
message. A verification level l corresponds to the minimum number of times
that a signed message can be transferred sequentially to other recipients. For
a given protocol, the maximum number of sequential transfers that can be
guaranteed is denoted by lmax ≤ N .
• Ver:M× Σ × P × L → {True,False} is a deterministic function that takes a
message m, a signature σ, a participant Pi and a level l, and gives a boolean
value depending on whether participant Pi accepts the signature as valid at
the verification level l.
Notation 4.2. For a fixed participant, Pi, at a fixed verification level, l, we denote
the verification function as Veri,l(m,σ) := Ver(m,σ, i, l).
Notation 4.3. A signature σ on a message m is called i-acceptable if Veri,0(m,σ) =
True, i.e. (m,σ) is i-acceptable if participant Pi will accept (m,σ) as a valid message-
signature pair at the lowest verification level, l = 0.
Although the signing and verification algorithms are deterministic functions, the
generation algorithm (which creates them) must include randomness for the protocol
to be secure. The inclusion of randomness means that an adversary will not have a
full specification of the signing and verification algorithms held by each recipient, a
fact that is crucial for preventing dishonesty. The randomness could be generated
in a variety of ways. For example, in many quantum USS schemes it is generated
via the inherent randomness of quantum measurement outcomes.
Correctness
The definition above describes the core elements that must be present in any USS
scheme. However, it does not provide any information on what these elements are
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supposed to achieve. An integral part of the definition of USS schemes is the speci-
fication of the functionality that an USS scheme must possess. A scheme providing
this functionality is said to be working correctly.
Definition 4.4 (Correctness of USS schemes). An USS protocol Q is correct if
Veri,l(m, Sign(m)) = True for all m ∈M, i ∈ {1, ..., N}, and l ∈ L.
Definition 4.5 (-correct). An USS protocol is called -correct if it is correct except
with probability .
These definitions formalise the intuitive notion of what an USS scheme is – a
correct USS scheme is one in which the signing algorithm produces signatures that
will be accepted by the verification algorithms. As such, in the absence of errors,
all signatures created by the signing algorithm of a correct USS scheme will be
accepted as valid by all verification algorithms. Of course, in reality not all protocol
participants may be honest. Therefore, as well as correctness, USS schemes must
also be secure. Security definitions are provided in Section 4.4 after we have formally
introduced the process of dispute resolution.
Verification levels
We also briefly discuss the notion of verification levels since they have no analogue
in public-key digital signature schemes and are perhaps confusing. Intuitively, if
a signature is found to be valid, then all participants should agree on its validity.
This is the case for all real-world signature schemes with the “universal verifiabil-
ity” property, but unfortunately this is not possible when one wants unconditional
security in the standard resource model. Instead, the best that can be done is to
provide guarantees on how many times a message can be forwarded in sequence and
accepted as valid1. Nevertheless, this is sufficient for many applications.
As a standard example consider a protocol involving a signer, Alice, a receiver,
Bob, his local bank branch, and the bank’s headquarters. Upon receiving a cheque
from Alice, Bob wants to deposit the cheque into his bank account. However, his
local branch will only credit Bob’s account once the cheque has also been accepted
by their headquarters. Therefore, for the cheque to be useful to Bob it must be
sequentially transferable at least twice (i.e. from Bob to his local branch and from
the local branch to the headquarters).
1As we shall see, even if the message is only guaranteed to be transferable l times, it is still
possible that it can be securely transferred many more than l times. Indeed, if participants are
honest, it is likely that the message will actually be able to be transferred N times, but there are
no a priori guarantees that the message is N -transferable. As such, from an efficiency point of
view finite transferability is not necessarily a limiting factor.
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Definition 4.6 (l-transferable). A signature σ on a message m is l-transferable if
Ver(i,l)(m,σ) = True for all i ∈ {1, . . . , N} and there exists j such that Ver(j,l+1)(m,σ) =
False. For l = lmax, the function Ver(j,lmax+1)(m,σ) is not defined and we assume by
convention that it is always False.
In other words, a message is l-transferable if l is the highest level at which all
participants would accept the message.
Accepting a message-signature pair at a higher transferability level corresponds
to accepting with a higher degree of certainty. By definition, the verification algo-
rithms become more strict as l increases – specifically, for each verifier,
Ver(i,l)(m,σ) = True ⇒ Ver(i,l′)(m,σ) = True for all l′ ≤ l. (4.1)
This must be the case since, if a message is guaranteed to be transferable l times in
sequence, it is also guaranteed to be transferable l′ times in sequence.
Accepting a message at level l is supposed to provide a guarantee that all other
participants would accept the forwarded message at the less strict level l − 1. In
practice, the receiver of the forwarded message may also be able to accept the
message at the higher level l, but this is not guaranteed. Thus, the message can
be forwarded at least l times before level 0 is reached, at which point the message
authenticity can be verified but not transferred. The l = −1 verification level is
necessary for the dispute resolution process discussed below. In short, a level below
l = 0 is necessary so that, if a message is accepted at level 0 and subsequently
a dispute arises, the participants still have a method of collectively deciding the
validity of the message.
4.3 Dispute Resolution
For most USS schemes there is no trusted authority. When deciding the validity
of a signature, honest participants use the verification algorithm assigned to them
by the generation algorithm. In general, since the generation algorithm contains
randomness unique to each user, the verification algorithms are also unique to each
user. In principle this could be exploited by dishonest coalitions whose aim is to
cause two recipients to disagree as to the validity of a message. Even simpler than
this, suppose a member of a dishonest coalition decided to reject a forwarded signed
message, despite the fact that his true verification algorithm (if it were used) would
show the message as valid. Since there is no impartial authority to appeal to, if such
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a clash arises how does one decide whether the message is valid?
This question is important in the context of repudiation attempts by Alice.
Suppose Bob accepts a message from Alice at a level l = 0. This means Bob is
convinced the message indeed came from Alice, but that he may not be able to
transfer the message to others. Nevertheless, since Bob is convinced, he may accept
the message and act on it regardless of the fact that it cannot be transferred2. For
illustration, consider the scenario that Alice is a software developer who sends Bob
a digitally signed software update. Bob has no need to transfer this message, and
as long as he is convinced of the sender he will trust and install it. If the package is
later found to contain malware and Alice decides to repudiate having sent it, how
does one decide who is telling the truth, especially since Bob has no guarantees that
he can transfer the message?
This dilemma is solved by incorporating a procedure called dispute resolution
into the USS scheme. Dispute resolution should be thought of as an expensive last
resort akin to taking someone to court. It does not happen in the ordinary run of a
protocol, but is present as a safety net to ensure honest participants can prove they
acted properly. It is expected that even dishonest participants would be discouraged
from pursuing this route, since forcing the expensive dispute resolution process would
come with consequences, and the procedure ensures that honest participants prevail
so long as they are in the majority.
Definition 4.7 (Dispute resolution). A dispute resolution method DR for a USS
scheme Q is a procedure invoked whenever there is a disagreement on whether a
signature σ on a message m is valid. The participant invoking the dispute resolution
can be anyone, including the signer P0. The procedure consists of an algorithm DR
that takes as input a message-signature pair (m,σ) and outputs a value {Valid,
Invalid} together with the rules:
1. If DR(m,σ) outputs Valid, then all users must accept (m,σ) as valid.
2. If DR(m,σ) outputs Invalid, then all users must reject (m,σ).
This definition provides a blueprint for the functionality of dispute resolution,
but gives no indication of how the DR algorithm could be constructed. Depending
on the resources available there are many possibilities of how to construct DR. In
the absence of a trusted authority, in this thesis the dispute resolution method
used is always majority vote. Simply put, all participants use their own verification
2In the real world, signatures are most often used in this way – they are used as an authentication
scheme, with transferability being a secondary (but still important) functionality.
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algorithm at a level l = −1 to test if the signature was valid or not. They vote
according to the outcome of their test and the majority outcome wins.
Definition 4.8 (Majority Vote). When the validity of a message-signature pair
(m,σ) is in dispute, we invoke a majority vote dispute resolution method MV(m,σ),
defined by the following rules:
1. MV(m,σ) = Valid if Ver(i,−1)(m,σ) = True for more than half of the users.
2. MV(m,σ) = Invalid otherwise.
The l = −1 verification level is reserved for dispute resolution alone. There is
nothing particularly special about this level; it is simply there to ensure the existence
of a verification level lower than those used for normal runs of the protocol. As we
have seen, the lower the verification level, the more lenient the verification algorithm.
Therefore, even if a message is considered to be authentic but not transferable (i.e.
accepted at level 0), by reserving an even lower verification level the protocol still
guarantees that an honest participant can prove the message received was authentic.
4.4 Security
As discussed previously in Section 2.3.1, USS schemes must be secure against forg-
ing, non-transferability and repudiation. The adversary is not limited to being
a single participant, but can instead be any coalition of participants. However,
the signer must not be included in the coalition for the notion of forging to make
sense, and must be included in the coalition for the notions of repudiation and non-
transferability to make sense. Formally, the threats to USS schemes are defined as
follows.
Definition 4.9 (Forging). Let Q be an USS protocol and let C ⊂ P be a coalition
of malevolent parties that does not include the signer P0. Suppose that the coalition
holds any valid message-signature pair (m,σ) and can use this to output a message-
signature pair (m′, σ′) with m′ 6= m. We define Forging to be the function
ForgC(Q,m′, σ′) =
1 if (m
′, σ′) is i-acceptable for some Pi /∈ C
0 otherwise.
(4.2)
The protocol Q is -secure against forging attempts if
sup
{
P(ForgC(Q,m′, σ′) = 1)
}
≤ , (4.3)
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where the supremum is taken over all possible coalitions and strategies.
The meaning of this definition is that, given access to a single valid message-
signature pair, the coalition succeeds in forging (i.e. ForgC(Q,m′, σ′) = 1) if they
are able to produce a message-signature pair that will be accepted by any honest
recipient not part of the coalition. This definition captures the common notion of
a forgery in the sense that the coalition, which does not contain the designated
sender P0, is successful if they are able to convince any third party that a message
originated with P0.
Definition 4.10 (Non-Transferability). Let Q be an USS protocol and C ⊂ P
a coalition of malevolent participants that includes the signer P0. Suppose that
C outputs a message-signature pair (m,σ) and a verification level l. We define
Non-Transferability to be the function
NonTransC(Q,m, σ, l) =

1 if Ver(i,l)(m,σ) = True for some Pi /∈ C and
Ver(j,l′)(m,σ) = False for some 0 ≤ l′ < l
and some j 6= i, Pj /∈ C,
0 otherwise.
(4.4)
The protocol Q is -secure against non-transferability if
sup
{
P(NonTransC(Q,m, σ, l) = 1)
}
≤ , (4.5)
where the supremum is taken over all possible coalitions and strategies.
The meaning of this definition is that the coalition succeeds in breaking trans-
ferability of the scheme (i.e. NonTransC(Q,m, σ, l) = 1) if, for any two honest
recipients not part of the coalition, they are able to produce a message-signature
pair that will be accepted by one of the recipients at some level l, and rejected by
the other recipient at the strictly lower level l′. This definition intuitively captures
what it means for transferability to be broken in the scheme – the coalition, which
includes the sender P0, is successful if they are able to make an honest recipient
believe a message is transferable l times when in fact it is not.
Definition 4.11 (Repudiation). Let Q be an USS protocol and C ⊂ P a coalition
of malevolent participants that includes the signer P0. Suppose that C outputs a
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message-signature pair (m,σ). We define Repudiation to be the function:
RepC(Q,MV,m, σ) =

1 if (m,σ) is i-acceptable for some Pi /∈ C and
MV(m,σ) = Invalid
0 otherwise
(4.6)
The protocol Q is -secure against repudiation attempts if
sup
{
P(RepC(Q,MV,m, σ) = 1)
}
≤ , (4.7)
where the supremum is taken over all possible coalitions and strategies.
The meaning of this definition is that the coalition succeeds in repudiating (i.e.
RepC(Q,MV,m, σ) = 1) if they are able to produce a message-signature pair that
will be accepted by an honest recipient and yet, if the coalition denies having sent
the message, the dispute resolution procedure will rule in favour of the coalition.
This definition captures the common notion of repudiation, in which P0 sends out a
message and later tries to deny having sent it.
Lastly, we define what it means for an USS scheme to be secure.
Definition 4.12 (Security of USS schemes). An USS protocol Q is -secure if it is
-secure against forging, non-transferability and repudiation attempts.
In other words, the protocol is called -secure if it is -secure against all three
types of threat. Alternatively, if the probabilities of forging, repudiating and non-
transferability all decay exponentially with respect to some security parameter, then
we will simply say that the protocol is secure. We will refer to these definitions in
later chapters when analysing the security of proposed schemes.
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Chapter 5
Considerations for constructing
practical USS schemes
5.1 Introduction
At this point in the thesis we will be moving away from discussions of generic USS
schemes and instead start to construct new USS schemes. This chapter aims to
provide motivation as to why the USS schemes presented in later sections appear
the way they do. With the exception of Theorem 5.1 in Section 5.4, the arguments
presented in this chapter are not rigorous, but are instead meant to serve as a guide
in the search for secure, efficient and practical USS schemes.
Quantum USS scheme template
Quantum USS schemes have been proposed in many different forms throughout
the literature, but all realisable schemes1 have followed the same generic template.
Namely, in the distribution stage, the sender Alice transmits quantum states to each
of the recipients. The recipients perform measurements to gain partial information
on the states chosen by Alice. In the messaging stage, Alice’s signature is a classical
record of the states transmitted which the recipients can verify by checking it against
the partial information gained from the states they received.
Throughout this chapter it may be helpful to keep this generic quantum USS
template in mind. We do not claim that this is the most general form for quantum
USS protocols, but stress that all known realisable quantum USS schemes (at the
time of writing this thesis) fit this generic template. Therefore, we have found it
useful to consider this template when searching for more efficient USS schemes that
1I.e. schemes that can be realised using current technology.
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remain realisable with currently available technology.
Security
Roughly speaking, the security of all USS schemes, both classical and quantum,
rests on two key features:
1. Partial information recovery: recipients do not gain full information on
what is sent from/to Alice. This prevents recipients from being able to forge
messages. In classical schemes this property is enforced using secret channels
to hide selected communications. In quantum schemes this property can also
be enforced by having Alice transmit states selected from a non-orthogonal
ensemble.
2. Recipient symmetry: the information held by each recipient is identically
distributed from Alice’s perspective. This prevents her from being able to cre-
ate biased signatures that are more likely to be rejected by one recipient than
another, thus safeguarding against both repudiation and non-transferability.
In classical schemes this property is often achieved using anonymous channels
to hide the identity of the recipients. Quantum schemes have instead used
secret channels to perform an exchange process that enforces symmetry (e.g.
Protocol 1 from Section 2.4).
5.2 Same-state quantum USS schemes
Many quantum USS schemes, for example Refs. [1, 50–53, 59, 108, 109], involve Alice
sending the same states to all recipients in the distribution stage. This is analogous
to public-key digital signature schemes in which the signature is set up by having the
sender broadcast the same information to all possible recipients. Intuitively schemes
of this type seem natural because we want all participants to agree on the validity of
a signature, and sending the same states to each recipient seems to enforce recipient
symmetry.
These schemes could also be seen as potentially advantageous because they might
allow for quantum USS schemes requiring significantly fewer channels than classical
USS schemes, and fewer than those assumed in the standard resource model. Specif-
ically, the same-state quantum USS schemes might seem to require direct quantum
channels only from the sender to each recipient (i.e. linear in the number of re-
cipients), rather than pairwise between all participants as given by the standard
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resource model. If true, this would be an advantage over classical USS schemes,
which all require channels pairwise between all participants, i.e. quadratic in the
number of participants2.
Nevertheless, we shall show in this section that same-state quantum protocols
introduce significant problems. In particular, since a t-party coalition of dishonest
recipients will have access to t copies of each state, as t increases they are able to
recreate each state sent by Alice with high fidelity, and thereby forge messages. This
places restrictive limits on the number of colluding adversaries that the protocols are
able to handle. Further, as well shall see in the following section, it is difficult to re-
move the majority of recipient-recipient communication without drastically reducing
the efficiency of the protocols.
Recipient symmetry in same-state protocols
Of vital importance to same-state schemes is the notion of broadcast. The recipients
must be able to check that Alice sends the same states to each participant. If they
cannot check this, a dishonest Alice could easily break recipient symmetry by sending
entirely different states to each participant so that her future signature agrees with
what one recipient received in the distribution stage, and yet disagrees with another.
So, how can recipients check that they received the same states from Alice in the
distribution stage, without revealing too much information to compromise the partial
information recovery property?
As we shall see, this issue can only be avoided using additional channels to
connect the recipients. Assuming that all participants are connected pairwise by
classical authenticated channels, the most practical solution would be to implement
a sampling procedure in which each participant chooses a selection of the received
states, and broadcasts3 the associated information to other recipients, who can use
that information to check that Alice sent out the same states.
However, this method has two problems. First, implementing detectable broad-
cast requires authenticated classical channels between all participants, partially re-
moving the “fewer channels” advantage hoped for in same-state quantum protocols4.
On top of this, the communication overhead required to implement detectable broad-
2As always, this statement applies only to classical USS schemes that do not use a trusted
authority.
3Using a detectable broadcast protocol, not an authenticated broadcast protocol (c.f. Section
3.8).
4The standard resource model assumes authenticated classical channels and insecure quantum
channels pairwise between all participants. Therefore the “fewer channels” advantage is not fully
lost here.
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cast is fairly large and hinders efficiency. The second main problem is that, even
if we assume broadcast as an additional resource, for any practical quantum USS
protocol there still remains powerful strategies available to Alice which allow her to
cheat.
Transferability attacks on same-state protocols
In this subsection we outline an attack available to Alice in same-state protocols
when the quantum channels are lossy. We consider a three-party protocol in which:
Alice, Bob and Charlie are all connected by authenticated classical channels; Alice-
Bob and Alice-Charlie are connected by insecure quantum channels; and there exists
a broadcast channel. Again, for the following arguments it is useful to keep the
generic quantum USS template in mind.
In any practical setting the quantum channels will be lossy; suppose that states
sent over the quantum channels are lost with probability q. If Alice is dishonest, for
information-theoretic security we must assume that she can replace these imperfect
quantum channels with lossless ones. In the distribution stage, if Alice is supposed
to send n states in total, she can instead use the lossless quantum channels to send
n(1− q) signals to Bob and n(1− q) signals to Charlie. Alice artificially introduces
losses such that the losses of Bob and Charlie do not overlap.
Bob: Honest states Correct Losses
Charlie: Honest states Losses Incorrect
n(1− 2q) states qn states qn states
Figure 5.1: Representation of the states sent to Bob and Charlie. The left block represents positions
in which both Bob and Charlie received a state. For these states, Alice acts honestly and sends the
same thing to both recipients. The middle block represents positions in which Alice sent states to
Bob but not to Charlie. The states sent to Bob are chosen by Alice so as to agree with her future
signature declaration. The right block represents positions in which Alice sent states to Charlie,
but not to Bob. The states sent to Charlie are chosen by Alice so as to disagree with her future
signature declaration.
In this way Alice can increase either Bob’s or Charlie’s error rate (with her
future signature) by q. If q > sv − sa, where sv and sa are the message acceptance
thresholds at transferability levels 0 and 1 respectively, then Alice can in this way
break transferability. In most cases in the literature, sv − sa < 0.1. This is because
most realised quantum schemes have found a channel error rate of above 1%, and the
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schemes have been unable to tolerate more than about an 11% channel errors, e.g.
Refs. [59, 109–111]. For correctness and security, the parameters sa and sv must be
chosen to be between these two parameters, i.e. above the expected channel error
rate, but below the threshold tolerable channel error for the protocol. Overall, this
means that transferability will often be compromised for even small channel loss.
Note that Alice’s strategy will not be caught by any sampling performed by Bob
and Charlie since they agree on all positions where they both received a state. Of
course, this strategy can also be applied in the general N -participant scenario.
Preventing loss attacks
A simple method for preventing Alice from performing this type of attack is to have
all recipients discard all signals unless all recipients report that they received a
signal at a given position. Indeed this strategy has been proposed and implemented
in the literature [108, 109]. However, this strategy becomes extremely inefficient
and entirely impractical for even moderate numbers of participants – for example,
with 10 recipients and a total system loss of just 6 dB for each recipient, less than
one in every million states sent would be kept.
The only other known resolution to these loss manipulation strategies is to have
recipients secretly exchange a selection of the states (or measurement outcomes)
received from Alice. The exact exchange method will depend on the details of the
protocol, but the goal is to enforce recipient symmetry, regardless of what Alice
sends. Of course, this further requires recipients to be connected by quantum chan-
nels, either to forward the states directly, or to perform QKD to generate a secret
classical channel. In this case, we are back to the standard resource model. There-
fore, it seems that same-state protocols cannot simultaneously remain practical and
use fewer resources than those granted in the standard resource model.
5.3 Exchange-type quantum USS schemes
In this section we consider quantum protocols in which the participants enforce
recipient symmetry by exchanging a selection of their measurement outcomes. For
simplicity, we again restrict to the three-party scenario. An example of an exchange
procedure is described in Step 6 of the distribution stage of Protocol 1 (see Section
2.4). The aim of the exchange procedure is to leave Bob and Charlie with outcomes
that have the same expected error rate with whatever signature Alice can later
declare. For this to happen, Bob and Charlie must exchange their measurement
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outcomes in secret so that Alice cannot selectively introduce errors for one party
and not the other.
The end result of the exchange process is that, regardless of what Alice sends,
Bob and Charlie have the same expected error rates with Alice’s future signature
declaration. Therefore, it is natural to ask: is it sensible for protocols to require an
honest Alice to send the same states to Bob and Charlie?
Same-state vs different-state protocols
The exchange process ensures that security against repudiation and non-transferability
are guaranteed regardless of whether Alice sends the same or different states to each
recipient. On the other hand, having Alice send the same states to recipients helps
dishonest forgers by weakening the partial information recovery property – a dishon-
est Bob is provided with a perfect copy of the states sent to Charlie. For protocols
involving larger numbers of participants the situation is even worse, since dishonest
coalitions would have access to many copies of the states sent to honest participants,
thereby allowing them to make accurate estimates of exactly what Alice sent.
As such, same-state quantum protocols place highly restrictive limitations on
the number of participants allowed in any quantum USS scheme. Instead, it seems
more efficient and secure to specify exchange-type protocols in which Alice sends
different states to Bob and Charlie, similarly to the classical USS scheme P2 [1].
Basis reconciliation
In this subsection we consider Protocol 1 from Section 2.4 and consider how it could
be improved. Based on the discussion in the previous subsection, we immediately
make the modification that an honest Alice is not required to send the same states
to Bob and Charlie. Instead, each state that is sent to Bob or Charlie is chosen
independently and uniformly at random from the set {|0〉 , |1〉 , |+〉 , |−〉}.
We further examine whether it is more efficient for recipients to perform the
unambiguous state elimination (USE) measurements used in Protocol 1, or whether
it is beneficial to include a BB84-style processing stage where the sender and receiver
announce their basis choices and only results in matching bases are kept. Based on
the discussion in the remainder of this subsection, we will conclude that for a number
of reasons it is better to use the latter.
For non-repudiation and transferability, it is the exchange process that ensures
security. Without a basis reconciliation step Alice does not know which basis each
recipient chose to measure in. Whenever an element of her signature is expressed
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in a different basis to the chosen measurement basis, this signature element will not
cause an error, regardless of who made the measurement. Effectively, this means
Alice’s signature contains redundant information that does not provide additional
security against these threats. Shorter signatures are desirable because they are ap-
pended to the message transmitted, and so carry a communication cost. Performing
basis reconciliation allows for a shorter signature lengths and does not compromise
security.
For forging, since Alice sends different states to Bob and Charlie, a dishonest
Bob’s information comes entirely from eavesdropping on the Alice-Charlie channel.
Without basis reconciliation, each signature element is taken from the set SUSE =
{0, 1,+,−}. When Bob is trying to forge, for each signature element he is trying to
choose one of the 3 members of SUSE that do not cause a mismatch with Charlie’s
recorded outcome. Recall that Charlie performs an USE measurement to exclude a
single element of SUSE, and a mismatch occurs if Bob declares the excluded element.
With basis reconciliation, each signature element is taken from the set SBR = {0, 1},
and Bob is trying to choose one of the two members of SBR that will not cause a
mismatch with Charlie’s recorded outcome. Therefore, a naïve argument suggests
that Bob’s task is easier without basis reconciliation, since 3 out of the 4 elements
of SUSE will not cause a mismatch.
However, this naïve argument may not be correct, since the basis declaration step
reveals additional information which Bob may be able to use to help him to forge a
message. Nevertheless, as in QKD, it can be shown that so long as the Alice-Charlie
quantum channel error rate is reasonably small, the basis declaration does not reveal
much information to Bob. For signatures of equal length, the forger’s task is indeed
harder with basis reconciliation than without. Intuitively, this can be understood as
follows. Without basis reconciliation, Bob has more freedom in choosing his forging
strategy. Whenever an element of Bob’s dishonest signature is specified in a different
basis to Charlie’s measurement, Charlie will never find a mismatch on that element.
In this way, allowing the potential of mismatched bases helps the forger to reduce
his overall error rate. Therefore, although the basis declaration reveals some small
amount of information to the forger, this is offset by forcing the forger to declare
elements in the same basis as measured by the verifier Charlie.
A final benefit to including the basis reconciliation step is that it allows us to
leverage existing results in QKD and apply them to quantum USS schemes. As we
shall see in Chapter 6, the theoretical tools developed to analyse QKD protocols are
powerful, and allow for significant improvements in both the security analysis and
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experimental implementations of quantum USS schemes.
5.4 Minimal resource requirements for USS schemes
We end this chapter by considering limitations on two stage (distribution stage and
messaging stage) USS schemes performed in which the only resources available to
the participants are point-to-point communication channels, i.e. there is no trusted
authority or additional resources such as a broadcast channel.
We find that USS schemes in this setting must have an interactive distribution
stage5, and if O(N) participants can be dishonest, then they always require O(N2)
secret keys held pairwise between participants. By interactive, we mean that all
recipients must be able to communicate with one another. This is as opposed to
non-interactive schemes (e.g. computationally secure public-key digital signature
schemes) in which each recipient communicates only with the sender.
Theorem 5.1. All USS schemes of the above type require participant interaction
in the distribution stage. Further, in an N-party scheme allowing O(N) dishon-
est participants, the number of authenticated channels between protocol participants,
and therefore the overall amount of secret shared key required between participants,
increases as O(N2).
Proof. USS schemes of the type considered here all contain a distribution stage
in which information is distributed amongst the protocol participants. Protocol
recipients use the distributed information to verify signatures in the messaging stage.
Consider an N -party USS scheme in which two recipients, P1 and P2, are entirely
separated in the distribution stage and are unable to learn anything about the
information held by the other, i.e. they cannot communicate either directly or
indirectly using other (trusted or untrusted) protocol participants as intermediaries.
In this case, in the messaging stage, the sender is free to choose a signature that will
agree with information held by P1 and disagree with the information held by P2.
Recall that, in the messaging stage, protocol recipients check the signature locally,
without any interaction with other recipients.
Since P1 and P2 cannot exchange any information in the distribution stage of
the protocol, there is no way that they can derive any assurances that the other will
accept a signature as valid. Therefore a signature in a scheme where two parties
are kept entirely separate cannot be provably transferable. The above argument
5This is similar to the case of secret sharing, in which it is impossible to provide unconditional
security for all participants using a non-interactive protocol [112].
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shows that USS schemes must include at least the potential for either direct or
indirect means of communication between all pairs of protocol participants in the
distribution stage of the protocol.
The protocol will therefore contain at least one communication channel. There
must also be at least one authenticated communication channel, since if all com-
munication channels were unauthenticated then a single dishonest adversary could
intercept all communications and perform a man-in-the-middle attack to cheat in
any desired way.
Each honest participant must be connected via an authenticated communication
channel to at least one other honest participant, since otherwise he would have no
way of communicating with the other honest participants, since the dishonest partic-
ipants could perform man-in-the-middle attacks to separate the honest participant
from all other honest participants. As above, this would mean that messages cannot
be transferable since two honest recipients would be entirely separated.
Therefore, if dP is the number of dishonest participants allowed by the proto-
col, each participant must be directly connected via an authenticated channel to
at least dP + 1 other participants. To authenticate communication channels with
information-theoretic security, it is necessary for the two communicating parties to
share a secret key whose size depends on the length of the message being authenti-
cated (see Section 3.6). For dP = O(N), the number of authenticated direct chan-
nels required, and therefore the amount of secret shared key required, must increase
quadratically in the number of participants, i.e. the secret shared key requirements
scale as O(N2).
For example, if the protocol can tolerate up to 1/2 of the participants being
dishonest, there must be at least N2/4 direct communication channels (since each
channel connects two participants).
5.5 Conclusion
Overall, the arguments presented in this chapter help to guide the construction
of new USS schemes in the following chapters. Section 5.2 considered same-state
protocols, and argued that in fact the resources assumed in the standard resource
model are minimal and necessary for practical quantum USS schemes. Essentially,
this followed from the requirement of recipient symmetry, which meant that recipi-
ents needed the ability to corroborate the information they received from the sender
with all other recipients. Without such corroboration, powerful and undetectable
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cheating strategies exist for Alice. As such, it seems necessary to have pairwise
authenticated classical channels and pairwise quantum/secret channels between all
participants.
This leads naturally to exchange-type protocols, which are considered in Section
5.3. We re-examined Protocol 1 and argue that, given recipients exchange a selection
of their received states, there is no functional benefit to having Alice send the same
states out to all recipients. In fact, protocols in which Alice sends the same states
to all recipients face prohibitive restrictions on the number of participants allowed
in the scheme, since larger collusions can break the partial information recovery
property and therefore are able to forge. We further found that it is beneficial from
an efficiency perspective to include a basis reconciliation step in Protocol 1, leading
to a BB84-type measurement process. These considerations lead directly to the
protocol described and analysed in Chapter 6.
Lastly, Theorem 5.1 proves that in any USS scheme, all protocol participants
must have the ability to interact in the distribution stage. Additionally, it states
that the number of authenticated channels required scales quadratically with the
number of participants. In Chapter 8 we will see a classical USS scheme which only
requires participants to (pairwise) share secret keys that are logarithmic in the size
of the message being signed. This requirement is no more expensive than assuming
participants are connected pairwise by authenticated classical channels (c.f. Section
3.6). In light of Theorem 5.1, this means that the scheme in Chapter 8 is essentially
minimal in terms of resource requirements.
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Chapter 6
Secure quantum signatures using
insecure quantum channels
6.1 Introduction
Since the original Gottesman-Chuang scheme [49] was proposed in 2001, quantum
USS schemes have steadily improved to become simpler, more practical and more
efficient. Prior to the work contained in this chapter, Protocol 1 (outlined in Section
2.4) represented the culmination of these advances. However, its security analysis,
provided in detail in Ref. [59], was incomplete in two ways. First, the analysis
was restricted to collective forging attempts and did not cover coherent attacks.
Second, the analysis assumed “tamper-proof” quantum channels that do not allow
eavesdropping or modification of the transmitted states. This strong and generally
undesirable assumption meant that a potential forger (Bob) only had access to his
own copy of the signature states (sent by Alice). In reality an adversarial Bob would
be able to gain extra information on Alice’s signature through eavesdropping on the
signature states sent from Alice to Charlie.
We use this chapter to introduce a new quantum USS scheme – called the AWKA
scheme – derived from Protocol 1, but containing three key modifications based on
the considerations in Chapter 5.
1. Alice does not send the same states to Bob and Charlie; instead, she sends
different states. This has the advantage of making the protocol much more
efficient by limiting a dishonest coalition’s forging potential. It also enables us
to make our second modification, stated next.
2. Although Alice is still the one sending and signing messages in the messaging
stage, in the distribution stage it is Bob and Charlie who send the states and
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Alice who receives them. In a sense, it is Bob and Charlie who create Alice’s
signature. This has the practical benefit of making the receiver loss/detector
efficiency the same for each participant, since it is always Alice receiving the
states. It also removes Alice’s ability to send correlated states to Bob and
Charlie in the distribution stage.
3. Rather than the USE measurements performed in Protocol 1, we include a
BB84-style basis reconciliation step which allows us to both decrease the sig-
nature length and to use existing results taken from QKD.
A direct result of the third modification is that we are able to use decoy-state
techniques (see Section 3.5) to make the scheme fully realisable with current tech-
nology. Further, we are able to prove the security of the AWKA scheme against all
types of attack, while also removing all trust assumptions on the quantum chan-
nels. This resolves both issues in the security analysis of Protocol 1, and closes the
theory-experiment gap discussed in Section 2.4.3. Our analysis also highlights an
interesting theoretical result; namely, in the AWKA protocol the error threshold for
the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quantum channels is less strict than that required
for distilling a secret key using QKD.
Lastly, the protocol presented in this chapter can be performed using exactly the
same equipment as required by QKD. This is of practical benefit for both signatures
and QKD. On the signatures side it allows us to make use of the already mature
QKD technologies to easily implement our scheme. On the QKD side, signature
schemes provide an additional functionality to complement existing QKD networks.
The work presented in this chapter has been published in Ref. [110] with minor
modifications.
6.2 The AWKA USS scheme
In this chapter we describe the AWKA protocol for three parties, a sender, Alice,
and two receivers Bob and Charlie. Generalisation to more parties is possible, but
special care should be taken to address colluding adversaries. As before, in the three-
party scenario, at most one party can be dishonest, since two colluding dishonest
parties can trivially cheat on the third party. We employ a majority vote dispute
resolution process, meaning transferability and non-repudiation become identical in
this three-party setting.
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Scheme outline
We assume that between Alice and Bob, and between Alice and Charlie there exists
authenticated classical channels as well as untrusted, imperfect quantum channels.
In addition, Bob and Charlie share a QKD link which can be used to transmit clas-
sical messages in full secrecy. The protocol makes use of a key-generating protocol
(KGP) performed in pairs separately by Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie. The KGP is
essentially a restricted form of QKD, used by the sender and receiver to generate
a raw key. They do not proceed to perform the post-processing steps of error cor-
rection and privacy amplification. The KGP uses the untrusted quantum channels,
and generates two correlated bit strings, one for the sender and one for the receiver.
When the channel noise level is below a prescribed threshold, we show that the Ham-
ming distance between the receiver’s string and the sender’s string is smaller than
the Hamming distance between any string an eavesdropper could produce and the
sender’s string. The KGP is discussed in Section 6.3, after we present the signature
protocol itself.
6.2.1 The protocol
As is always is the case for USS schemes, the AWKA protocol has two parts, a dis-
tribution stage, where the scheme is set up, and a messaging stage, where messages
are signed and sent. The distribution stage involves both classical and quantum
communication, whereas all communication in the messaging stage is classical. In
this chapter we show how to sign a 1-bit message. Longer messages can be signed
by suitably iterating the 1-bit protocol, as in [113].
Distribution stage
1. For each possible future message, m = 0 or m = 1, Alice independently
performs the KGP, twice with Bob and twice with Charlie, to generate four
different length L keys, AmB and AmC , for m ∈ {0, 1} and where the subscript
denotes the participant with whom she performed the KGP. Bob holds the
two length L strings Bm and Charlie holds the two length L strings Cm.
2. For each value of m, Bob and Charlie each separately and randomly split their
keys into two equal parts to obtain the sets Bm1 , Bm2 , Cm1 and Cm2 . Using a
secret classical channel, they each forward the set indexed “2” to the other
participant so that Bob holds Bm1 and Cm2 , while Charlie holds Cm1 and Bm2 .
86
For each possible future message m, Alice’s signature will be the 2L length string
Sigm = (AmB , AmC ). As we shall show in Section 6.3, except with negligible probability
AmB contains fewer mismatches with Bm than does any string an eavesdropper, Eve
(who may be Charlie) can produce. The same applies to AmC and Cm. Essentially,
this is what will protect against forging; Alice knows the pair (Bm, Cm) better than
anyone else.
Bob and Charlie will check Alice’s signature by matching it against the two
sets they hold (e.g. Bob uses Bm1 and Cm2 ). In Section 6.4 we show that, since
Alice does not know how Bob and Charlie split Bm and Cm, the exchange process
means that Alice has no information on whether each element in her signature will
ultimately be checked by Bob or Charlie. Essentially, this is what will protect against
repudiation/non-transferability.
Messaging stage
1. To send a signed 1-bit messagem, Alice sends (m, Sigm) to the desired recipient
(say Bob).
2. Bob checks (m, Sigm) separately against Bm1 and Cm2 1. If the signature element
is a ∈ {0, 1} and Bob’s corresponding stored element is b ∈ {0, 1}, a mismatch
occurs if a 6= b. Bob records the number of mismatches he finds for each of
the two sets he checks. If there are fewer than sa(L/2) mismatches in both
sets (where sa < 1/2 is a small threshold determined by the parameters and
the desired security level of the protocol) then Bob accepts the message.
3. To forward the message to Charlie, Bob forwards the pair (m, Sigm) that he
received from Alice.
4. Charlie tests for mismatches in the same way (using Cm1 and Bm2 ), but in
order to protect against repudiation by Alice he uses a different threshold, sv.
Charlie accepts the forwarded message if the number of mismatches in both
sets is below sv(L/2) where 0 < sa < sv < 1/2.
That the recipients must use different thresholds or acceptance criteria for mes-
sages received directly from the sender and for forwarded messages is a necessary
1Note that Bob could use Bm2 to further check the validity of the signature (and similarly for
Charlie). This has some subtle security advantages even in the three-party case, and could protect
against forms of collusion in the multi-party case. However, we do not specify this here, since it is
not necessary under our three-party security assumptions, and it simplifies our security analysis to
consider only the symmetrized keys. Note also that, of course, a dishonest Bob must be assumed
to retain full knowledge of Bm2 .
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feature of all USS schemes (see Refs. [33, 34]).
6.3 The key generation protocol
We now describe how two parties, Alice and Bob, perform the KGP. Essentially,
Alice and Bob perform the quantum part of QKD to generate raw keys, but they
do not proceed to error correction or privacy amplification. This means that Alice
and Bob will generate different (but correlated) strings that are not entirely secret.
These keys are the AmB and Bm strings described above. Although the KGP builds on
QKD, the security analysis for the KGP does not follow directly from the security
of the QKD protocol. This is because the goal of an adversary in the signature
protocol is different from that of an eavesdropper in QKD. For the signature protocol,
what matters is the number of mismatches with a recipient’s key; for QKD, what
matters is the information an eavesdropper can hold about the key. Note also that
for signatures the eavesdropper acts from within the protocol, and, for example,
Eve could be Charlie. This means the eavesdropper has access to additional “side
information” over and above that held by an eavesdropper in QKD.
Nevertheless, starting from the bound on an eavesdropper’s min-entropy in QKD,
we show how to bound the number of mismatches (with Bm) a forger in our signature
protocol can achieve. Let d(., .) be the Hamming distance between two bit strings.
We say that the KGP is -secure if
sup
{
P
(
d(AmB , B
m) ≥ d(Eguess, Bm)
)}
≤ , (6.1)
where the supremum is taken over all strategies for Eve allowed by quantum me-
chanics and the probability is taken over all the randomness in the protocol. The
meaning of this definition is that, except with probability , the eavesdropper pro-
duces a string that contains more mismatches with Bm than does Alice’s string.
In this section we prove that the KGP is secure. The security of the overall
signature protocol (in which the KGP is used as a subprotocol) will be proven below
in Section 6.4.
6.3.1 Implementing the KGP
In what follows, the underlying QKD protocol upon which the KGP is built will
be the prepare-and-measure decoy-state BB84 protocol using weak coherent pulses,
described in [114]. Specifically, we assume that Bob has a phase-randomised source
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of coherent states. The intensity of each light pulse is chosen by Bob to be either u1,
u2, or u3, where u1 > u2 > u3. The intensities are chosen with probabilities pu1 , pu2 ,
and pu3 . All intensity levels are used for key generation. To encode information,
Bob randomly selects one of four possible polarisation states – |0〉, |1〉 (Z basis)
and |+〉 := 1/√2(|0〉 + |1〉), |−〉 := 1/√2(|0〉 − |1〉) (X basis). The X and Z bases
are chosen with probabilities pX ≥ 1/2 and pZ = 1 − pZ ≤ 1/2 respectively. The
asymmetric probabilities for the two bases can be used to increase the efficiency of
the protocol [115]. Intensities and states are chosen independently by Bob to avoid
correlations between intensity and information encoding. Alice also independently
chooses the X and Z measurement bases with probabilities pX and pZ respectively.
Notice that it is Bob who prepares the states and sends them along the quantum
channel to Alice. This role reversal may not be necessary, but simplifies the security
analysis in two ways:
1. A dishonest Alice cannot send correlated states to Bob and Charlie.
2. Receiver loss and detector efficiency will be the same for both the Alice-Bob
KGP and the Alice-Charlie KGP, since both use Alice as the receiver.
For each state sent by Bob, Alice obtains one of four possible outcomes {0, 1, ∅, d},
where 0 and 1 are the bit values, ∅ represents no detection and d is a double click
event. In the case of double clicks, there is an additional post-processing stage in
which Alice randomly assigns the double click to a single bit value, in line with
the squashing model [116]. Alice and Bob then announce their basis and intensity
choices over an authenticated classical channel. If states are transmitted and then
measured in different bases, or if there is no detection, they are discarded (sifting).
The protocol is continued until a sufficient number of measurement outcomes have
been obtained for each basis and intensity choice.
A raw key is generated by choosing a random sample of size L+k of the X basis
counts. The bit string generated by Bob is split into three parts (VB, XB,keep, XB,forward)
of length k, L/2 and L/2 respectively. Alice holds the corresponding strings (VA, XA),
where VA has length k and XA has length L. Note that she does not know which
bits Bob chooses to forward and which he chooses to keep, but she does know the
index positions of the counts in VB. As in QKD, the V strings are used to perform
parameter estimation to estimate the correlation between Alice’s and Bob’s strings
generated from X basis measurements, after which they are discarded. The two
strings, XB,keep and XB,forward, refer to Bob’s keys, Bm1 and Bm2 , respectively2. To
2We believe that the duplication of notation is justified by the additional clarity it provides.
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ease notation we set n := L/2.
Alice and Bob also randomly select a sample of Z basis counts, which we denote
ZA and ZB, respectively. These strings are used to quantify the level of eavesdrop-
ping by Eve. Essentially, Eve’s smooth min-entropy on XB,keep can be quantified
using the entropic uncertainty relations described in Section 3.4.4 together with the
level of correlation between ZA and ZB.
It should be stressed that, contrary to all QKD protocols, in USS schemes it
cannot be assumed that Alice and Bob are honest. However, as will be explained
below, neither can gain from dishonesty during the KGP.
6.3.2 Security of the KGP
In what follows we consider a finite number of states being sent and measured. Eve
is allowed to perform the most general attack permissible by quantum mechanics – a
so-called “coherent” attack. This means that Eve can perform any operation allowed
by quantum mechanics on any/all states sent over the quantum channel, as well as
an arbitrary ancilla system she prepares. Eve is also able to hold systems in quantum
memory and perform general measurements at any point during or after the protocol.
In this way she is free to take full advantage of all communications, both classical and
quantum, sent between Alice and Bob. The classical random variables V , Θn and
XB,forward represent the information gained by Eve from parameter estimation, basis
declarations in the sifting step and, if Eve is Charlie, the forwarding of XB,forward by
Bob, respectively. Our strategy is to find Eve’s information in terms of her smooth
min-entropy, and use that to bound the probability that she can make a signature
declaration containing fewer than a specified number of mismatches with Bob’s key.
Eve’s smooth min-entropy
Eve’s conditional smooth min-entropy on Bob’s key XB,keep can be derived using
existing results in QKD, with the only difference being that here Bob gives the
extra information XB,forward to Eve. However, since Bob does not subsequently use
this part of the key, this can be treated in the same manner as the V string sacrificed
for parameter estimation [117]. For ease of notation, we will simply write X instead
In quantum information it is common for letters near the start of the alphabet (A, B, C, etc) to
refer to quantum systems, whereas letters near the end of the alphabet (X, Y , Z, etc) refer to
classical random variables. For this reason, during the KGP subprotocol, to align with standard
QKD notation we denote Bob’s keys using X, since they are classical bit strings generated from
X basis measurements. Nevertheless, when discussing the full signature protocol it is clearer to
denote Bob’s keys using the B label to denote Bob’s identity.
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of XB,keep.
We gather all of Eve’s information into one quantum system living in the Hilbert
space HE. This comprises the space containing Eve’s ancilla quantum systems
following her coherent attack, HE′ , as well as the spaces containing the classical
information V , Θn, and XB,forward, which we assume are available to Eve. As in
Appendix B of [114], the min-entropy is then
Hmin(X|E) ' s−X,0 + s−X,1
[
1− h(φ+X,1)
]
, (6.2)
where the inequality holds up to a small additive term proportional to log(1/).
Here s−X,0 and s
−
X,1 are estimates of the number of X basis counts which come from
0 and 1-photon pulses respectively, and which make up the entries in the string X.
φ+X,1 is the phase error rate in X basis measurements coming from single-photon
pulses. The superscripts + and − are upper and lower bounds representing worst-
case scenario estimates consistent with parameter estimation performed on a finite
sample (see Appendix A.1), and h is the binary entropy.
Guessing bounds
Given Eve’s conditional smooth min-entropy, the following theorem places bounds
on Eve’s ability to guess X to within a certain Hamming distance.
Theorem 6.1. Suppose that Bob and Eve share the state ρXE where, as above, X is
an n-bit string held by Bob and E is a quantum system representing all information
held by Eve. Then, for any strategy, Eve’s probability of making at most r mistakes
when guessing X can be bounded as3
pr ≤
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2−H

min(X|E)ρ + . (6.3)
To prove this theorem, we use the following two lemmas which are proved in
3Note that, compared to Ref. [110], this thesis makes a subtle change to the notion of security,
to one which we now believe makes more sense. Both here and in Ref. [110], Eve succeeds if she
is able to make at most r mistakes when guessing X. As per the proof of Lemma 6.3, Eve uses
the value of a random variable F to guess X. Although F is a random variable, its distribution
function PF depends on Eve’s strategy. In this thesis, we have defined Eve’s success probability,
pr, to be her probability of making at most r mistakes when guessing X, averaged over PF . In Ref.
[110], a stricter notion of pr was used – namely, instead of averaging over PF , it was shown that Eve
could not succeed for any F outcome, except with some small probability. Since, given PF , Eve
cannot further control the value taken by F , we believe the averaged definition used throughout
this chapter and the next makes more sense. The ideas and essence of the security proofs remain
the same under either definition, but the averaged definition used in this thesis allows for a clearer
and simpler statement of our results.
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Appendix A.2.
Lemma 6.2. Let τXF be a classical state, i.e.
τXF =
∑
x,f
PXF (x, f) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ |f〉 〈f | (6.4)
for some orthonormal bases {|x〉}x and {|f〉}f . Let B(τXF ) denote the set of all
sub-normalised density matrices -close to τXF in terms of the generalised purified
distance. Then
Hmin(X|F )τ = Hmin(X|F )τ (6.5)
for some classical τXF ∈ B(τXF ).
Lemma 6.3. Suppose Bob and Eve share the classical state ηXF defined by the
probability distribution QXF , with Bob holding X and Eve holding F . Let qr be
Eve’s probability of guessing X making fewer than r errors, given that X and F are
distributed according to QXF . Then qr can be bounded as
qr ≤
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
2−Hmin(X|F )η . (6.6)
Notation 6.4. For the sake of readability, we introduce the notation
brn :=
r∑
k=0
(
n
k
)
. (6.7)
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Bob and Eve share the state ρXE and Eve aims to use this
to guess X while making fewer than r errors. Since Eve must output a classical
string, she performs some optimal CPTP mapping NE→F to transform system E
into a classical random variable, F , which dictates her guess for X4. Her strategy
maps
ρXE → τXF :=
∑
x,f
PXF (x, f) |x〉 〈x| ⊗ |f〉 〈f | , (6.8)
where PXF is a probability distribution. Although τXF (and hence PXF ) are un-
known, Lemma 6.2 states that
Hmin(X|F )τ = Hmin(X|F )τ , (6.9)
for some classical τXF ∈ B(τXF ) defined by the (possibly sub-normalised) proba-
4For example, F could simply represent Eve’s guess for X. More generally though, F could
just be a classical string that, following some processing, leads to Eve’s guess for X.
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bility distribution PXF . Suppose that Tr(τXF ) = 1 − δ. Then if X and F were
distributed according to the probability distribution QXF := 11−δPXF , applying
Lemma 6.3 gives
qr ≤ 1
1− δ b
r
n2
−Hmin(X|F )τ , (6.10)
where qr is Eve’s probability of making up to r errors under QXF . In fact, X and
F are distributed according to PXF , so we would like to use Eq. (6.10) to bound
pr. The purified distance upper-bounds the trace distance, and the trace distance
characterises the distinguishability of probability distributions. Since PXF is -close
to (1− δ)QXF in terms of the purified distance,
pr ≤ (1− δ)qr + . (6.11)
This means that
pr ≤ brn2−Hmin(X|F )τ + . (6.12)
The above expression is still not particularly enlightening, since τ is unknown in
general. Nevertheless, the data processing inequality (Section 3.4.4) and Lemma 6.2
give
Hmin(X|E)ρ ≤ Hmin(X|F )τ = Hmin(X|F )τ . (6.13)
Putting it all together, we can bound pr as
pr ≤ brn2−H

min(X|E)ρ + . (6.14)
6.3.3 Application to signatures
In the preceding section we were able to bound Eve’s probability of guessing X (to
within r mistakes) in terms of her conditional smooth min-entropy. For large values
of n we can simplify this bound using the approximation brn ≈ 2nh(r/n). Combining
Theorem 6.1 with the expression for the min-entropy given in Eq. (6.2), and defining
γ := r/n to be the mismatch rate, we find5
pr ≤ 2−n{c
−
X,0+c
−
X,1[1−h(φ+X,1)]−h(γ)} + , (6.15)
5The equation above should technically have an approximation sign since we have used the
approximate bound on the min-entropy from Eq. (6.2). It can be made exact by including the
terms proportional to log(1/) in the min-entropy. However, for simplicity and since they do not
affect our results, we have neglected these small terms.
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where c−X,i := s
−
X,i/n is a lower bound on the expected number of counts per pulse
that arise from an X basis signal state containing i photons. The condition
c−X,0 + c
−
X,1[1− h(φ+X,1)]− h(γ) > 0 (6.16)
determines whether or not Eve is able to make errors at a rate smaller than γ with
non-negligible probability. If the condition holds, n can be increased to make Eve’s
probability of making errors at a rate smaller than γ arbitrarily small (and decay
exponentially fast). We will see in the following section that this means that Eve’s
probability of successfully forging a message can also be made arbitrarily small. We
define p∗E by the equation
c−X,0 + c
−
X,1[1− h(φ+X,1)]− h(p∗E) = 0, (6.17)
i.e. p∗E is the error rate such that the left hand side of Eq. (6.16) equals zero. The
meaning of this is that p∗E is the minimum fraction of errors that Eve will be able
to make when trying to guess XB,keep.
Suppose the error rate on X basis measurements between Alice and Bob is upper
bounded as e+X (recall that this bound is found from parameter estimation on VA and
VB). As long as p∗E > e
+
X , there exists a choice of parameters and signature length
which make the protocol secure to any security level (see Section 6.4). Equivalently,
quantum USS are possible as long as
c−X,0 + c
−
X,1[1− h(φ+X,1)]− h(e+X) > 0. (6.18)
6.4 AWKA protocol security analysis
We will now prove the robustness and security of the main signature protocol, the
AWKA protocol, described in Section 6.2. For robustness, we prove that the prob-
ability of the signature being rejected when all participants are honest is negligibly
small. For security, we prove that the probability of an adversary being able to forge
or repudiate (as per Definitions 4.9 and 4.11) is negligibly small. Recall that for this
three-party protocol using the majority vote dispute resolution process, security
against repudiation and non-transferability are equivalent.
In what follows, we assume that Bob and Charlie have each indepen-
dently performed the KGP twice (once for each future message) with Al-
ice to generate the strings (VB,m, ZB,m, XB,m,keep, XB,m,forward) for Bob and
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(VC,m, ZC,m, XC,m,keep, XC,m,forward) for Charlie, where m ∈ {0, 1} denotes the mes-
sage. Translated to the USS notation as per Section 6.2:
• for Bob, XB,m,keep = Bm1 and XB,m,forward = Bm2 . The corresponding L-bit
string generated by the KGP for Alice is AmB .
• for Charlie, XC,m,keep = Cm1 and XC,m,forward = Cm2 . The corresponding L-bit
string generated by the KGP for Alice is AmC .
6.4.1 Robustness
Suppose that all participants are honest. Bob rejects a signed message if either Bm1
or Cm2 has a mismatch rate higher than sa with Alice’s signature, (AmB , AmC ). During
parameter estimation performed on the strings VA,m and VB,m (both are length k
strings) Alice and Bob observe the error rate in the Alice-Bob channel. Their aim is
to use these observations to bound the true channel error rate. For this, Serfling’s
inequality is helpful.
Theorem 6.5 (Serfling’s Inequality [118]). Let X1, . . . , Xn be a list of random vari-
ables taking values in {0, 1} and let Xi1 , . . . , Xik be a sample of k of those random
variables, chosen without replacement. Further, define
µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
xi and Sk =
k∑
j=1
Xij . (6.19)
Then for any δ > 0,
P(µ− 1
k
Sk ≥ δ) ≤ exp
[
− 2kδ
2
1− k−1
n
]
. (6.20)
Suppose the error rate observed by Alice and Bob during parameter estimation is
e˜X,B. Serfling’s inequality upper-bounds the true error rate, eX,B, in the Alice-Bob
channel as
eX,B ≤ e˜X,B + δ := e+X,B, (6.21)
where
δ :=
√
ln(1/PE)
2k
(
1− k − 1
n
)
. (6.22)
The bound holds except with probability PE. Similarly, we can upper bound the
error rate in the Alice-Charlie channel by e+X,C . Based on these error rates derived
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in the distribution stage of the protocol, the participants set e+X := max{e+X,B, e+X,C}
and choose sa such that sa > e+X .
Finally, given that the true error rates in both the Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie
channels are less than e+X (except with probability PE), we can use Hoeffding’s
inequality to bound the probability of Bob finding an error rate higher than sa
when checking either Bm1 or Cm2 against Alice’s signature. The result is
P(Honest Failure) ≤ 2 exp [−(sa − e+X)2L]+ 2PE, (6.23)
where the factors of 2 arise since the abort can be due to either Bm1 or Cm2 .
6.4.2 Security against forging
It is easier for either Bob or Charlie to forge than for any other external party,
and we will therefore consider forging by an internal party. Forging is defined in
Definition 4.9 in Chapter 4. For the three party scenario considered, the coalition
can have at most one member and it cannot be Alice. Without loss of generality,
suppose the forger is Bob. In order to forge a message, Bob must give a declaration
(m, Sigm) to Charlie that has fewer than svn (= svL/2) mismatches with both Cm1
and Bm2 6. Since Bob knows Bm2 , matching that part is trivial and we therefore only
consider Cm1 . If parameter estimation is successful in the KGP, then the worst-case
(maximum) rate at which Alice’s signature would make errors with Charlie’s key is
known – call it e+X . From Eq. (6.17), we also know the minimum rate at which a
dishonest Bob will make errors with Charlie’s key – call it p∗E.
Assuming e+X < p
∗
E (if not, the protocol is aborted), the particpants choose sv
such that e+X < sv < p
∗
E. In this case, Charlie will likely accept a legitimate signature
originating from Alice, since the upper bound on their error rate, e+X , is less than the
threshold sv. On the other hand, Charlie will likely reject any dishonest signature
declaration by Bob, since the probability of Bob finding a signature with an error
rate smaller than sv is restricted by Theorem 6.1 as
P(Bob (Eve) makes fewer than svn errors) = psvn
≤ 2−{Hmin(X|E)ρ−nh(sv)} + 
≤ 2−n{c−X,0+c−X,1[1−h(φ+X,1)]−h(sv)} + .
(6.24)
The calculation of quantities in the above equation involves a number of parameter
6Since Charlie creates C0 and C1 independently, using arguments very similar to above it can
easily be shown that knowledge of (m′, Sigm′) cannot help Bob to forge for m′ 6= m.
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estimation processes due to the finite samples taken. Suppose that if any parameter
estimation procedure fails (so, for example, if e+X is not a good upper bound), then
Bob is able to successfully forge with certainty. In this conservative setting, Bob’s
probability of successfully forging is bounded as
P(Forge) ≤ 2−{Hmin(X|E)ρ−nh(sv)} + + ˜PE
≤ 2−n{c−X,0+c−X,1[1−h(φ+X,1)]−h(sv)} + + ˜PE,
(6.25)
where ˜PE is set as the probability of the upper/lower bounds failing on any of the
estimated quantities eX , sX,0, sX,1 or φX,1 (see Appendix A.1). This equation is
valid for any choice of , ˜PE > 0 and can be made arbitrarily small by increasing
the signature length.
Note that security against forging from Bob derives entirely from the Alice-
Charlie KGP, in which Bob is already assumed to be an adversary. Specifically, all
parameters which go into the above security analysis can be derived in the distribu-
tion stage by Alice and Charlie alone, and cannot be influenced by Bob in any way
that will help him to forge.
To make the protocol secure also against attempts to forge from Charlie, ex-
actly the same arguments as above apply except with the roles of Bob and Charlie
switched. The overall protocol would find two pairs of e+X and p
∗
E, one pair from the
Alice-Bob KGP and one from the Alice-Charlie KGP. It would then take the worst
case estimates, i.e. set e+X := max{e+X,B, e+X,C} and p∗E := min{p∗E,B, p∗E,C}.
6.4.3 Security against repudiation
Repudiation is defined in Definition 4.11 in Chapter 4. Since the dishonest coalition
can have at most one member and must include the signer, Alice must be the one
trying to repudiate. Without loss of generality, suppose she first sends the message
to Bob. In this case, she aims to send a declaration (m, Sigm) which Bob will accept
and, when forwarded, Charlie will reject. To do this, Bob must accept both Bm1
and Cm2 at threshold sa, and Charlie must reject at least one of either Cm1 or Bm2 at
threshold sv, where sv > sa.
Intuitively, security against repudiation follows because of the symmetrisation
performed by Bob and Charlie using the secret classical channel, and the gap between
sa and sv. Even if Alice knows and can control the error rates between AmB and Bm,
and between AmC and Cm, she cannot control whether the introduced errors end up
with Bob or Charlie following symmetrisation. Accordingly, after symmetrisation,
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the expected error rate for Bob with Alice’s signature must be the same as the
expected error rate for Charlie with Alice’s signature. To repudiate, due the the gap
between sa and sv, one recipient must find significantly more errors than the other.
We give Alice full power and assume that in the messaging stage she is able to
fully control the number of mismatches her signature declaration contains with Bm
and Cm – call the mismatch rates eB and eC respectively. In the symmetrisation
process, Bob creates Bm2 by randomly selecting half of the elements in Bm. He
sends this set to Charlie in secret. Charlie does similar as per Step 2 of the
distribution stage. We aim to show that any choice of eC and eB from Alice leads
to an exponentially decaying probability of repudiation.
Case 1. Suppose that Alice chooses eC > sa. In this case, Bob is receiving
(without replacement) L/2 elements from the set Cm, which contains exactly eCL
mismatches with Alice’s future signature declaration (since a dishonest Alice can
perfectly control the mismatch rate). The number of mismatches Bob receives in
Cm2 therefore follows a hypergeometric distribution H(L, eCL,L/2), with expected
value eCL/2. In order to accept the message, Bob must find fewer than saL/2
errors. Using tail bounds due to Chvátal [62] we can bound the probability that
Cm2 contains fewer than saL/2 mismatches as
P(Cm2 contains fewer than saL/2 mismatches) ≤ exp[−(eC − sa)2L]. (6.26)
To repudiate, Alice must make Bob accept the message, which means that Bob
must accept both Bm1 and Cm2 . Accordingly, the probability of Bob accepting the
message is less than or equal to the probability of Bob accepting Cm2 , given by Eq.
(6.26), which decays exponentially.
Case 2. Suppose that Alice chooses eC ≤ sa. In this case, if eB > sa, the
same argument as in Case 1 above shows that it is highly likely that Bob will reject
the message, so we consider only the case where we also have eB ≤ sa.
Consider the set Bm. We can use the same arguments as above to bound the
probability of Bm2 containing more than svL/2 mismatches as
P(Bm2 contains more than svL/2 mismatches) ≤ exp[−(sv − eB)2L]. (6.27)
Charlie rejects the signature if he finds more than svL/2 mismatches in either Cm1
or Bm2 . The probability of this happening is at most the sum of the probability of
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Charlie finding more than svL/2 mismatches in Cm1 and the probability of Charlie
finding more than svL/2 mismatches in Bm2 . For eB, eC ≤ sa, we have
P(Charlie rejects signature) ≤ 2 exp[−(sv − sa)2L]. (6.28)
So again, the probability of Alice successfully repudiating decreases exponentially
in the size of the signature. Therefore, we can see that there is no strategy available
to Alice that leads to a non-negligle success probability, meaning the protocol is
secure against repudiation (and non-transferability) attempts.
In fact, Alice’s optimal strategy is to choose the middle ground and set
eB = eC =
1
2
(sv + sa). In this case
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
4
(sv − sa)2L
]
. (6.29)
Note that security against repudiation derives entirely from the symmetrisation
performed by Bob and Charlie, in which Alice plays no part. Even if Alice can
control the choices of sa and sv by manipulating the error rates achieved during the
Alice-Bob KGP and the Alice-Charlie KGP, the choice of L takes into account the
public parameters sa and sv, and the protocol is secure regardless.
6.5 Comparison to QKD
For the finite size, decoy-state BB84 protocol described above, Appendix B of [114]
gives the length of the extractable secret key as
l ≈ s−X,0 + s−X,1
[
1− h(φ+X,1)
]− λEC , (6.30)
where the approximation is due to the omission of some small constants related to
the possibility of failure of error correction and privacy amplification. The term λEC
represents the information leaked to Eve during error correction. It depends on the
specific implementation of the error correction process, but, according to the CQSW
theorem (in Section 3.4.2), must be greater or equal to nh(e+X), where n is the size
of the bit string being corrected. In practice, error correction will not be perfect
and it is common to write λEC = nfECh(e+X) where fEC is a leakage parameter.
To perform error correction, the total raw key is split into blocks and the leakage
parameter, fEC , depends on this block size, but not the overall length of the key.
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Increasing the block size reduces fEC at the cost of decreasing the efficiency of the
error correction protocol. Estimates of fEC for practically feasible error correction is
an area of active research [119], though it is commonly estimated to be in the range
1.1− 1.2, regardless of the length of the total key being distilled. For example, [120]
assumes fEC = 1.2 based on the performance of error-correcting codes in use at ID
Quantique. Rewriting (6.30), we obtain
l ≈ n{c−X,0 + c−X,1 [1− h(φ+X,1)]− fECh(e+X)} . (6.31)
Comparing equations (6.18) and (6.31), we immediately see that the inclusion of
fEC means that there are Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie quantum channels for which
quantum USS schemes are possible and yet practical QKD gives a zero key genera-
tion rate. As stated above, fEC is independent of n and so cannot be decreased by
simply increasing the size of the total key. The important point is that because our
quantum USS scheme omits the inefficient process of error correction, in practice
there is always some region in which quantum signature generation is possible but
secure key distillation is not.
6.6 Experimental implementations
We use this section to outline various experimental implementations of the AWKA
scheme. In Section 6.6.1 we simulate the AWKA scheme using realistic system
parameters taken from an existing BB84 QKD setup described in Ref. [121]. The
simulation allows us to estimate the efficiency of the scheme and to compare it to
previous signature experiments.
In Section 6.6.2 we outline the results of two actual implementations of our
scheme performed over 90km of installed optical fibre [122, 123]. Both are imple-
mentations of the AWKA scheme, but neither use a BB84-type system to perform
the KGP. Instead, the KGP is performed using the existing differential phase shift
QKD (DPS-QKD) system developed for use in the Tokyo QKD network.
6.6.1 Simulation
In this section we use system parameters taken from Ref. [121] to estimate the
number of states that Bob and Charlie need to transmit over a 50 km quantum
channel in order to securely sign a 1-bit message over 50 km. We stress that the
analyses performed in this example have not been optimised. Instead, it is meant to
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illustrate the protocol and to provide approximate signing rates/signature lengths.
Experimental parameters
The experiment uses a 1 GHz source capable of transmitting at three different in-
tensities (u1, u2, u3) = (0.425, 0.0435, 0.0022). The intensities are chosen with prob-
abilities pu1 = 0.25, pu2 = 0.4 and pu3 = 0.35. Independently, the encoding bases
are chosen with probabilities pX = 0.5 and pZ = 0.5.7 The signals are transmitted
via optical fibre at 1550 nm achieving a channel attenuation of 0.2 dB/km. The
receiver loss at Alice is 2.8 dB and her detectors have efficiency ηdet = 20.4%. The
dark count rate, pd, is the rate at which the detectors register counts in the absence
of any incident light. Here we set pd = 2.1× 10−5. Lastly, there is a biased optical
bit error rate of QX = 1.38% in the X basis and QZ = 0.76% in the Z basis.
Source and channel estimates
Over 50km, the signal attenuation due to the combined channel and receiver loss is
ηch = 0.0525. The parameter η represents the overall system transmission, where
η = ηdetηch = 0.0107. The detection rates, Rui , for signals with intensity ui can be
modelled as [124]
Rui = 1− (1− 2pd)e−ηui . (6.32)
The X basis bit error rates, eX,ui , for signals with intensity ui can be modelled as
eX,ui =
(1− e−ηui)QX + e−ηuipd
Rui
, (6.33)
and similarly for the Z basis bit error rates.
Protocol parameters and security
A USS scheme is called δ-correct and δ-secure if the probabilities of honest failure,
forging, non-transferability and repudiation are all less than δ (see Chapter 4). In
what follows we set δ = 10−4. The choice of security level is arbitrary but is chosen
to match with the existing quantum USS literature. The security and correctness of
the AWKA protocol is described by Eqs. (6.23), (6.25) and (6.29). To evaluate these
expressions, we must first set the value of the internal parameters sa and sv. From
the security proofs above, sa and sv must be chosen such that e+X < sa < sv < p
∗
E.
If this is not possible, the protocol aborts following the distribution stage.
7For longer messages, it would be more efficient to bias these probabilities so that PX > 1/2
and to sign multiple messages using a single Z basis error estimation, as in [111].
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The quantity e+X,I , with I ∈ {B,C}, is an upper bound on the X basis error
rate found from parameter estimation in the KGP performed by Alice and recipient
I (see Eq. (6.21)). For this example the Alice-Bob and the Alice-Charlie channels
are the same, and as such the recipient subscript is unnecessary. In practice, it is
likely that the channels will differ, in which case we set e+X := max{e+X,B, e+X,C}, i.e.
we choose the worst case (maximum) of the error rates found in the Alice-Bob and
Alice-Charlie KGPs.
Similarly, the quantity p∗E,I , with I ∈ {B,C}, is a lower bound on the error
rate an eavesdropper is able to achieve when dishonestly declaring a signature. The
quantity derives from the channel noise estimates and is found using Eq. (6.17).
Again, since the Alice-Bob channel could in principle differ from the Alice-Charlie
channel, the achievable eavesdropper error rates can also differ. Here, and in all that
follows, we set p∗E := min{p∗E,B, p∗E,C}, i.e. we choose the worst case (minimum) of
the achievable error rates.
Suppose that each recipient (we focus on Bob, but Charlie will do exactly the
same) transmits T = 6.09×108 states in total8. From losses due to the experimental
parameters listed, we expect the raw key to contain 2.09 × 105 bit values resulting
from successful X basis measurements. Of these, Bob will randomly choose n =
L/2 = 9.94× 104 to be Bm1 and another L/2 will be chosen as Bm2 . The remaining
k = 9.94×103 bits make up VB and will be used to estimate the correlation between
Alice’s and Bob’s X basis measurement outcomes.
For the given intensity probabilities, error rates and detection rates, we expect
to observe an X basis bit error rate of 2.87%. Since the overall security level we
require is 10−4, we choose PE = 10−6 meaning ˜PE ≤ 1.1×10−5 (see Appendix A.1).
Eq. (6.21) then provides an upper bound on the true error rate as e+X = 5.37%.
Finding p∗E is slightly more involved. The parameters sX,0, sX,1 and φX,1 are esti-
mated using the observed number of errors and counts in different bases/intensities
(see Appendix A.1 or Appendix B of [114]). Setting  = 10−6, Eq. (6.2) allows us
to estimate the min-entropy as
Hmin(X|E)ρ = 4.12× 104. (6.34)
Together with Eq. (6.17), this gives p∗E = 8.36%. Note that both e
+
X and p
∗
E are
found in the distribution stage, and the parameters sa and sv are also set in the
distribution stage.
8This number, though currently obscure, is chosen to provide the required security level of 10−4,
as we shall see.
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The aim is to choose the internal parameters sa and sv so as to maximise
the security level for a given signature length. It is important to minimise both the
signature length, 2L, and the number of signals required to generate the signature,
T . Reducing L is desirable as it reduces the communication overhead imposed by
appending the signature to a message. Reducing T is desirable as it increases the
rate at which signatures can be generated. Here we set
sa = e
+
X +
p∗E − e+X
4
= 0.0612, sv = e
+
X +
3(p∗E − e+X)
4
= 0.0761. (6.35)
This choice seems reasonable and is in line with previous quantum signature exper-
iments [1]. However, we do not show it is optimal and better choices may exist.
Given these parameters, we find
P(Honest failure) ≤ 2.97× 10−5, (6.36)
P(Forge) ≤ 1.20× 10−5, (6.37)
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2.98× 10−5. (6.38)
Results
Overall, the above analysis shows that to sign a 1-bit message to a security level
of 10−4, the AWKA protocol requires a signature length of 2L = 1.99 × 105. This
requires the recipients (Bob and Charlie) to transmit 6.09× 108 states per possible
message. For a 1-bit message there are two possibilities, meaning the senders must
each transmit 1.22 × 109 states in total. With a 1GHz source, this translates to
being able to sign a 1-bit message once every 1.2 seconds9.
6.6.2 Other experimental implementations
As we have seen, the AWKA scheme uses an underlying QKD-like process (the KGP)
to generate correlated keys between participants. Although we have so far chosen
a BB84 implementation, we can in fact base the KGP on any valid QKD scheme.
Due to its efficiency and ease of use, differential phase shift QKD (DPS-QKD) [125]
has become a popular choice of protocol among many experimental groups.
In Refs. [122, 123] the AWKA protocol is performed using a modified DPS-QKD
9It should be stressed that this analysis has not been optimised.
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link to generate the keys Am, Bm and Cm. The increased efficiency of DPS systems
allows the protocol to be performed over longer distances and requires much shorter
keys. The aim of these experiments was to demonstrate the simplicity of performing
the AWKA scheme using any existing QKD network.
Security
DPS-QKD differs from standard QKD by encoding information into the relative
phase of successive pulses. This change allows for simpler experimental implemen-
tations, but comes at the cost of reduced security. Until recently there was no proof
that DPS-QKD was unconditionally secure, and, in order to make any security state-
ments, it was necessary to place additional restrictions on the adversary’s abilities.
Unconditional security proofs do now exist [126, 127], but require photon-number-
resolving detectors as well as a slightly different setup to the system used in this
experiment.
As such, the security analysis performed for this implementation of the AWKA
scheme was restricted to adversaries capable of only independent and sequential
attacks (i.e. attacks on a limited number of successive pulses). These are the
most realistic attacks given current technology, but they do not include all possible
attacks. The security against forging attempts relies on results in Ref. [128] to
bound the success probability of an eavesdropper attempting to forge a message.
The security against repudiation attempts follows similarly to Section 6.4.3, though
again, security is only valid for restricted adversaries as above. For full details, see
Refs. [122, 123].
Experimental setup
The experimental setup is shown in Figure 6.1 and a full description of the system
components is provided in Ref. [123]. For completeness, in this subsection we
reproduce the key points.
Only one DPS-QKD system was available, so that states were first sent with
the source acting as Bob, and later as Charlie. The transmitting system used a
continuous-wave (CW) laser diode with a central wavelength of 1551 nm. The CW
output was modulated into a series of pulses using a lithium niobate (LiNbO3) op-
tical intensity modulator driven at clock rate of 1 GHz so that the time between
the centre of each pulse was T = 1 ns. For each pulse a field programmable gated
array (FPGA) selected a phase of 0 or pi radians which was subsequently imparted
onto the signal using a LiNbO3 phase modulator. The intensity of the optical pulses
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was also attenuated to a mean photon number per pulse of 0.2. Additional at-
tenuation was introduced via a variable neutral-density (ND) filter at Bob/Charlie
to simulate longer transmission distances. The optical encoder was used for signal
synchronisation.
The pulses were transmitted over a 90 km standard telecommunications optical
fibre link comprised of a 45 km installed fibre link configured with a loopback at
the far end. The total transmission loss was 28.7± 0.2 dB, giving a per-unit length
loss of 0.32 dB/km. This was used in conversion of the additional attenuation into
equivalent length.
Receiver Alice employed a temperature-stabilised silica planar light-wave circuit
to introduce a delay of 1 ns so that successive pulses could be interfered. The
phase difference between the two successive pulses, either 0 or pi, determined which
superconducting niobium nitride superconducting nanowire single-photon detector
(SNSPD) the pulse was routed towards for detection. This allowed the encoded
information to be decoded, with one detector denoted as signifying 0 and the other
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Figure 6.1: The figure, taken from Ref. [123], shows the experimental setup used to perform the
AWKA quantum USS scheme.
Results
The system represents a significant advance in the operating length and efficiency
of quantum USS systems. Over a distance of 90 km, the system is able to sign a
1-bit message every t = 0.2 seconds for a security level of 10−4. The corresponding
signature length is L = 2, 502 bits.
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This signature length and generation time improves upon all previous implemen-
tations of quantum USS schemes by approximately an order of magnitude. However,
as mentioned, these efficiency improvements are partly due to the use of DPS-QKD,
and therefore come at the cost of sacrificing the proof of unconditional security.
6.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented a quantum USS protocol and proven its uncondi-
tional security against the most general attacks allowed by quantum mechanics. It
improves upon all previous quantum USS schemes in a number of ways.
First, it removes all trust assumptions on the quantum channels between par-
ticipants. Second, despite removing these assumptions, the AWKA protocol also
significantly reduces the length of the signature needed to sign a message. The sim-
ulation results in Section 6.6.1 suggest that a signature length of L = 1.99× 105 is
required to sign a 1-bit message with 10−4 security over a distance of 50 km10. This
would require Bob and Charlie to transmit approximately 6.09×108 states (per pos-
sible bit to be signed) to Alice during each of their respective KGP’s. We compare
this to the previously most efficient quantum USS protocols which required both a
signature length and the number of states transmitted to be O(1010) to achieve 10−4
security over just 1 km [1, 59].
The increase in efficiency is largely due to the fact that in the AWKA protocol
Bob and Charlie send different states to Alice, whereas previous quantum protocols
had all been same-state protocols, i.e. Alice sent Bob and Charlie the same states.
In same-state protocols, even without any eavesdropping, a potential forger has
access to a legitimate copy of each of the states Alice sent to the participants. This
problem becomes even more serious when generalising to N participants with up to
t dishonest parties, since colluding forgers may have t legitimate copies of each state.
In our protocol, in which different states are sent by each participant, this problem
is evaded. The only source of information for a potential forger is by eavesdropping
on the quantum channels – an activity not considered in the theoretical analysis of
previous protocols due to the assumption of “tamper-proof” quantum channels.
The third advantage of the AWKA scheme is that it closes the gap between
theory and experiment. Previous schemes were proven to be secure within a given
theoretical model, but required modifications to make them experimentally viable.
10We do not consider the signature length and generation times found in Section 6.6.2, since
these are not proven to provide unconditonal security.
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These modifications, though small, compromised the security analysis and left the
schemes lacking a full security proof against all types of attack. The AWKA scheme
allows Bob and Charlie to use a coherent light source, and then decoy-state tech-
niques are used to map the weak coherent states back to the single-photon setting.
The result is a protocol that is both provably secure and fully implementable using
current technology.
Lastly, we showed that the noise threshold in the quantum channels connecting
Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie is in practice less strict for quantum USS schemes than
for distilling a secret key using QKD. For some quantum channels, therefore, USS
protocols that use QKD (e.g. P2 of [1]) are not possible, while our direct quantum
protocol remains possible. This is a concrete example of a scenario in which direct
quantum USS schemes are preferable to classical USS schemes, the latter of which
always requires secret shared keys which can only be generated with information-
theoretic security using QKD.
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Chapter 7
Measurement-device-independent
quantum USS schemes
7.1 Introduction
Throughout this thesis we have talked about schemes with information-theoretic
security – schemes that are secure as long as the laws of quantum mechanics are
true. While the systems considered technically do provide this level of security,
it is of a theoretical nature; the security holds within our idealised models of the
cryptosystems we are analysing. For instance, a common assumption in both QKD
and quantum USS schemes is that participants’ labs are completely private from Eve
and the outside world. However, in reality it has been shown that there are many
reasons why this assumption may not hold true. For example, in any communication
protocol, participants’ labs must be connected to the channels which link them to
other protocol participants. Therefore, their labs are often not completely isolated,
and there are open lines through which the eavesdropper can penetrate to gain
additional information on the state of the supposedly “private” labs. Loopholes
such as these can be very serious, and have been exploited to completely break the
security of real-world QKD systems [129–134].
The problem we are describing is one of side information – it is possible that the
adversary could have additional information, not included in the theoretical model,
which allows her to perform powerful strategies which bypass the security proofs.
The additional information may arise as a result of a breakdown of explicitly stated
assumptions, as suggested above, but more generally can arise in any number of
more subtle ways. For example, in the real world, it is highly likely that protocol
participants will not create all of the equipment contained within their own lab.
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Even if they did, they would usually not be able to guarantee there has been no
eavesdropping on the equipment creation process. Much more likely, especially for
commercial systems, is that most experimental components – detectors, sources,
beamsplitters etc – will be bought from a third party provider who cannot be fully
trusted. Any additional information an adversary is able to gain on system compo-
nents is called side information, and must be characterised and protected against if
one wants to claim real-world security. To bridge this new gap between the theory
and practice of QKD, there are a number of proposed solutions. As we shall see,
these solutions can also be applied to quantum USS schemes.
For QKD, one approach is to attempt to model all possible side channels and
prove that the system remains secure against all attacks using the additional side
information [93]. This solution seems very difficult, as it requires complex real
devices to be modelled and fully characterised. Further, the class of strategies
available to the adversary using side information is huge, and characterising them
to prove security is a daunting prospect. A perhaps better approach is what’s
called “device independence”. Device independent QKD (DI-QKD) does not require
any modelling of any of the devices used in the protocol. Instead, the violation of
Bell inequalities is used to infer that the state held by Alice and Bob is close to
a maximally entangled state, and from there the monogamy of entanglement can
be used to prove security. The major advantage of this approach is that security
rests entirely on the correlation statistics observed by Alice and Bob, since it is
only these statistics that are used to deduce their shared state. The devices used to
generate the statistics need not be trusted as long as the holders are free to choose
their measurements and the detection efficiency is sufficiently high. The major
disadvantage of this approach is efficiency; because of the detection loophole, high
detection efficiency is required. Even then, DI-QKD generates extremely low key
rates [135, 136]. Is it possible to use the ideas of device independence but somehow
maintain efficiency?
In this chapter we begin in Sections 7.2 and 7.3 by introducing the concept of
measurement-device independence; a frontrunner in the potential solutions to the
side information problem in the context of QKD. We will see that measurement-
device-independence partially bridges the gap between theory and experiment, and
provides a higher level of practical security while also maintaining protocol efficiency.
In Section 7.4 we follow Ref. [137] in applying these techniques to create the first
measurement-device-independent quantum USS protocol. We go on to analyse its
security and provide simulation results to demonstrate its efficiency.
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7.2 Measurement-device-independent QKD
Historically, detectors have been the most vulnerable part of practical QKD setups.
Indeed, the hacking attacks cited above all exploit different detector imperfections.
Motivated by this, the goal of measurement-device-independent QKD (MDI-QKD)
[138] is to remove all detector side-channels. Of course, this does not address other
potential side channels such as attacks using source side-channels, and so the aims
of MDI-QKD are more limited in scope than fully device-independent QKD. Nev-
ertheless, an efficient MDI-QKD scheme would be an important step forward as it
removes almost all known hacking attacks using side information.
The essential idea of MDI-QKD derives from a time-reversed EPR protocol for
QKD suggested in 1996 [139]. The time-reversed protocol is very similar to the
entanglement based EPR BB84 protocol described in Section 3.3.1, but, unsurpris-
ingly, acts in reverse. In EPR schemes, a maximally entangled state is prepared and
later projected onto the BB84 states to generate the key. The key is secure because
the eavesdropper does not know what basis Alice and Bob will choose, and only the
maximally entangled state can produce perfect correlation in both bases. Monogamy
of entanglement then implies security. On the other hand, in reverse EPR schemes
the BB84 states are prepared and later projected onto one of the Bell states (which
are all maximally entangled) by means of an untrusted party’s (Eve’s) measurement.
The measurement results are announced and used by Alice and Bob to deduce the
other’s bit, e.g. if Bob sends |0〉 and Eve announces |ψ+〉 = 1/√2(|01〉+ |10〉) as the
measurement outcome, Bob can deduce that his bit must be anti-correlated with
Alice’s (i.e. she sent |1〉 to Eve) and so flip his bit accordingly (assuming they also
post-select on matching basis choices). Security follows because, similarly to before,
Eve does not know Alice’s and Bob’s basis choice, and the only measurement that
will produce results which do not lead to errors (between Alice’s and Bob’s key)
is the honest Bell measurement. However, if Eve performs the Bell measurement,
she effectively projects Alice and Bob into sharing a maximally entangled state. As
before, monogamy of entanglement means that Eve can then have no information
on their shared key.
In the reversed EPR scheme, Alice and Bob only need to be able to prepare BB84
states, which are then sent to Eve for measurement. Thus, the measurement device
is completely untrusted and it is unnecessary to attempt to characterise it. Despite
this, the protocol remains secure! Nevertheless, MDI-QKD does require Alice and
Bob to characterise the states they prepare, and this characterisation should take
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place in a protected environment outside the influence of the adversary. MDI-
QKD combines the idea of time-reversed QKD with decoy-state QKD to produce
an efficient, practical and much more secure protocol.
7.3 BB84 MDI-QKD
In this section we describe a decoy-state BB84 MDI-QKD protocol, taken from
Ref. [140], which we will later use to construct a measurement-device-independent
quantum USS scheme, similar to the AWKA scheme presented in Chapter 6.
1. State preparation. Alice chooses a bit value r ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random
and encodes it into a phase-randomised coherent state with three possible
intensities – a signal intensity, as, and two decoy intensities, ad1 and ad2 .
The bit is encoded using either the X or Z basis. The intensity level and
encoding basis are chosen randomly by Alice, each with probability pa,α, where
a ∈ {as, ad1 , ad2} and α ∈ {X,Z}. Bob does exactly the same, independently
to Alice.
2. State distribution. Alice and Bob send their state to Eve using a quantum
channel.
3. Measurement. If Eve is honest, she makes a Bell state measurement on
the received signals. Whether Eve acted honestly or not, she informs Alice
and Bob of whether or not her measurement was successful. If successful, she
declares the Bell state obtained as the measurement outcome.
4. Sifting. If Eve reports a successful result, Alice and Bob communicate their
intensity and basis settings using an authenticated classical channel. For each
Bell state k, we define two groups of sets: Za,bk and X a,bk . The sets group the
signals according to basis choice (if Alice and Bob choose different bases the
signals are discarded), and further by the chosen intensity levels and measure-
ment outcome. The a, b superscript denotes the intensity chosen by Alice and
Bob respectively, and k denotes the Bell state measurement outcome declared
by Eve. Steps 1–4 are repeated until |Za,bk | ≥ Ma,bk and |X a,bk | ≥ Na,bk for all
a, b and k. The choice of Ma,bk and N
a,b
k will depend on the post-processing
techniques used and the desired security level. After this, Bob modifies his bits
according to the declared measurement outcome to correctly correlate them
with those of Alice. The modifications necessary are shown in Table 7.1.
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5. Parameter estimation. Alice and Bob together choose nk random bits from
X as,bsk to form the bit strings Xk held by Alice, and X ′k held by Bob. The
remaining Rk bits from X as,bsk are used to compute the error rate, Eas,bsk =
1
Rk
∑
l rl ⊕ r′l, where rl and r′l are Alice’s and Bob’s bits, respectively. After
this the bits in Rk are discarded. If Eas,bsk > Etol for all k, then Alice and
Bob abort the protocol. If Eas,bsk ≤ Etol, Alice and Bob use Za,bk and X a,bk to
estimate s−k,0, s
−
k,1 and φ
+
k,1. The parameter s
−
k,0 is a lower bound for the number
of bits in Xk where Alice sent a vacuum state. Similarly, s−k,1 is a lower bound
for the number of bits in Xk arising from when Alice and Bob both sent a
single-photon state. φ+k,1 is an upper bound for the single-photon phase error
rate. If φ+k,1 > φtol, the corresponding strings Xk and X
′
k are discarded.
6. Error correction. For those k that passed the parameter estimation step,
Bob obtains an estimate X˜k of Xk using an information reconciliation scheme.
For this, Alice sends him λEC,k bits of error correction data.
7. Privacy amplification. If k passed the error correction step, Alice and Bob
apply a random universal hash function to Xk and X˜k to extract two shorter
strings with higher secrecy. The concatenation of these strings for all non-
aborted k values forms the secret key, S.
Alice’s & Bob’s basis Bell state reported by Eve|ψ−〉 |ψ+〉 |φ−〉 |φ+〉
Z Bit flip Bit flip – –
X Bit flip – Bit flip –
Table 7.1: Processing of data in the sifting stage. The Bell states are defined as |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 −
|10〉), |ψ+〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉+ |10〉), |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉) and |φ−〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉 − |11〉).
MDI-QKD security
A central aim of any QKD protocol analysis is to find the maximum length of the
generated key, S, held by Alice and Bob, such that S can be proven to be almost
perfectly secret (as per Definition 3.3). A crucial element in finding the length of
the generated key is expressing Eve’s uncertainty on the sifted key Xk (before error
correction and privacy amplification) in terms of her min-entropy. For the protocol
above
Hkmin(Xk|E) ≥ s−k,0 + s−k,1[1− h(φ+k,1)]− 2 log2
2
′k ˜k
' s−k,0 + s−k,1[1− h(φ+k,1)],
(7.1)
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where k ≥ ′k + ˜k. The approximation on the second line is valid because the
logarithmic term is small compared to the preceding two terms. For clarity, and since
it does not impact our later results, we omit explicit references to the logarithmic
term.
Advantages of MDI-QKD
As discussed above, the major advantage of MDI-QKD is that it removes all possible
detector side-channel attacks, thus bringing theory further in line with practical
implementations. On top of this, the scheme also enjoys a number of secondary
advantages discussed below.
First, a severe practical limitation of all QKD schemes is that they are fun-
damentally distance limited – current fibre-based QKD systems are restricted to
distributing key over distances up to approximately 250km, but for efficiency typ-
ically operate at distances of less than 100km. Theoretical results show that this
limitation is inherent to any optical QKD scheme [141] and cannot be overcome
without quantum memory. By placing the detectors halfway between Alice and
Bob, MDI-QKD effectively doubles the achievable transmission distance.
Second, MDI-QKD is very efficient compared to other attempts to remove side-
channel attacks. Fully DI-QKD suffers hugely from problems associated with the
detection efficiency loophole, which requires an overall detection efficiency of around
80%. For practical QKD setups in which there is high channel loss and only im-
perfect detectors available, DI-QKD becomes essentially impossible, with expected
secret key rates falling below 1 bit per second (bps) if possible at all. On the other
hand, recent advances in experimental techniques have allowed MDI-QKD systems
to achieve secret key rates of 9.7 × 104 bps over a distance of 52km, and Mbps se-
cret key rates over shorter distances [142]. These rates are even comparable to the
state-of-the-art measurement-device-dependent QKD systems.
Third, MDI-QKD removes the need for either Alice or Bob to have detectors.
Detectors are often the most expensive and complex element of a QKD system,
and could significantly increase the cost of purchasing/maintaining a QKD link
between two parties. MDI-QKD allows for the possibility of an untrusted central
node holding all measurement equipment and connecting many parties. From a
commercial perspective, this could be very beneficial in larger networks since it
reduces the cost for each individual Alice and Bob. Instead, they could use third
party measurement providers, such as Eve, whom they do not even need to trust.
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7.4 MDI quantum USS schemes
Just as QKD can suffer from detector side-channel attacks, so too can quantum USS
schemes. In the context of the AWKA scheme presented in Chapter 6, Eve could,
for example, employ a detector hacking strategy to produce a string Eguess such
that d(AmB , Bm) ≥ d(Eguess, Bm) with probability greater than  (c.f Eq. (6.1)) even
when the channel noise is low. This is not due to a flaw in the security proof, but
rather due to the limitations of the model assumptions – namely, our model assumes
Alice’s and Bob’s labs are completely secure, and does not consider potential side-
channel attacks. Detector hacking strategies therefore fall outside of the scope of
the strategies included in the supremum in Eq. (6.1).
More generally, any quantum USS scheme will be vulnerable to detector side-
channel attacks since all involve the transmission and measurement of quantum
states. Perhaps due to the relative immaturity of quantum USS schemes compared
to QKD, together with the lack of any “standard” USS scheme, side-channel attacks
have not been considered in the USS literature. In general, removing potential side
channels from quantum USS schemes is a tough open problem, and for many schemes
it is not clear how to achieve measurement-device independence, or even whether it
is possible. However, a major benefit of the AWKA scheme is its similarity to QKD,
which means that the concepts from MDI-QKD can be directly applied to create
the first MDI quantum USS scheme. The results presented in this section have been
published in Ref. [137].
7.4.1 The MDI-AWKA protocol
In this section we modify the AWKA protocol described in Section 6.2 to make it
fully measurement-device-independent. The idea is simple: the protocol proceeds
in exactly the same way as before, except that whenever Alice, Bob or Charlie need
to perform either the KGP or QKD, they instead perform an MDI version using an
untrusted party, Eve, to perform all measurements. The modified distribution stage
is shown in Figure 7.1, while the messaging stage remains unchanged. For a detailed
description of each stage, refer to Section 6.2 and note that whenever the KGP or
QKD is mentioned, here it is replaced by a measurement-device-independent version
(the MDI-KGP is described below). Finally, recall that for signature protocols, in
which any party could be dishonest, Eve could actually be Alice, Bob or Charlie.
114
AliceAmB A
m
C
Eve
Bob
Bm → Bm1 , Bm2
Charlie
Cm → Cm1 , Cm2
C
C
C
C
Q
C
QC
QC
(a) MDI-KGP.
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Figure 7.1: The distribution stage of the MDI-AWKA protocol. In (a), Alice, Bob and Charlie all
have quantum channels to Eve. Alice-Bob and Alice-Charlie are also connected via authenticated
classical channels. Similarly to the AWKA protocol, they use these channels to perform the MDI-
KGP to generate the sets AmB , B
m, AmC and C
m, independently for each of m = 0, 1. Bob and
Charlie then randomly (and secretly) split their sets, Bm and Cm, in half. In (b), Bob and Charlie
use the quantum channels to Eve, together with the Bob-Charlie authenticated classical channel,
to perform MDI-QKD to create a secret classical channel. They use this to transmit Bm2 and Cm2
to the each other in secret.
The MDI-KGP
The KGP is simply the quantum part of QKD without the classical post-processing
steps of error correction and privacy amplification. Similarly, the MDI-KGP is
simply steps 1–5 of the MDI-QKD protocol described above, with steps 6 and 7
omitted. For example, to perform the MDI-KGP to generate sets AmB and Bm, Alice
and Bob each send a sequence of phase-randomised weak coherent pulses to Eve,
who announces a Bell state as the measurement outcome. Alice and Bob sift their
results to filter out any positions where they chose different bases, and they perform
the correction operations specified by Eve’s measurement outcome. The resulting
string held by Alice is AmB and the string held by Bob is Bm. They do not perform
error correction or privacy amplification, so the strings will be neither identical nor
perfectly secret. However, as long as the error rate found in parameter estimation
is sufficiently low, we will show that the MDI-KGP is still -secure, i.e.
sup
{
P
(
d(AmB , B
m) ≥ d(Eguess, Bm)
)}
≤ , (7.2)
where the supremum is taken over all strategies for Eve allowed by quantum me-
chanics. As before, the probability is taken over Eguess, Eve’s attempt at guessing
Bm, and d(., .) is the Hamming distance. Note that now, since neither Alice nor
Bob have detectors, there can be no detector side-channel attacks available to Eve.
115
MDI-KGP security
Suppose that Alice and Bob perform the MDI-KGP so that Bob generates the strings
(VB, ZB, XB,keep, XB,forward) for use in the signature protocol, exactly as described in
Section 6.3. As before, the string XB,keep has length n and denotes the outcome set
Bm1 . Similarly, the string XB,forward also has length n and denotes the outcome set
Bm2
1. The strings VB and ZB are used to estimate channel error rates and then
they are discarded. The MDI-QKD results stated above in Eq. (7.1), together with
very similar arguments to those in Section 6.3.2, lead to
Hmin(XB,keep|E) ' s−0 + s−1 [1− h(φ+1 )], (7.3)
where s−0 is a lower bound for the number of bits in XB,keep where Alice sent a
vacuum state, s−1 is a lower bound for the number of bits in XB,keep where Alice
and Bob sent a single-photon state, and φ+1 is an upper bound for the single-photon
phase error rate.
Once the conditional min-entropy is known, Theorem 6.1 can be used to bound
pr, Eve’s probability of making at most r mistakes when guessing XB,keep. As before,
pr ≤
r∑
j=0
(
n
j
)
2−H

min(XB,keep|E) + . (7.4)
This bound is used to prove security against forging in the full signature protocol.
7.4.2 The MDI-AWKA protocol security
With the security of the MDI-KGP given above, security of the full MDI-AWKA
protocol proceeds similarly to the analysis performed in Section 6.4. Below we
summarise the arguments.
Robustness
Parameter estimation on the V strings generated during the MDI-KGP leads to
an observed error rate (with Alice’s signature (AmB , AmC )) of e˜X,B for Bob and e˜X,C
for Charlie. Serfling’s inequality allows us to upper bound the actual error rate by
e+X,B and e
+
X,C , as per Eq. (6.21). These bounds hold except with probability PE.
Setting e+X := max{e+X,B, e+X,C} and choosing sa such that sa > e+X , we find that in
1As in Chapter 6, for the sake of clarity we duplicate notation, i.e. set XB,keep = Bm1 and
XB,forward = B
m
2 .
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the honest case Bob will accept Alice’s signature except with probability
P(Honest Failure) ≤ 2PE. (7.5)
Forging
Suppose Bob is trying to forge a message to Charlie. Parameter estimation provides
a bound on the maximum error rate between AmC and Cm1 , call it e
+
X . As before,
Theorem 6.1 and Eq. (6.17) can be used to bound, p∗E, the minimum rate at which
Bob/Eve can make errors, as
1
n
Hmin(XB,keep|E) ≤ h(p∗E). (7.6)
Assuming e+X < p
∗
E (if not, the protocol is aborted), we choose sv such that e
+
X <
sv < p
∗
E and find
P(Forge) ≤ 2−{Hmin(XB,keep|E)−nh(sv)} + + ˜PE, (7.7)
where ˜PE > 0 is the probability of failure of any of the upper/lower bounds on the
estimated quantities eX , s0, s1 and φ1.
Repudiation
Security against repudiation derives from the key exchange performed by Bob and
Charlie over a secret classical channel. This part of the protocol is unaffected by
the switch to measurement-device independence since Bob and Charlie still perform
full QKD. Therefore, as before, we choose sv > sa and find
P(Repudiation) ≤ 2 exp
[
−1
2
(sv − sa)2n
]
. (7.8)
Overall, we see that the protocol is correct and that the probability of forg-
ing, repudiating, or non-transferability decays exponentially with the length of the
signature.
7.4.3 Advantages of MDI-USS schemes
The advantages of MDI-USS schemes are the same as the advantages enjoyed by
MDI-QKD. First and foremost, it brings the theory further in line with practice by
removing detector side-channel attacks. To varying degrees MDI-USS schemes also
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enjoy the same secondary benefits such as increased transmission distances, an only
moderate efficiency loss, and a decrease in the required number of physical quantum
channels.
Unlike QKD, USS schemes necessarily involve N > 2 parties meaning MDI
schemes allowing all participants to simply be connected via quantum channels
to a central untrusted node is a potentially major advantage, more so than for
QKD. On the other hand, the loss in efficiency arising from measurement-device
independence, though moderate, is particularly damaging to USS schemes since
inefficiency is already their major drawback.
7.4.4 Simulation results
In this section we present the results of the simulation performed in Ref. [137] to
estimate the number of quantum transmissions necessary to sign a 1-bit message to
a security level of 10−4 and 10−10 over 50 km. The analysis closely resembles the one
presented in Chapter 6 of this thesis, and is not repeated here. For further details,
see the Appendices A and D from Ref. [137].
Using realistic experimental quantities, the simulation finds that a signature
length of 2L = 3.56× 107 will suffice for a security level of 10−4. This requires Bob
and Charlie to transmit a total of approximately Nsig = 2.23× 1013 quantum states
to Eve to perform the two (each) required MDI-KGPs (one each for each possible
future message m = 0 or 1). Using a 1 GHz source we calculate that it would take
approximately 372 minutes to perform the distribution stage when the experiment
uses single-photon detectors with a detection efficiency (ηD) of 14.5%. Of course,
detectors with higher efficiency will reduce the signature generation time.
Table 7.2 shows the signature generation times for various existing detectors
which could be used in the protocol. The most advanced superconducting nanowire
single-photon detectors (SNSPDs), which have a 93% efficiency [143], require Bob
or Charlie to send 2.56×1011 signals to generate the signature, which could be done
in 6.4 minutes. The table also shows the signature generation times if a security
level of 10−10 is used instead.
Clearly, the signature generation times are currently too long for the scheme to
be considered practical. Nevertheless, the scheme presented in this chapter is the
first MDI quantum USS scheme and should be considered as a proof of concept, first
iteration scheme. Since it can be performed using the same equipment as required
by QKD (with only minor modifications), we believe that many experimental and
theoretical improvements exist allowing the scheme to become much more efficient
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Detectors ηD(%) Y0(×10−6) Nsig(×10
12) tr(min)
10−4 10−10 10−4 10−10
Standard [144] 14.5 6.02 22.3 42.1 372 700
InGaAs APD [145] 30 130 7.20 13.4 120 223
InGaAs/InP APD [146] 55 500 3.48 6.52 58 108
SNSPDs [143] 93 1 0.392 0.72 6.4 12
Table 7.2: Raw key generation times for various detectors that could be used in a MDI-USS protocol
for a distance of 50 km and security thresholds of 10−4 and 10−10. The parameters ηD(%), Y0 and
Nsig denote respectively the detection efficiency, dark count rate of Eve’s detectors, and the number
of signals that Bob/Charlie sends to Alice during their KGPs. tr is the time taken to generate the
raw key assuming a source with a pulse rate of 1 GHz.
as well as remaining implementable with current technology.
Indeed, a recent paper [142] employs an existing MDI-QKD setup to perform
the MDI quantum USS protocol described here, and is able to generate a 1-bit
message signature every 45 seconds to a security level of 10−10. The speedup is
gained despite the fact that the detectors used are InGaAs APDs with an average
efficiency of just 20.9%. The significant improvement in the signature generation
time can be explained partly by a better optimisation of system parameters, but
is mainly due to certain “economies of scale” that appear when using the protocol
to generate more than one signature. Namely, the system was run for a prolonged
length of time – sufficient to collect enough key to generate 2, 506 independent 1-
bit signatures. When many signatures are generated from a large block of collected
data, the authors show that a single estimation procedure is sufficient to characterise
the channel/eavesdropping information for all signatures created from that block.
This leads to an order of magnitude decrease in the average number of required
signals per 1-bit message signature.
7.5 Conclusion
In this chapter we have introduced the first MDI quantum USS scheme and proven it
unconditionally secure. The scheme helps to further bridge the gap between theory
and real-world implementations by removing all detector side-channels, thus ruling
out a wide class of potential hacking attacks. The protocol implementation only re-
quires participants to send coherent states to a central untrusted node who performs
a Bell state measurement. This similarity to QKD means that MDI quantum USS
schemes could easily be deployed in existing QKD networks with only small over-
heads, as demonstrated in Ref. [142]. The MDI structure could also reduce the cost
of USS schemes over larger networks since it both removes the need for participants
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to hold detectors, and reduces the number of physical quantum channels required.
On the other hand, MDI quantum USS schemes suffer from a moderate reduction in
protocol efficiency which, for signatures, further reduces already impractical signing
rates. Nevertheless, since research into MDI quantum USS schemes is still in its in-
fancy, we expect there could be many theoretical and experimental advances which
could significantly improve the quoted signing rates.
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Chapter 8
The hash scheme
8.1 Introduction
The previous two chapters have focused on the development of practical quantum
USS schemes. In this chapter we propose a new classical USS scheme, referred to
as the “hash scheme”, which naturally extends the unconditionally secure MACs
introduced in Section 3.6. The main difference between an unconditionally secure
MAC and an USS scheme is that signature schemes ensure the transferability of
signed content, while authentication codes do not. We propose a method, similar
to secret sharing [147], allowing unconditionally secure MACs to be transformed
into classical USS schemes1. In the hash scheme, a sender shares with each of the
remaining protocol participants (or recipients) a set of keys (hash functions) from
a family of universal hash functions. The recipients then share with each other a
random portion of the keys that they received from the sender. A signature for a
message is a vector of tags generated by applying the hash functions to the message.
As for MACs, the practical implementation of the hash scheme is straightforward
and efficient.
There were two main motivations for this chapter. First, all realisable quantum
USS schemes and many classical USS signature protocols are Lamport-type schemes,
in which participants must perform the distribution stage many times to sign a single
future message. Effectively, the distribution stage is performed once for each possible
future message. In order to sign longer messages, this strategy is hugely inefficient
– to sign an arbitrary n-bit message as a whole, the distribution stage needs to be
performed 2n times; alternatively, if the message is signed bit-by-bit, the distribution
stage would need to be performed 2n times (twice for each bit in the message), and
1The hash scheme can be thought of as a transferable MAC.
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one would need to be careful as to how overall security was defined. The scheme
proposed in this chapter aims to resolve and remove this inefficiency. Second, we
have seen that quantum schemes are partly motivated by their ability to seemingly
provide USS schemes requiring fewer resources than their classical counterparts.
This motivation does not always hold, and for example classical USS schemes such
as P2 [1] exist using only the resources contained in the standard resource model.
Nevertheless, we aimed to find a classical USS scheme that further reduced the
resources required to sign a message in order to further explore whether requiring
fewer resources was a true advantage of quantum USS schemes.
As we shall see, the scheme we present addresses both points above, as well as
others. Using the distribution stage to send hash functions (rather than bit values
as in previous schemes) allows participants to sign any message (up to a given maxi-
mum size) using just the single distribution stage. Further, the scheme achieves this
significant efficiency boost while using fewer resources than quantum USS schemes;
namely, the hash scheme only uses resources scaling similarly to authenticated clas-
sical channels (see Section 8.4).
Compared to the most efficient realisable quantum USS scheme, the hash scheme
is a huge improvement when considering larger messages. For 51 participants signing
a 1 Mb message, both the secret key required by each participant and the signature
length is reduced by a factor of at least 106 (see Section 8.6.2). The disparity in
size becomes larger as the message size increases. A further advantage of classical
schemes over quantum schemes is simplicity – implementation of classical schemes
is easier as it does not necessarily require quantum state preparation/detection2.
As such, if quantum USS schemes are to compete, they must provide additional
motivation for their use.
Direct comparisons of our new protocol to existing classical USS schemes are
more difficult due to the variety of different resources assumed in each. Neverthe-
less, as we shall see in Section 8.6, even compared to the most efficient and practical
classical USS schemes, the hash scheme enjoys a number of favourable properties
such as short secret key requirements, short signature lengths, and high computa-
tional efficiency. Our contributions and the chapter outline can be summarised as
follows.
• We construct a classical USS scheme that, unlike most prior schemes, does
2The removal of quantum state transmission also means that classical schemes are not neces-
sarily distance limited. However, this latter point is not entirely fair, since all classical schemes
require a secret shared key, and these can only be generated with information-theoretic security
using QKD.
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not rely on a trusted authority, detectable broadcast or anonymous channels
(Section 8.2).
• We prove the information-theoretic security of our scheme against forging,
repudiation, and non-transferability (Section 8.3).
• We show that the resources required by our scheme are minimal and have the
same scaling as message authentication (Section 8.4).
• Although our scheme does not rely on trusted third parties, we show that
having a trusted authority makes our scheme even more attractive (Section
8.5)). In addition, we discuss other possible extensions to our scheme.
• We compare our schemes with existing classical and quantum USS schemes, as
well as some common quantum-safe signature schemes (Section 8.6). The com-
parisons show that the hash scheme has a number of unparalleled advantages
over the previous USS schemes.
The work presented in this chapter is taken from Ref. [148] with minor modifications.
8.2 The protocol
The hash scheme is inspired by the protocol named Generalised P2 (GP2), first intro-
duced in [1], and subsequently extended and formalised in [34]. However, contrary
to GP2, in which participants independently distribute bit values for each possible
future message, our new scheme requires participants to distribute universal hash
functions (chosen from an -ASU2 set) which are later used to sign any possible
future message (up to a given maximum size).
Almost strongly universal hash functions are used extensively throughout this
chapter, and are discussed in Section 3.6.3. The effectiveness of the protocol relies on
our ability to find an -ASU2 set which is “small” so that participants can exchange
the hash functions efficiently. Fortunately, finding small -ASU2 sets is an active
area of research, and many already exist. In this chapter we will use the following
theorem.
Theorem 8.1 ([98]). There exists an -ASU2 set F = {f | f : M → T } with
 = 2/|T |, such that if a := log |M| and b := log |T |, then
|F| = 2y, (8.1)
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where y := 23b+2s and s is defined by the equation a = (b+ s)(1 + 2s).
The functions in F are chosen to map messages in the set M to tag values in
the set T . Accordingly, we refer to M as the message set and T as the tag set.
The theorem means that fully specifying an element f ∈ F requires y bits, where y
depends on both the maximum allowed message length and the tag length.
Protocol overview
The protocol contains N + 1 participants: a sender P0 and N receivers, P1, ..., PN .
Before the protocol, all participants agree on an -ASU2 family of functions, F , where
 = 2/|T |. The basic idea is for the sender to give each recipient a number of keys
(hash functions) which will be used in future to authenticate a message by appending
tags (hash values) to the message being sent. To check the signature, participants
will apply their hash functions to the message, and check that the outcome matches
the tags appended to the message by the sender. They will count the number
of mismatches between their hash values and the appended tags, and only accept
the message if they find less than a threshold amount of mismatches. However, if
the sender were to know which hash functions are held by which participant, she
could choose to append appropriate tags such that one recipient accepts the message
while another does not, thereby breaking transferability of the scheme. To ensure
transferability then, each recipient will group the hash functions received from the
sender into N equally sized sets (of size k), and send one set (using secret channels)
to each of the other N − 1 recipients, keeping one set for himself. The recipients
test each of the N sets independently.
Transferability levels
The situation is further complicated if the sender is in collusion with some of the
recipients. In that case, the sender can have partial knowledge on who holds which
keys. This forces us to define levels of transferability. Levels of transferability are
perhaps confusing, so here we will try to highlight the need for such levels.
Imagine that a sender is in collusion with a single recipient. In this case, the
sender knows k of the keys held by honest recipient H1, and k of the keys held by
honest recipient H2 - namely, he knows the keys that were forwarded to the honest
recipients by his dishonest partner. For these known keys, the sender can attach tags
that are correct for H1, and are incorrect for H2. Therefore, based on the number of
colluding adversaries, the sender is able to bias the number of mismatches and the
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number of incorrect sets found between each honest party. To ensure transferability
then, we require that the second verifier accepts a message as authentic even if
each set contains a higher number of mismatches, and there are more invalid sets
than found by the first verifier. Of course, to ensure security against forging, we
cannot allow message-signature pairs containing too many errors to be accepted,
and so there must be a cap on the highest level of mismatches acceptable by anyone.
This leads to levels of verification, and a limit on the number of times a message is
guaranteed to be transferable in sequence.
For clarity, suppose then there are three levels of verification, l0, l1 and l2. Ac-
cepting a message at any of these levels means the message is guaranteed to have
originated with the claimed sender. If H1 accepts a message at level l2 (the highest
verification level, i.e. the level with the fewest errors in the signature), then he can
forward it to H2, who will first try to accept the message at level l2. If he finds
too many mismatches for the message to be accepted at level l2, he will instead
try to verify at level l1. The protocol ensures that if H1 found the message to be
valid at level l2, then H2 will find the message to be valid at level l1. Therefore,
with three verification levels, accepting the message at level l2 guarantees that the
message can be transferred at least twice more. In practice, the message may be
transferred many more times, since with honest participants it is highly likely that
H2 will also find the message valid at level l2 and they will not need to move to the
next verification level.
With this in mind, to begin the protocol we must first decide the maximum
number of dishonest participants we want our protocol to be able to tolerate (which,
as per the preceding paragraph, will impact our verification levels). We set this to
be ω such that ω < (N + 1)/2, since the protocol cannot be made secure (using the
majority vote dispute resolution process) if more than half of the participants are
dishonest (see Section 4.3). We also define the notation dR := (ω − 1)/N , i.e. dR
is the maximum fraction of dishonest recipients possible when the sender is part of
the coalition.
As in previous protocols, there are two stages - the distribution stage and the
messaging stage.
Distribution Stage
1. The sender independently and uniformly at random selects (with replacement)
N2k functions from the set F , where k is a security parameter. We denote these
functions by (f1, ..., fN2k) and will refer to them as the signature functions.
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2. To each recipient, Pi, the sender uses secret classical channels to transmit
the Nk functions (f(i−1)Nk+1, ..., fiNk). As per Theorem 8.1, this requires the
sender to share Nky secret bits with each recipient.
3. Each recipient Pi randomly splits the set {(i − 1)Nk + 1, ..., iNk} into N
disjoint subsets of size k, which we denote Ri→1, ..., Ri→N . These sets form an
index of the functions that Pi will forward to the other recipients. Specifically,
Pi uses the secret classical channels to send Ri→j and Fi→j := {fr : r ∈
Ri→j} to recipient Pj. To securely transmit the signature functions and their
positions requires each pair of participants to share ky+k log(Nk) secret bits.
Following this symmetrisation, participant Pi holds the Nk functions given
by Fi :=
⋃N
j=1 Fj→i and their positions given by Ri :=
⋃N
j=1Rj→i. We refer
to these as the key functions and function positions of participant Pi. The
participants will use these to check a future signature declaration.
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f 1
, · ·
· , f
N
k
Pi
f(i−1)Nk+1, · · · , fiNk
PN
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k
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P1
R i
→1
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Figure 8.1: The distribution stage of the hash scheme. Figure (a) shows Steps 1 and 2 of the
distribution stage, in which the sender P0 shares distinct sets of keys with all of the receivers
P1, · · · , PN . Figure (b) shows Step 3 of the distribution stage, in which the recipients exchange a
randomly selected portion of their keys with each other.
Messaging Stage
1. To send message m ∈M to Pi, the sender sends (m, Sigm), where
Sigm := (f1(m), f2(m), . . . , fN2k(m)) = (t1, . . . , tN2k).
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Since the tags have size b, the signature is N2kb bits in size.
2. For message m and the signature elements tr such that r ∈ Rj→i, participant
Pi defines the following test
Tmi,j,l =
1 if
∑
r∈Rj→i g(tr, fr(m)) < slk
0 otherwise
(8.2)
where sl is a fraction defined by the protocol implementation, such that 1/2 >
s−1 > s0 > ... > slmax , and g(., .) is a function of two inputs which returns 0
if the inputs are equal, and 1 if the inputs are different. Essentially, this is a
test on the set of functions Fj→i to check whether a sufficient number of the
tags in the signature match the output of the functions when applied to the
message. For each fixed l, if the outcome of the test is 1, we say that that
test is passed at level l. For any verification level, the recipient will perform
N such tests, one for each j = 1, ..., N . Note that participant Pi can perform
all of these tests without interaction with any other participant.
3. Participant Pi will accept (m, Sigm) as valid at level l if
N∑
j=1
Tmi,j,l > Nδl (8.3)
That is, participant Pi accepts the signature at level l if more than a fraction
of δl of the tested sets are passed, where δl is a threshold given by δl =
1/2 + (l + 1)dR.
4. To forward a message, participant Pi simply forwards (m, Sigm) to the desired
recipient.
8.3 Security analysis
8.3.1 Forging
Recall the definition of forging, provided in Definition 4.9. In order to forge, a
coalition C (which does not include the signer) with access to a single message-
signature pair (m, Sigm) must output a distinct message-signature pair (m′, Sigm′)
that will be accepted (at any level l ≥ 0) by a participant Pi /∈ C. We consider
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forging to be successful if the coalition can deceive any (i.e. at least one) honest
participant.
Theorem 8.2. The protocol defined in Section 8.2 is secure against forging attempts.
Proof. It is easiest for the coalition to forge a message at the lowest verification
level l = 0, so we consider this case in what follows. We further assume that
the coalition hold a valid message-signature pair (m, Sigm). We first restrict our
attention to the coalition trying to deceive a fixed participant, and we will prove
that this probability decays exponentially fast with the parameter k. We then use
this to bound the general case where the target is not a fixed participant. Therefore,
for now, we fix the recipient that the coalition wants to deceive to be Pi /∈ C.
To successfully forge, as per Eq. (8.3), the coalition should output a message-
signature pair, (m′, Sigm′), that passes at least Nδ0 + 1 of the N tests performed
by Pi in step 2 of the messaging stage, where m′ 6= m. Since δ0 = 1/2 + dR and
dR := (ω− 1)/N , this means Nδ0 + 1 = N/2 + ω. By the definition of the protocol,
the number of members in a coalition is at most ω. The coalition knows Fd→i and
Rd→i for all Pd ∈ C, so they can use this knowledge to trivially ensure that Pi passes
ω of the N tests performed at level l = 0. To pass the required N/2 + ω tests, the
coalition must pass a further N/2 tests out of the N − ω remaining tests. The first
step in computing the probability that they are able to do this is to calculate the
probability of the coalition being able to create a signature such that, for a single
Pj /∈ C, Tm′i,j,0 = 1, i.e. the probability that the coalition can guess the tags forwarded
from a single honest recipient Pj to Pi.
Let pt denote the probability that the coalition can force Tm
′
i,j,0 = 1, when they
have no access to (Fj→i, Rj→i), i.e. pt is the probability that the coalition can create
a message-signature pair that will pass the test performed by Pi for the functions
received from Pj /∈ C. As per the protocol, Pj sent (Fj→i, Rj→i) to Pi using secure
channels, and therefore Fj→i and Rj→i are unknown to the coalition. However, we
assume that the coalition possess a valid message-signature pair (m, Sigm), from
which they can gain partial information on (Fj→i, Rj→i). Let us denote the k un-
known functions in Fj→i by u1, ..., uk, and consider how the coalition might try to
guess the value of t′1 := u1(m′), given t1 := u1(m), where m′ 6= m.
Since F is -ASU2, using Definition 3.16 the coalition immediately knows u1 is
in a set F1 ⊂ F which has size |F|/|T |. Upon receiving message m′, Pi will be
expecting to find tag t′1 in the signature. The coalition does not know t′1 though,
so the best they can do is to pick a random function in F1, and hope that this
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function also maps m′ to the unknown t′1. Again by Definition 3.16, the fraction of
functions in F1 that map m′ to t′1 is at most 2/|T |. Therefore, the probability that
the coalition chooses a function that gives the correct tag for message m′ is 2/|T |.
This is independently true for each of the k unknown functions.
Let X be the random variable that counts how many incorrect tags the coalition
declares. Then X follows a binomial distribution and we have
pt = P(X < ks0) =
ks0−1∑
v=0
(
k
v
)(
2
|T |
)k−v (
1− 2|T |
)v
. (8.4)
This decays exponentially fast with the parameter k. For example, it may be desir-
able to choose a small tag length in order to minimise the length of the signature.
For |T | = 4 the signature is 2N2k bits in size and we have
pt =
ks0−1∑
v=0
(
k
v
)(
1
2
)k
≈ 2−k(1−h(s0)). (8.5)
In this equation, h denotes the binary entropy function. Obviously, choosing a larger
tag size will increase security against forging.
We will now give an upper bound for the probability of forging against a fixed
participant. We compute the probability of passing at least one of the unknown
N−ω tests, and use this to upper bound the probability that the coalition can forge
a message sent to Pi. We find
P(FixedForge) ≤ 1− (1− pt)N−ω ≈ (N − ω)pt, (8.6)
where we have used the fact that pt  1 in the approximation.
The total number of honest recipients is N−ω and for successful forging we only
require that any one of them is deceived. Using the probability of forging against a
fixed participant, we can bound the probability of deceiving any honest participant
as
P(Forge) = 1− (1− P(FixedForge))N−ω ≈ (N − ω)2pt, (8.7)
where again we have used the fact that P(FixedForge)  1 in the approximation.
Note that this probability decays exponentially fast with parameter k, and thus the
protocol is secure against forging attempts.
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8.3.2 Transferability
Recall the definition of non-transferability, provided in Definition 4.10. In order to
break the transferability of the protocol, a coalition C (which includes the signer
P0) must generate a signature that is accepted by recipient Pi /∈ C at level l, and
rejected by another recipient Pj /∈ C at a level l′ < l.
Theorem 8.3. The protocol defined in Section 8.2 is secure against non-
transferability attempts.
Proof. The task of the coalition is easiest if l′ = l − 1 and so we consider this
case in what follows. To provide an upper bound on the cheating probability, we
allow for the biggest coalition C, i.e. one that includes NdR recipients and the
sender. For simplicity, we will again start by fixing the participants whom the
coalition is trying to deceive to be the honest participants Pi and Pj. All other
honest participants will be labelled with the index h. In general, transferability fails
if the coalition forms a signature that is not transferable for at least one pair of
any honest participants (Pi, Pj). Therefore, we should take into account all possible
pairs of honest participants. We begin by focusing on the case of a fixed pair of
participants, and at the end we give the more general expressions.
The first step is to compute pml,l−1 , which is the probability that: (i) test Tmi,h,l is
passed (i.e. the tags sent from honest participant Ph to recipient Pi are accepted at
level l); and (ii), the test Tmj,h,l−1 fails (i.e. the tags sent from honest participant Ph
to recipient Pj are rejected at level l−1). Since the sender P0 is dishonest, it can be
assumed that the coalition knows all of the signature functions. However, they are
unaware of the sets Rh→i and Rh→j. Therefore, the coalition can control the number
of mismatches the signature will make with the signature functions originally sent
to Ph, but they cannot separately bias the number of mismatches the signature will
make with the functions in Fh→i and Fh→j. Therefore, when participants Pi and Pj
test the functions sent to them by an honest participant Ph, they will both have the
same expected fraction of mismatches; we call this fraction pe.
It is helpful to use the following bound
pml,l−1 = P(Pi passes test at level l ∧ Pj fails test at level l − 1)
≤ min{P(Pi passes test at level l), P(Pj fails test at level l − 1)}.
(8.8)
The probability of passing the test at level l when pe > sl can be bounded using
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Hoeffding’s inequalities to be below
exp(−2(pe − sl)2k). (8.9)
The probability of failing the test at level l − 1 when pe < sl−1 can similarly be
bounded to be smaller than
exp(−2(sl−1 − pe)2k). (8.10)
Note that sl−1 > sl and so the above two cases cover all possible values for pe.
Therefore pml,l−1 will always decay exponentially with the parameter k. As in [34],
since we are taking the minimum over both cases, the optimal choice for the coalition
is choose pe so that the probabilities in Eqs. (8.9) and (8.9) are equal. This is
achieved by choosing pe = (sl + sl−1)/2. In this case we obtain the bound
pml,l−1 ≤ exp
(
−(sl−1 − sl)
2
2
k
)
, (8.11)
which again decays exponentially with k.
For a test that involves a member of C it is trivial for the coalition to make two
recipients disagree in any way they wish, i.e. they can make Tmi,c,l and Tmj,c,l−1 take
any values they wish if Pc ∈ C. However, the number of those tests is at most NdR,
which is the maximum number of recipients in the coalition. For the participant
Pi to accept a message at level l, he needs at least Nδl + 1 of the tests to pass at
this level, as per Eq. (8.3). On the other hand, for the participant Pj to reject the
message at level l−1, at most Nδl−1 of tests must pass at this level. Therefore, since
it holds that δl − δl−1 = dR, in order for the coalition to be successful, the honest
participants Pi and Pj need to disagree on at least NdR + 1 tests. As we saw, the
coalition can easily make them disagree on the NdR tests originating from coalition
members, but they still have to disagree on at least one more test originating from
an honest recipient. There are N(δl − dR) + 1 such tests (tests originating from
an honest recipient that were passed by Pi), and the Pj need only reject one of
them for the coalition to succeed. Therefore, we can bound the probability of non-
transferability between Pi and Pj by the probability that they disagree on a single
test originating from an honest participant. We find
P(Fixed Non-Transferability) ≤ 1− (1− pml,l−1)N(δl−dR)+1
≈ (N(δl − dR) + 1)pml,l−1 .
(8.12)
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Lastly, we consider the general case, where the participants Pi and Pj are not fixed.
Simple combinatorial arguments give
P(Non-Transferability) ≤ 1− (1− P(Fixed Non-Transferability))Np
≈ Np(N(δl − dR) + 1)pml,l−1 ,
(8.13)
where Np := [(N(1− dR)][N(1− dR)− 1]/2. Again, this decays exponentially with
k, and thus the protocol is secure against non-transferability.
8.3.3 Repudiation
Recall the definition of repudiation, provided in Definition 4.11. Security against
repudiation can be reduced to the special case of non-transferability from level l = 0
to level l = −1, thus we have the following:
Theorem 8.4. The protocol defined in Section 8.2 is secure against repudiation
attempts.
Proof. The proof is a special case of non-transferability (see Section V A of [34]).
We find
P(Repudiation) ≤ Np(N(δ0 − dR) + 1)pm0,−1 . (8.14)
This tends to zero exponentially fast with k, and thus the protocol is secure against
repudiation.
We note here that equations (8.7), (8.13) and (8.14) are independent of the
message size, meaning the signature size will be constant with respect to the size of
the message being sent.
8.4 Resource requirements
Theorem 5.1 in Chapter 5 states that O(N2) authenticated channels are always
necessary to sign a message with unconditional security. In addition to this, all
previous protocols (both quantum e.g. Refs. [1, 110], and classical e.g. Refs. [37,
40, 42]) have also required secret channels, and have used them to transmit O(n)
bits, where n is the bit-length of the message to be signed.
In the information-theoretic setting there is no physical difference between an
authenticated classical channel and a secret classical channel, since both can be
created using any channel capable of transmitting bits. As we saw in Chapter 3,
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the only difference is the amount of secret shared key required. To authenticate an
n-bit message, the sender and receiver must share O(log n) bits of secret key [31].
On the other hand, to send the message in secret the sender and receiver must share
O(n) bits of secret key [7].
Therefore, it is sometimes misleading to talk about resource requirements in
terms of authenticated versus secret classical channels, as in the standard resource
model. Instead, one should talk about the number of shared secret bits required,
since this is what is used to create both authenticated and secret channels in the
information-theoretic setting.
The hash scheme resource scalings
Importantly, the hash scheme uses secret key only to transmit the keys (hash func-
tions) in secret (and to authenticate this communication). As per Theorem 8.1, the
number of bits needed to specify a single key is logarithmic in the bit-size of the
message being sent. This means the amount of secret shared key required by each
participant in the hash scheme is y = O(log n+log log n), where the double log term
comes from the need to authenticate the communication.
Accordingly, in terms of the scaling of resource requirements, using the hash
scheme to sign an n-bit message m is no more expensive to implement than using
a MAC scheme to authenticate message m. This protocol therefore provides the
functionality of signatures at the same asymptotic cost as authentication. It could
also be said that the hash scheme uses fewer resources than those assumed in the
standard resource model, since the secret channels are only necessary to send very
small messages, meaning their secret-bit cost is O(log n), rather than O(n). This
is important because it shows that the signing functionality is fundamentally (and
significantly) cheaper than secrecy.
Dishonest participants
The number of dishonest participants the protocol is able to tolerate is directly
related to the number of allowed transferability levels, according to the parameter
δl = 1/2 + (l + 1)dR. Specifically, the maximum transferability level for a given
number of dishonest participants is set by the requirement that δl < 1, meaning
(lmax + 1)dR < 1/2. (8.15)
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This limit is rather restrictive, and it is unclear whether this requirement is a result
of our protocol, or whether it is a fundamental restriction on USS schemes using
the resources in the standard resource model. We note that currently all quantum
schemes suffer from the same restriction as above. However, it would be an in-
teresting open question to see whether there are schemes which can tolerate more
dishonest participants. The restriction seems to occur due to the exchange process
carried out by all recipients.
In that case, it seems plausible that the same-state quantum USS schemes con-
sidered in Section 5.2, although highly inefficient, could tolerate higher numbers of
dishonest participants than any classical USS protocol by avoiding the costly ex-
change process. Same-state protocols are not possible classically with unconditional
security, because if all participants receive the same information it is always possible
to forge. Increasing the allowable number of dishonest participants could therefore
be a distinct advantage provided by quantum schemes. Nevertheless, further re-
search is necessary to confirm this.
8.5 Protocol extensions
Reusability
A desirable extension of the current protocol would be to make the distributed keys
reusable so that multiple messages could be signed using a single distribution stage.
With the current protocol, this is not possible – the definition of an -ASU2 set
means that to maintain security against forging attempts, once the keys have been
used to sign a message they must be discarded.
Reusability could be obtained in two different ways. The first (trivial) method
would simply be to perform the distribution stage ψ times before moving on to the
messaging stage. In this way, the sender would be able to send ψ different messages
in the future. The second method would be to distribute functions from an -ASUψ
set, instead of an -ASU2 set as described above.
Definition 8.5 ([149]). A hash function family F of functions from M to T is
-ASUψ provided that for all distinct elements m1, ...,mψ ∈ M and for all (not
necessarily distinct) t1, ..., tψ ∈ T , we have
|{f ∈ F : f(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ψ}| ≤ × |{f ∈ F : f(xi) = yi, 1 ≤ i ≤ ψ − 1}|.
The meaning of this definition is that a function chosen randomly from F sim-
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ulates a truly random function when up to ψ − 1 input-output pairs are known. It
is shown in [149] that such families exist. Similarly to how -ASU2 families allow
us to sign a single message with unconditional security, -ASUψ families allow us to
sign ψ − 1 messages with unconditional security.
The smallest known -ASUψ family requires z = (ψ2−ψ+1)b+ψv bits to specify
a function, where v is an integer such that a ≤ ((ψ − 1)b+ v)(1 + 2v), and where a
and b are the message and tag length respectively, as before. Note that for ψ = 2
this reduces to the key length given in (8.1).
For simplicity, we will have the sender perform the distribution stage ψ times,
rather than using an -ASUψ family. Note that for a fixed tag length and large
v (with ψ  v), both methods require the distribution of O(ψs) secret keys to
leading order, where s is defined in Theorem 8.1. Therefore, in our case there is
little advantage in using -ASUψ functions as opposed to simply performing the
distribution stage ψ times.
Latecomers
One might wonder whether it is possible for a new participant to enter the protocol
after the distribution stage. In fact it is, but it requires either a trusted authority
(see below), or for the new participant to communicate with all existing participants
in the protocol. More concretely, to join, the sender would give the new participant
(N + 1)k functions from the -ASU2 set. The participant would then send k of
the functions to each of the other recipients and keep k for himself. The other
participants would each randomly select k of the Nk functions they hold and send
them over secure channels to the latecomer. Following this, security follows in a
very similar manner as before.
Designated sender
For practical applications of signature schemes, it is often useful for any participant
to be able to sign a message, rather than having a designated sender. This can
trivially be introduced to the hash scheme by having the participants perform the
distribution stage N + 1 times, where each participant acts as the sender in one of
the distribution stages.
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Trusted authority
The hash scheme requires participants to communicate pairwise with all other par-
ticipants, as well as for secret keys to be distributed pairwise. For some applications,
this may be too cumbersome a requirement, especially when all future participants
are not known. In those situations, it is possible to greatly increase the efficiency of
the protocol at the expense of introducing a trusted authority.
In the distribution stage, the signer would send Nk functions to the trusted
authority, where N is an arbitrarily large number chosen to be the maximum number
of participants able to verify the senders signature. When the sender wants to send
a signed message, the trusted authority randomly (and secretly) sends k of the
Nk functions to the recipient. Recipients could either obtain their k functions at
the start of the protocol (i.e. have a distribution stage), or simply request the
functions from the trusted authority as and when needed. Security against forging
would follow as before from the properties of -ASU2 sets, while security against
repudiation would come from the fact that the trusted authority distributes the
functions out at random, so each honest participant would have the same expected
number of mismatches with any signature declaration. This would simplify the
protocol in that all participants would only need to share a short secret key with
the trusted authority, rather than requiring pairwise secret shared keys. Thus, as
well as removing the need for pairwise communication between all parties, the total
number of secret shared bits needed to generate the verification algorithms would
scale as O(N), rather than O(N2) as in the unmodified protocol.
Further benefits are that messages would be transferable an unlimited number
of times between participants, and that if the sender gives an excess of keys to
the trusted authority, latecomers can easily join by communicating solely with the
trusted authority, who would send the latecomer k of the unused functions.
Extended protocol
In the section that follows, to facilitate comparisons to other classical USS schemes
we include some of the above extensions into the basic protocol described in Section
8.2. Namely, each participant will perform the distribution stage ψ times in the role
of the sender. Thus the distribution stage is performed (N + 1)ψ times before the
messaging stage takes place. In this case, any participant would be able to send up
to ψ messages in future. We will refer to this as the extended protocol. Note that
we do not include a trusted authority.
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8.6 Comparisons to existing schemes
8.6.1 Classical USS schemes
In this section we compare the performance of our extended protocol to the classical
USS scheme proposed in Ref. [40] constructed using polynomials over a finite field.
We will refer to this protocol as the HSZI scheme. The hash scheme enjoys a number
of advantages when compared to the HSZI scheme. Namely,
1. We require fewer trust assumptions – the hash scheme does not require a
trusted authority.
2. Security in the hash scheme can be tuned independently of message size, re-
sulting in shorter signature lengths.
3. The hash scheme scales more efficiently (with respect to message size) in terms
of the number of secret shared bits required by participants.
We will look at the second and third advantages in more detail.
Signature length
According to Theorem 3 of [40] (translated to our notation) the HSZI scheme has
|Σ| = q(ω+1), (8.16)
|S| = q(ω+1)(ψ+1), (8.17)
|V| = qω+(N+1)(ψ+1), (8.18)
where Σ is the set containing all possible signatures, S is the set containing all pos-
sible signing algorithms, V is the set containing all possible verification algorithms,
q is the number of elements in the chosen finite field and ψ is the number of times
the keys can be reused.
Let us first consider the size of the signature. Since the signature must be
transmitted with the message, it is desirable to have as small a signature as possible.
In the HSZI scheme the message m is an element of the finite field, meaning the
size of the finite field must be at least as big as the size of the message set, i.e.
q ≥ |M|. Accordingly, in what follows we set q = |M|. Eq. (8.16) implies that
(ω + 1) log(|M|) is the bit-length of the signature. The authors also show that the
HSZI scheme provides security proportional to 1/|M|.
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Immediately then, we see that both the size of the signature and the security
level depend on the size of the message to be sent. On the other hand, in the hash
scheme, the signature length is 2N2k bits, regardless of the message length. The
security level in the hash scheme depends on the parameter k, but is independent
of the length of the message being signed. This allows the hash scheme to bypass
the optimality results presented in Ref. [40]. Specifically, the authors show that
the signature generated by the HSZI scheme is optimally small for a given security
level. By decoupling the security level from the size of the message being sent, we
are able to generate smaller signatures while maintaining security.
Secret key requirements
We now consider the number of secret shared bits required to securely distribute
the signing/verification keys. In the HSZI scheme, to secretly send the signing and
verification keys to all participants, the trusted authority must hold
[
(ω + 1)(ψ + 1) + ω + (N + 1)(ψ + 1)
]
log(|M|) = O(Nψ log |M|) (8.19)
secret shared bits with each participant (as implied by Eqs. (8.17) and (8.18)).
For the hash scheme, each recipient must share Nky secret bits with the sender
(to receive the signature functions), and ky+k log(Nk) with every other recipient (to
forward on a selection of the key functions and their positions). For the extended
protocol, where the distribution stage is performed ψ times for each participant
acting as sender, each participant must share: (i) Nky secret bits with each of the
N recipients for the ψ rounds in which he is the sender; and (ii) Nky bits with the
sender and ky + k log(Nk)) secret bits with each of the (N − 1) other recipients for
each of the Nψ rounds when he is not the sender. This is a total of
N2kψy +Nψ
[
Nky + k(N − 1)(y + log(Nk))]
= Nkψ(3N − 1)y +N(N − 1)kψ log(Nk)
= Nkψ(3N − 1)(6 + 2s) +N(N − 1)kψ log(Nk)
= O
(
N2kψ(log log |M|+ logNk))
(8.20)
secret shared bits per recipient. The second equality follows using the definition
of y together with b = 2. The last equality follows using the Lambert W function
to find a leading order approximation for s when s is large [150]. The results are
summarised in Table 8.1 below.
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The table shows that the signature length in the hash scheme is constant with
respect to the size of the message to be signed. On the other hand, the signature
length in the HSZI scheme increases linearly with the bit-length of the message to
be signed. Similarly, the secret shared key required by the hash scheme increases
logarithmically with the bit-length of the message, whereas the increase in the HSZI
scheme is linear in the bit-length of the message.
The fact that the hash scheme scales unfavourably with respect to the number
of participants is due to the lack of a trusted authority, meaning participants must
perform the pairwise exchange process. As mentioned in Section 8.5, this N2 scaling
can be removed from the hash scheme by introducing a trusted authority.
Hash scheme HSZI Quantum USS
Signature size 2N2k (ω + 1)a O(N2a)
Secret key size O
(
N2ψ(log a+ logN)
)
O(Nψa) O
(
N2ψ(a+ logN)
)
Table 8.1: Comparison of the signature length and secret shared key required for various signature
protocols. It can be seen that the hash scheme scales favourably with respect to the message length,
a := log |M|, both in terms of signature length and required secret shared key. The “Quantum
USS” column refers to practical quantum USS schemes in general. Though there are many such
schemes, the above rates are applicable to the schemes which at present are most efficient, namely,
the AWKA protocol and GP2.
Disadvantages
Due to the inclusion of a trusted authority, the HSZI scheme enjoys a number of
advantages over the hash scheme. These are:
1. Pairwise secret shared keys between all participants are not required by the
HSZI scheme. Instead, each participant only needs a shared secret key with
the trusted authority. This means that the HSZI scheme scales favourably
with respect to the number of protocol participants.
2. Participants in the HSZI scheme are able to enter the protocol even after the
distribution stage. The new participant only needs to communicate with the
trusted authority to join.
3. The HSZI protocol has unlimited transferability, whereas the hash scheme can
only guarantee transferability a finite number of times.
While these advantages are significant, they are only possible due to the existence of
a trusted authority – an additional trust assumption not present in the hash scheme.
As highlighted in Section 8.5 the hash scheme could easily be modified to include
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the trusted authority, in which case it would achieve the same three benefits above,
as well as being significantly more efficient.
8.6.2 Quantum USS schemes
A central motivating factor in the study of quantum USS schemes was that they
usually require fewer resources than classical USS schemes. Unsurprisingly, this
benefit came at a cost, and all quantum USS schemes proposed have been much
less efficient than classical USS schemes in terms of signature length and signature
generation times3.
Until now, this decrease in efficiency had been partly justified by the fact that
quantum protocols do not require detectable broadcast channels, anonymous chan-
nels, or a trusted authority. Instead, the only assumptions are that a limited number
of the participants are dishonest, and that the participants all share a number of
secret bits, which could be expanded via QKD.
However, the hash scheme makes the same trust assumptions as quantum USS
schemes, and still achieves two key advantages. Namely, the hash scheme generates
much shorter signatures and requires significantly fewer secret shared bits. One of
the reasons for the increase in efficiency is that, so far, all quantum USS schemes have
been of the Lamport-type, in which the distribution stage must be performed for
every possible future message. On the other hand, the hash scheme does not follow
this blueprint, and instead requires users to share hash functions in the distribution
stage, which can be used to sign any future message (up to some chosen size).
Efficiency
Here we consider the signature length and secret shared bit requirements of the
hash scheme and compare it to GP2. Although GP2 is essentially a classical USS
scheme (and should be classified as such in this author’s opinion), it was originally
described with the assumption that all participants generate and distribute secret
shared key using QKD. As such, the authors presented it as a quantum USS scheme
and, if classified as such, it is still the only quantum USS scheme for which a full
N -party security analysis exists. It would also be the most efficient quantum USS
scheme that is experimentally realisable, meaning the efficiency benefits of the hash
scheme (described in this subsection) apply equally to more distinctly “quantum”
3Although it may appear from Table 8.1 that quantum USS schemes scale comparably to the
HSZI scheme, in fact the constant of proportionality for the quantum schemes is very large, meaning
that for all practical purposes the HSZI scheme is far more efficient.
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USS schemes (such as the AWKA scheme). For these reasons, we have chosen to
compare the hash scheme to GP2.
We assume that a group of N + 1 = 51 participants are trying to sign a 1 Mb
message to a security level of 10−10. To make the comparison to GP2 fair, rather
than considering the extended protocol, we assume that the participants perform
the distribution stage as specified in Section 8.2, i.e. there is a designated sender
and only one message to be sent. In order to have lmax = 1, we assume that at most
ω = 13 participants are dishonest meaning dR = 0.24. We also choose s−1 = 0.41,
s0 = 0.21 and s1 = 0.01 so as to have even gaps between the verification levels4.
With these parameters, Eqs. (8.7), (8.13) and (8.14) show that k = 1700 is
necessary for the message to be secure to a level of 10−10. Given this value of k,
the signature length is 8.50× 106 and each recipient must hold a total of 7.69× 106
secret shared bits (shared over the different participants).
When considering GP2, we assume the sender signs the 1 Mb message bit-by-bit,
each to a level of 10−10. Overall this gives a lower security level than signing the
message as a whole, but makes the protocol significantly more efficient5. Eqs. (24),
(29) and (31) of Ref. [34] can be used to show that the resulting signature length
is 4.25× 1012, and that each recipient must hold a total of 5.96× 1012 secret shared
bits (shared over the different participants).
This example shows just how powerful the hash function scheme is when com-
pared to quantum schemes – even for a relatively small message, the hash scheme is
6 orders of magnitude more efficient both in terms of signature size and resource re-
quirements. Our results show that quantum USS schemes must either be drastically
improved, or find a new source of motivation if they are to remain relevant.
8.6.3 Computationally secure digital signatures
In this section we compare the hash scheme to some of the most popular computa-
tionally secure digital signature schemes. The comparison is fraught with difficulties
since, in many respects, USS schemes are fundamentally different to digital signa-
tures. Nevertheless, we think the comparison is worth a try.
In Table 8.2 we state the signature length as well as the public and private key
sizes for various common digital signature schemes. For comparison, Table 8.3 gives
the secret key requirements and signature length of the hash scheme for the same
4This choice is somewhat arbitrary, but is chosen to minimise the required signature lengths.
5Signing the message as a whole would require participants to share secret keys of size O(|M|) =
O(210
6
), which is clearly impossible.
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security level.
Algorithm Public key Private key Signature size
RSA [12] 3, 072 24, 576 3, 072
DSA [13] 3, 072 3, 328 3, 072
ECDSA [14] 512 768 512
XMSS (Hash based) [27] 7, 296 152 19, 608
Bliss (Lattice based) [19] 7, 000 2, 000 5, 600
Rainbow (Multivariate) [22] 842, 400 561, 352 264
Table 8.2: This table shows the public key length, private key length, and signature size of various
common digital signature schemes [26]. The schemes on rows 1-3 are computationally secure in the
classical setting but not quantum-safe. The schemes on rows 4-6 are quantum-safe. The figures
are quoted in bits, and are the lengths required for 128-bit security, i.e. a security level of 2−128.
Algorithm Secret shared key Signature size
Hash scheme 45, 250, 100 43, 500, 000
Trusted Authority 95, 200 220, 000
Table 8.3: This table shows the secret key requirements (per participant) and signature size needed
to sign a single 1 Mb message between 51 participants with 128-bit security using the hash scheme.
The figures are quoted in bits. The first row is for the protocol as described in Section 8.2, while
the second row allows for a trusted authority as described in Section 8.5.
Recall that digital signatures are believed to provide computational security,
rather than the unconditional security provided by USS schemes. The top three
lines of Table 8.2 show the schemes that are most commonly used in the real world.
These schemes are not quantum-safe, i.e. in the presence of quantum adversaries
the schemes are proven to be completely insecure [15]. The bottom three lines of
Table 8.2 show the most likely successors to the current digital signature schemes.
These schemes are believed to be quantum-safe, which means they are believed to
provide computational security even in the presence of quantum adversaries. As a
consequence of the lower security level provided, digital signatures also enjoy some
additional advantages not explicitly stated in the tables above. Namely,
1. Digital signatures are public-key schemes and do not require any secret shared
key between participants.
2. Digital signatures are universally verifiable.
3. The signature length and public/private-key sizes do not depend on the num-
ber of participants in the scheme.
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4. Public and private keys can be reused to sign many messages6.
Clearly, the tables and the points above show that the hash scheme is still less
efficient than the competing quantum-safe digital signature schemes, though the
difference is perhaps not as large as expected, particularly if one allows for a trusted
authority.
Nevertheless, even without the trusted authority, the hash scheme requires par-
ticipants to share a total of 4.35 × 107 secret bits (spread across the other partici-
pants) in order to send/receive a 1 Mb message with 128-bit security, or 7.69× 106
if the security level is reduced to 10−10. While this might sound like a lot, it is
worth noting that standard QKD systems can already distribute secret key at a
rate in excess of 1 Mbps [151] and this rate is constantly increasing. As such, the
hash scheme can certainly be considered practical and within the reach of current
technology.
A potential advantage of the hash scheme is the computational efficiency of
generating the signatures and the verification keys. To varying degrees, all of the
digital signature schemes above are quite computationally intensive when it comes to
creating a signature. In many applications this is not an issue, but for settings where
there are limited computational resources available, creating the signatures may
cause a noticeable slowdown of the application. The hash scheme on the other hand
requires only the evaluation of universal hash functions, something which is often
computationally cheap. For example, many commonly used -ASU2 sets are created
from Toeplitz matrices (e.g. [99, 152]) whose evaluation is simple and efficient.
It should be stressed that in real-world applications, the requirement of shared
secret keys mean that USS schemes should not be considered a stand-alone product.
Rather, they should be thought of as a complement to existing QKD networks.
Clearly, any system connected via a network of QKD links values high security. In
this case, the additional security guarantees offered by USS schemes over digital
signatures may be a significant incentive for their use. Further, the implementation
of USS schemes in existing QKD networks would come at a very small additional
cost, since the infrastructure necessary to distribute secret keys would already be in
place.
6There are limits on how many messages can be signed using XMSS, but the number is very
large ≈ O(220).
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8.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced a classical USS scheme which required fewer resources
than all previous classical USS schemes proposed in the literature – namely, we
presented a secure scheme that did not rely on either a trusted authority, broadcast
channels or anonymous channels. Further, to sign an n-bit message, the hash scheme
used secret channels only to send communications O(log n) in size, as opposed to
O(n) as is necessary in P2 [1], GP2 [34] and all known quantum USS schemes. As
such, our scheme has smaller resource requirements than all known quantum USS
schemes. Despite this, we show that in comparison to all quantum USS schemes,
the hash scheme is far superior, achieving efficiency improvements of at least six
orders of magnitude. As such, it is unclear what advantages quantum USS schemes
may provide over classical USS schemes, and additional motivation is necessary if
further quantum schemes are proposed.
In comparison to existing classical USS schemes, the hash scheme is again more
efficient both in terms of the signature length and the secret key requirements. In
fact, it is shown that the cost of implementing the hash scheme scales in the same
way as message authentication, and the hash scheme can therefore be considered
cheap.
Lastly, we compared the hash scheme to a selection of some of the most common
public-key digital signature schemes, both quantum-safe and not. We found that,
overall, the efficiency shortcomings of USS schemes mean they are certainly not
going to replace quantum-safe digital signatures in most real world applications.
Nevertheless, the hash scheme can be considered practical with current technology,
and can be implemented within existing QKD networks for a low additional cost.
Therefore, for systems requiring very high levels of security, the hash scheme could
well find commercial application.
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Chapter 9
Imperfect oblivious transfer
9.1 Introduction
The results of the previous chapter show that classical USS schemes can be drasti-
cally more efficient than all known quantum USS schemes. Importantly, this is the
case even for classical schemes requiring the same (or fewer) resources than quantum
schemes. As such, it is unclear whether quantum mechanics is necessary or useful
in creating USS schemes.
One potential advantage of quantum schemes, highlighted in Section 8.4, is that
the same-state schemes described in Section 5.2 may be able to increase the max-
imum tolerable number of dishonest participants within a USS protocol. In these
same-state schemes, we require the guarantees that:
1. The recipient cannot gain full information on the states Alice sends (to protect
against forging), and;
2. Alice does not know what information the recipient receives (to protect against
repudiation/non-transferability).
As discussed in Section 3.7, these guarantees are highly reminiscent of 1-out-of-2
oblivious transfer (1-2 OT).
OT is one of the most important primitives in cryptography. Its importance
stems from the fact that it can be used as the foundation for all secure two-party
computations – with OT, all secure two-party computations are possible [102, 103].
The widespread use and applicability of OT means that, aside from its potential
relevance to USS schemes, studying what is achievable with information-theoretic
security is independently interesting, and the bounds that we prove may impact a
wide range of other cryptographic protocols. The work in this chapter is taken from
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Ref. [153] with minor modifications.
9.2 Background and related work
OT exists in many different flavours, all with slightly different definitions and notions
of security. OT was first introduced informally in 1970 by Wiesner as “a means for
transmitting two messages either but not both of which may be received” [154], and
subsequently formalised as 1-2 OT in [155]. In related work, Rabin [156] introduced
a protocol (now called Rabin OT), which was later shown by Crépeau [157] to be
classically equivalent to 1-2 OT, in the sense that if it is possible to do one, it
is possible to use this to implement the other. Various “weaker” variants of OT
have also been proposed, most notably Generalised OT, XOR OT and Universal
OT [158], but all have been shown to be equivalent to 1-2 OT [159] in the classical
setting. The equivalence is believed to also hold in the quantum setting, but the
reduction proofs may need to be revised. There is also work by Damgård, Fehr,
Salvail and Schaffner [160] who define yet another variant of OT and characterise
security in terms of information leakage. With these definitions (and their quantum
counterparts), the authors describe a 1-2 OT protocol which is perfectly secure in
the bounded quantum storage security model.
Following the discovery of quantum key distribution in 1984 [10], there arose a
general optimism that quantum mechanics may provide a means to perform mul-
tiparty computations with information-theoretic security. Despite this early con-
fidence, the history of secure two-party computations is characterised by mainly
negative results. Mayers and Lo [104, 105] proved that all one-sided two-party
computations are insecure in the quantum setting, meaning that it is impossible
to perform important protocols such as bit commitment and OT with information-
theoretic security. Nevertheless, the result does not exclude imperfect variants of
these protocols from being possible, and it has been an interesting and productive
open question to determine the optimal security parameters achievable for some
important two-party computations.
For most cryptographic primitives, this question has been definitively answered.
For strong coin flipping, Kitaev [161] introduced the semi-definite programming
formalism to show that the product of Alice’s and Bob’s cheating probabilities must
be greater than 1/2, implying that the minimum cheating probability is at least
1/
√
2. For weak coin flipping, Mochon [162] showed that the minimum cheating
probability is at least 1/2. In the same paper a protocol achieving this bound is
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presented, showing that the bound is tight. Chailloux and Kerenidis [163] used these
results on weak coin flipping to generate a protocol for strong coin flipping achieving
Kitaev’s bound. Lastly, for quantum bit commitment, Chailloux and Kerenidis [164]
proved that the minimum cheating probability is 0.739, and presented a protocol
achieving this bias. Thus, for bit commitment, weak coin flipping and strong coin
flipping the achievability bounds are tight with the known protocols.
For OT on the other hand, the situation is not so clear-cut. The cheating proba-
bility of a 1-2 OT protocol is defined as pC := max{AOT , BOT}, where AOT and BOT
are Alice’s and Bob’s ability to cheat, respectively (formal definitions of AOT and
BOT are provided in Section 9.3). Classically, it is impossible to achieve even lim-
ited security for OT in the information-theoretic setting, since one party can always
cheat with certainty so that pC = 1. On the other hand, quantum mechanics allows
for imperfect protocols, in which the participants are able cheat but their abilities
are limited, i.e. 1/2 < pC < 1.
Contributions
In this chapter we consider stand-alone quantum protocols for 1-2 OT, and are
concerned only with information-theoretic security. As mentioned above, perfect
security (i.e. pC = 1/2) in this setting is impossible. However, the no-go results
of Mayers and Lo do not exclude imperfect variants of OT from being possible,
and these variants may be useful in constructing other cryptographic primitives.
For example, perfect 1-2 OT is not necessary to construct USS schemes, since we
only require that Bob does not gain full information on the states sent by Alice.
Therefore, as long as there exists an OT scheme in which Alice’s and Bob’s cheating
probabilities are sufficiently restricted, we may be able to use that imperfect OT
scheme to create a fully secure USS scheme.
The highest known lower bound on pC in all 1-2 OT protocols is due to Chailloux,
Gutoski and Sikora [106], who show that pC ≥ 2/3. However, known 1-2 OT
protocols all have a cheating probability of at least pC = 0.75. Therefore, there is a
gap between what is known to be achievable, and what is known to be impossible.
This chapter contains three main contributions:
1. We introduce the concept of Semi-random OT (Section 9.3) and prove an
equivalence between cheating in 1-2 OT and Semi-random OT (Section 9.4).
2. In Section 9.5 we describe a general framework for Semi-random OT, and
use it to increase the lower bound on pC for 1-2 OT to 0.749 if the states in
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the final round of the (honest) protocol are pure and symmetric. Our results
also reproduce the known pC ≥ 2/3 bound in the completely general setting1.
Additionally, our construction parametrises Alice’s and Bob’s ability to cheat
in terms of a single quantity, F , related to the fidelity of the protocol output
states. This parametrisation suggests how to construct schemes when one of
either sender or receiver dishonesty is prioritised, and also allows us to derive
new bounds for these settings. Such a scenario arises in the context of USS
schemes [1, 110], and the derived bounds prove useful for understanding the
potential application of imperfect OT to signatures.
3. Lastly, in Section 9.6 we illustrate our results by describing a protocol which
relies on unambiguous state elimination (USE) measurements, and can be
used to implement many runs of OT. The protocol serves to highlight the
interesting connection between USE measurements and 1-2 OT, and provides
a new application for this relatively underused type of measurement. The
average security parameters achieved are almost equal to the bounds proved in
this chapter, and the optimal cheating strategies are exactly those considered
in the general framework in the preceding sections.
9.3 Definitions
Intuitively, 1-2 OT is a two-party protocol in which Alice chooses two input bits,
x0 and x1, and Bob chooses a single input bit b. The protocol outputs xb to Bob
with the guarantees that Alice does not know b, and that Bob does not know x1−b.
A cheating Alice aims to find the value of b, while a cheating Bob aims to correctly
guess both x0, x1.
Definition 9.1 (1-2 OT [166]). A 1-2 quantum OT protocol is a protocol between
two parties, Alice and Bob, such that
• Alice has inputs x0, x1 ∈ {0, 1} and Bob has input b ∈ {0, 1}. At the beginning
of the protocol, Alice has no information about b and Bob has no information
about (x0, x1).
• At the end of the protocol, Bob outputs y or Abort and Alice can either Abort
or not.
1At the time of writing the results contained in this chapter, we believed the known lower
bound to be pC ≥ 0.585 . . . as per Ref. [165]. However, following the submission of our results
we discovered existing work (Ref. [106]), performed independently to our own, which indirectly
implies the increased lower bound of pC ≥ 2/3.
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• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xb, Alice has no information
about b and Bob has no information about x1−b.
• AOT := sup{Pr [Alice guesses b ∧ Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + A.
• BOT := sup{Pr [Bob guesses (x0, x1)∧ Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + B.
The suprema are taken over all cheating strategies available to Alice and Bob.
This definition of security against Bob differs from some other works, for example
[167], in which security is characterised in terms of the information leakage, or in
terms of Bob’s ability to guess the output of some function f(x0, x1), commonly
the XOR. Nevertheless, our simpler definition makes sense if we are interested only
in lower bounds on pC , since the ability to guess (x0, x1) automatically implies the
ability to guess f(x0, x1) for any f . In other situations, the choice of which definition
is most appropriate will be largely application dependent.
To prove the results contained in this chapter, we also introduce a useful variant
of OT, which we call Semi-random OT. Semi-random OT differs from 1-2 OT in
that Bob does not have any inputs and is randomly assigned an output.
Definition 9.2 (Semi-random OT). 1-2 quantum Semi-random OT, or simply Semi-
random OT, is a protocol between two parties, Alice and Bob, such that
• Alice chooses two input bits (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1} or Abort.
• Bob outputs two bits (c, y) or Abort.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xc, Alice has no information
about c and Bob has no information on x1−c. Further, if Alice and Bob are
honest, c is a uniformly random bit.
• AOT := sup{Pr [Alice guesses c ∧ Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + A.
• BOT := sup{Pr [Bob guesses (x0, x1) ∧ Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + B.
The reason for introducing Semi-random OT is that we have found it simpler to
work with than 1-2 OT, and the ability to perform Semi-random OT with cheating
probabilities AOT and BOT is equivalent to being able to perform 1-2 quantum OT
with the same cheating probabilities (see Section 9.4). Therefore, the lower bounds
on pC that we prove for Semi-random OT also apply to the well known 1-2 OT.
149
9.4 Equivalence of Semi-random OT and 1-2 OT
In this section we prove the following equivalence between the cheating probabilities
in Semi-random OT and 1-2 OT.
Proposition 9.3. The existence of a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating prob-
abilities AOT and BOT is equivalent to the existence of a 1-2 OT protocol with the
same cheating probabilities.
To prove this, we begin by introducing a related OT variant called Random
OT (ROT). ROT differs from Semi-random OT in that Alice has no inputs, and is
instead randomly given two outputs.
Definition 9.4 (Random OT). Random OT is a protocol between two parties, Alice
and Bob, such that
• Alice outputs two bits (x0, x1) ∈ {0, 1} or Abort.
• Bob outputs two bits (c, y) or Abort.
• If Alice and Bob are honest, they never Abort, y = xc, Alice has no information
about c and Bob has no information on x1−c. Further, if Alice and Bob are
honest, x0, x1 and c are uniformly random bits.
• AOT := sup{Pr [Alice guesses c ∧ Bob does not Abort]} = 12 + A.
• BOT := sup{Pr [Bob guesses (x0, x1) ∧ Alice does not Abort]} = 12 + B.
Ref. [166] proved that the existence of a ROT protocol with cheating probabili-
ties AOT and BOT is equivalent to the existence of a 1-2 OT protocol with the same
cheating probabilities. Following very similar arguments, in the following subsec-
tions we will show that the existence of a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating
probabilities AOT and BOT is equivalent to the existence of a ROT with the same
cheating probabilities. This, combined with the results in Ref. [166], proves the
proposition.
Semi-random OT from ROT
Let P be a ROT protocol with cheating probabilities AOT (P ) and BOT (P ). We con-
struct a Semi-random OT protocol with the same cheating probabilities as follows:
1. Alice has inputs (z0, z1).
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2. Alice and Bob run protocol P to output (x0, x1) for Alice and (c, y) for Bob.
3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, Alice
sends (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) to Bob.
4. Bob outputs (c, y′) where y′ = (zc ⊕ xc ⊕ y).
We now show that Q is a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating probabilities
AOT (P ) and BOT (P ).
If Alice and Bob are honest, then by definition we have y = xc and so y′ = zc.
Alice has no information on c and Bob has no information on z1−c. Further, c ∈R
{0, 1} as required.
If Alice is dishonest, she cannot guess c except with probability AOT (P ) since
she only receives communications from Bob via protocol P . Therefore AOT (Q) =
AOT (P ).
If Bob is dishonest, he holds (z0 ⊕ x0, z1 ⊕ x1) and aims to guess (z0, z1). This
is equivalent to Bob guessing (x0, x1) which he can do with probability BOT (P ).
Therefore BOT (Q) = BOT (P ).
ROT from Semi-random OT
Let P be a Semi-random OT protocol with cheating probabilities AOT (P ) and
BOT (P ). We construct a ROT protocol Q with the same cheating probabilities
as follows:
1. Alice picks x0, x1 ∈R {0, 1} uniformly at random.
2. Alice and Bob perform the Semi-random OT protocol P where Alice inputs
x0, x1. Let (c, y) be Bob’s outputs.
3. Alice and Bob abort in Q if and only if they abort in P . Otherwise, the
outputs of protocol Q are (x0, x1) for Alice and (c, y) for Bob.
The outputs of Q are uniformly random bits (in the honest case) since Alice chooses
her input at random. Note that, in the definition of ROT, the outputs are only
required to be random in the honest case, and no assertions are made when one party
acts dishonestly. Therefore Q does indeed implement ROT. From the construction
of Q it is also clear that AOT (Q) = AOT (P ) and BOT (Q) = BOT (P ). This concludes
the proof of Proposition 9.3.
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9.5 Generic protocol
In this section we introduce a general framework for Semi-random OT and use it to
prove lower bounds on pC for any Semi-random OT protocol. To do this, we present
undetectable cheating strategies always available to Alice and Bob and analyse them
to lower bound their cheating probabilities, AOT and BOT respectively. We show
that for any Semi-random OT protocol
pC = max{AOT , BOT} ≥ 2/3. (9.1)
Further, if the possible states output to Bob by the (honest) protocol are pure and
symmetric, then
pC = max{AOT , BOT} ≥ 0.749. (9.2)
We note that all 1-2 OT protocols we have seen proposed have output states that
are pure and symmetric. Although there is no reason why this must be the case in
general, the inherent symmetry of the protocol seems to lead to this property.
We will prove the above bounds by expressing Alice’s and Bob’s cheating proba-
bilities in terms of a single parameter, F , related to the fidelity of the output states
of the protocol. From this we find that there is always a trade-off; as Alice’s ability
to cheat decreases, Bob’s ability increases, and vice versa.
9.5.1 Protocol framework
We now describe the general framework for Semi-random OT protocols with N
rounds of communication between Alice and Bob. The framework is based on Ki-
taev’s construction for strong coin flipping [161] and is useful for analysing the
security of Semi-random OT.
1. Bob starts with the state ρBM and Alice starts with an auxiliary system A
initialised to |0〉 〈0|A. The overall state is ρBMA := ρBM ⊗ |0〉 〈0|A. We further
suppose Alice and Bob share the counter variable i, initialised to 1, which
tracks the round number of the protocol.
2. Alice randomly selects an element x0x1 ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10}.
3. Bob sends system M to Alice.
4. Based on her choice in Step 2, Alice performs the unitary operation Ux0x1,iMA ∈
{U00,iAM , U01,iAM , U11,iAM , U10,iAM}.
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5. Alice sends system M back to Bob.
6. Bob performs the unitary operation V (i)BM .
7. The index i is incremented by 1. If i = N + 1, the protocol proceeds to Step
8, otherwise it returns to Step 3.
8. The final output held by Bob is
σx0x1BM := TrA(η
x0x1
BMA), (9.3)
where
ηx0x1BMA := Ux0x1ρBMA (Ux0x1)† (9.4)
and
Ux0x1 = V (N)BMUx0x1,NMA . . . V (1)BMUx0x1,1MA . (9.5)
9. Bob performs a POVM with elements {Π0∗BM ,Π1∗BM ,Π∗0BM ,Π∗1BM} to obtain the
value of c and xc. For example, the outcome Π1∗BM denotes that c = 0 and
x0 = 1.
The steps of the framework above describes the honest actions of Alice and Bob,
together with the associated outputs, assuming all measurements are deferred. Of
course, Alice’s and Bob’s actual actions may deviate from the honest protocol de-
scription if they are dishonest.
In order to prove lower bounds on the protocol cheating probability pC , in the fol-
lowing sections we will describe general cheating strategies that are always available
to Alice and Bob within this framework, and which will always be undetectable.
9.5.2 Honest case
For the protocol to be correct in the honest case, we require the following conditions
to hold:
For c = 0: Tr(Πj∗BMσ
kl
BM) =
1/2, if j = k,0, if j 6= k. (9.6)
For c = 1: Tr(Π∗jBMσ
kl
BM) =
1/2, if j = l,0, if j 6= l. (9.7)
These conditions imply that Bob receives either one of Alice’s two chosen bits with
equal probability, and that the bit received by Bob is correct.
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9.5.3 Security against Bob
If Bob acts honestly throughout the protocol up until step 9, then at the beginning
of this step he holds either σ00BM , σ01BM , σ11BM , or σ10BM . In order to cheat, Bob wants
to guess the exact value of x0 and x1. Equivalently, Bob wants to know exactly
which of the four σ states he holds.
To do this, Bob’s optimal measurement is a minimum-error measurement. How-
ever, the minimum-error measurement will vary according to the states chosen by
any specific implementation of Semi-random OT. Instead, to provide a lower bound
on Bob’s optimal cheating probability for all protocols, we assume that Bob per-
forms the Square Root Measurement (SRM) [168]. Again, this may not be his
optimal strategy, but it is a valid cheating strategy for any Semi-random OT pro-
tocol, and one that he can employ without risk of being caught (since there is no
further interaction between Alice and Bob after step 7, so Alice has no way of know-
ing which measurement Bob performs). Using the success probability of the SRM,
we can bound Bob’s optimal cheating probability as [169]
BOT ≥ 1− 1
8
∑
jk 6=lm
F (σjkBM , σ
lm
BM), (9.8)
where jk, lm ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10} and F is the fidelity, defined as
F (ρ, σ) := Tr
(√
ρ1/2σρ1/2
)
. (9.9)
Eqs. (9.6) and (9.7) imply that F (σjkBM , σ
j⊕1,k⊕1
BM ) = 0 (since these states can be
perfectly distinguished). Without loss of generality, we suppose σ00BM and σ01BM are
the pair with the highest fidelity. Define
F := F (σ00BM , σ
01
BM). (9.10)
Then
BOT ≥ 1− F. (9.11)
This result is limited somewhat by the bound on the success probability of the SRM
for general mixed states, given in Eq. (9.8). Placing restrictions on the output states
of the protocol allows us to tighten this bound. In particular, if {σ00BM , σ01BM , σ11BM ,
σ10BM} forms a symmetric set2 of pure states, then Bob’s is successful in guessing
2Symmetric sets of states are ubiquitous in quantum information. In this context symmetric
means that there exists a permuting unitary U such that U4 = 1 and σ00BM = Uσ
01
BM = U
2σ11BM =
U3σ10BM .
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both of Alice’s inputs with probability [52]
BpureOT ≥
1
4
(
1 +
1
2
√
1− 2F + 1
2
√
1 + 2F
)2
, (9.12)
for F ∈ [0, 1/2]. Since there is no reason to bias Bob’s ability to cheat based on
Alice’s choice of input, it seems likely that most protocols would output symmetric
states and therefore, for protocols outputting pure states to Bob, the tighter bound
would apply.
9.5.4 Security against Alice
Suppose Alice is dishonest and aims to guess the value of c output to Bob. In this
section we present a cheating strategy that is always available to Alice, and which is
always undetectable. We derive Alice’s cheating probability given that she performs
this strategy, and use this to obtain a lower bound for Alice’s achievable cheating
probability given that she performs some optimal strategy.
Let |Ψ〉BMAE be a purification of ρBMA, where E denotes the environment. Alice
prepares an additional state |+〉D for use as a control qubit to perform her strategy.
Since we consider information-theoretic security, Alice can do anything allowed by
quantum mechanics and the overall state is
1√
2
(|Ψ〉BMAE |0〉D + |Ψ〉BMAE |1〉D) , (9.13)
with Alice in complete control of systems A, E and D. Without loss of generality,
we again assume that the two σ states with the highest fidelity are σ00BM and σ01BM . A
valid cheating strategy available to Alice is as follows. In each Step 4 of the protocol,
rather than performing a unitary Ux0x1,iMA , Alice instead performs
U00,iAM ⊗ |0〉〈0|D + U01,iAM ⊗ |1〉〈1|D. (9.14)
Defining the overall operations as U = V (N)BMU00,NMA . . . V (1)BMU00,1MA and V =
V
(N)
BMU
01,N
MA . . . V
(1)
BMU
01,1
MA , Alice’s strategy leads to an output state
|χ〉 := 1√
2
(U |Ψ〉BMAE |0〉D + V |Ψ〉BMAE |1〉D)
:=
1√
2
(∣∣ψ00〉
BMAE
|0〉D +
∣∣ψ01〉
BMAE
|1〉D
)
.
(9.15)
This strategy is not detectable by Bob, since without access to system D it is as
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if Alice has performed either the x = 00 or x = 01 honest operations, each with
probability 1/2.
The states
∣∣ψjk〉 are purifications of σjkBM , and all purifications are related by a
unitary operation acting on the purifying system alone. As such, Alice is able to
perform the further unitary operation
W
(1)
AE ⊗ |0〉 〈0|D +W (2)AE ⊗ |1〉 〈1|D , (9.16)
where W (1)AE and W
(2)
AE are chosen to transform |ψ00〉 and |ψ01〉 into |φ00〉 and |φ01〉,
such that the latter two states are the purifications of σ00BM and σ01BM with the highest
overlap. This operation is performed so that we can later use Uhlmann’s theorem
to express Alice’s cheating probability in terms of F , as we shall see. The resulting
state is
|Φ〉 := 1√
2
(∣∣φ00〉
BMAE
|0〉D +
∣∣φ01〉
BMAE
|1〉D
)
. (9.17)
In Step 8 of the protocol, Bob performs the POVM {ΠzBM}z on |Φ〉, where
z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1}. Our aim is to discover how well Alice can distinguish between
the outcomes c = 0 and c = 1 using a measurement on her D system. The state of
system D following Bob’s POVM is3
µD =
1
2
∑
i,j,z
〈
φi
∣∣ΠzMB ∣∣φj〉 |j〉 〈i|D , (9.18)
where i, j ∈ {0, 1}, z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1} and for ease of notation we have identified
φ0 := φ00 and φ1 := φ01.
Eqs. (9.6) and (9.7) can be used to evaluate terms of the form 〈φi|ΠzBM |φi〉(=
〈φjk|ΠzBM |φjk〉), since
〈φjk|ΠzBM |φjk〉 = TrBMAE
(
ΠzBM
∣∣φjk〉 〈φjk∣∣ )
= TrBM(ΠzBMσ
jk
BM).
(9.19)
The expression for µD can be further simplified using the following lemma.
Lemma 9.5. For all values of z ∈ {0∗, 1∗, ∗0, ∗1} and jk ∈ {00, 01, 11, 10} such
3Of course, since Bob’s POVM acts on systems B and M only, the reduced state of the D
system is unchanged regardless of whether Bob performs his measurement or not. Nevertheless,
the D system is correlated with systems B and M , and this fact can be exploited by Alice to help
her cheat, as we shall see.
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that TrBM(ΠzBMσ
jk
BM) = 0, it holds that
(ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE)
∣∣φjk〉
BMAE
= 0. (9.20)
Proof. Since ΠzBM ⊗1AE is a positive semidefinite Hermitian operator, we can write
its spectral decomposition as
ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE =
∑
n
cn |cn〉 〈cn| , (9.21)
where all cn are positive real numbers. Therefore, using Eq. (9.19),
TrBM(ΠzBMσ
jk
BM) = 0⇒ 〈φjk|ΠzBM ⊗ 1AE|φjk〉 = 0
⇒ 〈ci|φjk〉 = 0 ∀i,
(9.22)
and the result follows.
Using this lemma, µD simplifies to
µD =
1
2
[
1
2
|0〉〈0|D + 〈φ01|Π0∗MB|φ00〉|0〉〈1|D + 〈φ00|Π0∗MB|φ01〉|1〉〈0|D +
1
2
|1〉〈1|D
]
+
1
2
[
1
2
|0〉〈0|D + 1
2
|1〉〈1|D
]
=
1
2
µc=0D +
1
2
µc=1D ,
(9.23)
where the first square bracket corresponds to Bob obtaining an outcome c = 0 (i.e.
Π0∗ or Π1∗) and the second square bracket corresponds to Bob getting an outcome
of c = 1 (i.e. Π∗0 or Π∗1). Lastly, we must evaluate 〈φ01|Π0∗MB|φ00〉.
To satisfy no-signalling, the density matrix in system D must be the same re-
gardless of whether or not Bob actually performs his measurement. If Bob performs
no measurement, Eq. (9.17) gives system D as
1
2
[|0〉〈0|D + 〈φ01|φ00〉|0〉〈1|D + 〈φ00|φ01〉|1〉〈0|D + |1〉〈1|D]. (9.24)
Comparing Eqs. (9.23) and (9.24), we must have 〈φ01|Π0∗MB|φ00〉 = 〈φ01|φ00〉. The
trace distance between µc=0D and µc=1D is therefore |〈φ01|φ00〉|, meaning that Alice can
157
use her D system to distinguish c = 0 from c = 1 with probability
1
2
(
1 + |〈φ01|φ00〉|) = 1
2
(
1 + F (σ00BM , σ
01
BM)
)
:=
1
2
(1 + F ) , (9.25)
where the second equality follows from Uhlmann’s theorem [170] since |φ00〉 and
|φ01〉 are the purifications of σ00BM and σ01BM with maximum overlap.
9.5.5 Result
Previously, the best known lower bound for the cheating probabilities in 1-2 quantum
OT was
max{AOT , BOT} ≥ 2/3. (9.26)
Our results in the preceding section reproduce this bound, since
AOT ≥ 1
2
(1 + F ), BOT ≥ 1− F
⇒ max{AOT , BOT} ≥ 2
3
.
(9.27)
Further, if the output states of the protocol are pure and symmetric, then we can
use Eq. (9.12) to obtain the tighter bound
max{AOT , BOT} ' 0.749. (9.28)
If instead we are particularly interested in one of either AOT or BOT , our construction
quantifies the trade-offs possible between these parameters. This situation arises in
the context of quantum signatures [110], where, in the distribution stage, signing
keys are partially distributed in a manner very similar to 1-2 OT. In these protocols
AOT is prioritised, and it is important that AOT ≈ 0.5 to protect against repudiation
attempts (see Section 3.7). On the other hand, to protect against forging attempts is
much simpler, and the requirements on BOT are less strict. The parametrisation of
AOT in terms of F suggests that in order to create an imperfect 1-2 OT scheme with
a small A, it is necessary to have a protocol which, in the honest case, outputs states
that are almost orthogonal. Unfortunately, given AOT ≈ 0.5, our results show that it
is necessary to have BOT ≈ 1. Therefore imperfect OT protocols will most likely not
prove useful for quantum signatures in the information-theoretic security setting.
Nevertheless, while imperfect OT has not proved useful for quantum signatures,
there may be other useful direct applications.
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9.6 Unambiguous Measurements
Classical-quantum states of the form ρXA =
∑
x∈X p(x) |x〉 〈x|X ⊗ ρxA have been
widely studied in quantum information in a variety of contexts such as channel cod-
ing, secure multiparty computations, quantum key distribution and quantum signa-
tures to name a few. They can occur when quantum states (in this case ρxA) are used
to transmit classical information (in this case x). Retrieving the information stored
in ρxA using an “optimal” measurement is a subjective concept, and the identity of
the optimal measurement depends heavily on the application. For communication
protocols, it is common for the optimal measurement to be a minimum-error mea-
surement – one which decodes the classical message with the smallest probability
of error. For cryptographic protocols, the optimal measurement is often one which
returns the largest possible amount of information while simultaneously disturbing
the system less than a threshold amount.
A particular class of measurements we are interested in is unambiguous mea-
surements. These measurements give “perfect” information in the sense that, given
a successful measurement outcome, one can be certain that the decoded classical
information is correct. Unambiguous measurements come in two main flavours: un-
ambiguous state discrimination (USD), and unambiguous state elimination (USE).
A successful USD measurement on ρxA would identify x with certainty, but success-
ful measurement outcomes do not occur with probability 1. USE measurements on
the other hand can often be successful with probability 1, but only guarantee that
x /∈ Y ⊂ X , i.e. the measurement rules out states rather than definitively identifying
the state. Intuitively, it seems that unambiguous measurements are well suited to
cryptographic applications – their ability to provide “perfect yet partial” informa-
tion on the states being sent is often exactly what is needed. More concretely, USD
can be seen as very similar to Rabin OT, in which it is desired that the receiver
obtains the sender’s message with probability 1/2, and otherwise receives nothing
with probability 1/2. On the other hand, USE measurements seem closely related
to the more common 1-2 OT, in which incomplete but correct information is gained
with certainty. Since OT plays a central role in secure two-party computations, it
seems likely that unambiguous measurements could also play a major role in the
developing field.
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9.6.1 Semi-random OT using USE
In this section we present an interesting application of USE measurements. We de-
scribe a protocol for implementing many runs of Semi-random OT and analyse its
security in the asymptotic limit. We again work in the information–theoretic secu-
rity setting but this time prove upper bounds on the average cheating probabilities
achievable for Alice and Bob in this protocol.
Note that the results in this section apply only to the cheating probabilities
achievable for Alice and Bob averaged across all OT instances generated by the
protocol. We make no claims regarding the cheating probabilities achievable on any
single OT instance performed within the protocol. For this reason, the scheme in
this section is not directly comparable to many existing OT schemes proposed in
the literature which focus on performing a single instance of OT. Indeed, one must
be very careful when trying to extend results on averaged cheating probabilities to
worst-case bounds on any single OT instance, and we do not consider it here.
Nevertheless, if one considers the potential applications of imperfect OT, such as
USS schemes, then having many instances of OT is exactly what is needed, and the
important security parameter is the average cheating probability across all OT in-
stances (see, for example, the Distribution Stage V2 in Section 3.7). It is conceivable
that this would also be the case in other applications in which imperfect OT is used
as a component within a larger protocol. We show that our protocol performs better
than all previous protocols in terms of the average cheating probabilities it achieves
across many OT instances. We further show that the average cheating probabilities
are almost equal to the single-instance bounds derived in the previous section.
The protocol proceeds as follows:
1. Alice uniformly, randomly and independently selects N elements from the set
X = {00, 01, 11, 10}. She encodes elements as 00 → |00〉, 01 → | + +〉,
11→ |11〉 and 10→ | −−〉.
2. Alice sends the N two-qubit states to Bob.
3. Bob randomly selects
√
N out of the N states he receives and asks Alice to
reveal their identity 4. If Alice declares |++〉 or |−−〉, then Bob measures both
qubits in the X basis, otherwise he measures both qubits in the Z basis. The
protocol aborts if any measurement result does not match Alice’s declaration.
4The choice of
√
N test bits is somewhat arbitrary. For security, we only need Bob to choose
a number of test states such that: the number of test states tends to infinity as N increases; and
the fraction of states chosen for testing tends to zero as N increases.
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4. The
√
N states selected in the previous step are discarded.
5. For each of the N −√N remaining states, Bob measures the first qubit in the
Z basis and the second qubit in the X basis. These measurements consitute
two USE measurements (for example, an outcome of |0〉 on the first qubit rules
out |11〉). Following these measurements, Bob can with certainty rule out one
element from the set Y0 = {00, 11}, and one from the set Y1 = {01, 10}. In
this way, for each of the remaining states he can know with certainty exactly
one of x0 and x1, but not both (for example, if 11 and 10 are ruled out, then
Bob knows that x0 = 0).
The result of this protocol is that Alice and Bob have performed N −√N runs of
Semi-random OT, each of which could be used to implement a single instance of
1-2 OT, as per the construction in the Section 9.4. Below we analyse the average
cheating probabilities achieved across all instances of Semi-random OT generated by
this protocol. We show that this protocol can be made secure with average cheating
probabilities (across all N −√N instances) of AOT = 0.75 and BOT ≈ 0.729.
9.6.2 Security against Bob
On each instance of OT, if Bob wants to cheat then he is successful if he correctly
guesses both x0 and x1. In the asymptotic limit, the fraction of states discarded
for testing in Step 3 tends to zero. Since the states are prepared independently,
any strategy Bob performs (including general measurements correlated across all
received states) cannot have an average success probability (probability of correctly
identifying both x0 and x1) which is greater than the minimum-error measurement
on a single unknown state taken from the set S = {|00〉 , |++〉 , |11〉 , |−−〉}. If there
were such a measurement, Bob could simulate this strategy when he has only a
single state from S and beat the known minimum-error measurement.
More concretely, suppose that when Alice sends Bob N states chosen indepen-
dently from S, there exists a measurementM that Bob can make (potentially corre-
lated across all N states) which leads to an average success probability (across all N
states) that is greater than the success probability of the minimum-error measure-
ment performed on a single state from S. Since the N states are chosen randomly
and independently, if such a measurement existed then when Alice sends Bob only a
single state from S, Bob could beat the single state minimum-error measurement by
randomly creating a further N − 1 states himself and performing the measurement
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M on the resulting N states. Of course, this is a contradiction by definition of the
minimum-error measurement.
The above arguments do not show that correlated measurements provide no
advantage. Correlated measurements performed across multiple states can be used
to generate higher success probabilities on particular instances if one also allows for
post-selection by Bob. Post-selection strategies are powerful and are the reason why
the fraction of states used for testing must tend to zero. In our case though, since
the fraction of test states tends to zero, Bob is effectively trying to optimally cheat
on almost all received states. Therefore, in the asymptotic limit post-selection is
irrelevant and we can bound Bob’s average cheating probability across all N −√N
OT instances by considering the minimum-error measurement on a single state.
Since the set S is a set of symmetric pure states, the minimum-error measurement
is the SRM [52]. Using this measurement Bob can guess both of Alice’s input bits
with probability
BOT =
1
4
(
1 +
1√
2
)2
≈ 0.729. (9.29)
In this case, Bob’s optimal strategy is the exact strategy considered in the general
setting in Section 9.5.3.
9.6.3 Security against Alice
On each instance of OT, if Alice wants to cheat then her aim is to correctly
guess the value of c such that Bob received xc. To do this, she may send states
other than the ones in S. In general, for the overall protocol Alice will generate
ρAB11B12B21B22...BN1BN2 and send the B systems to Bob, keeping the A system for
herself. In Step 3 of the protocol Bob then randomly selects pairs of the states he
received, say ρBk1Bk2 , and asks Alice to declare the identity of the state. He does
this for
√
N of the N pairs. Since we are looking for an upper bound on Alice’s
capabilities, we assume that she holds a purification |Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A of ρBk1Bk2 .
Alice must declare a state to Bob that will agree with his measurement outcomes
in Step 3. If she can do this with certainty, then the state |Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A must be of the
form
|Ψ〉Bk1Bk2A = b0|00〉Bk1Bk2 |0〉A + b1|+ +〉Bk1Bk2|1〉A
+ b2|11〉Bk1Bk2|2〉A + b3| − −〉Bk1Bk2|3〉A,
(9.30)
where {|0〉A, |1〉A, |2〉A, |3〉A} is an orthonormal set. If Alice does not send states in
the above form, then she cannot guess Bob’s measurement outcomes with certainty,
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and for asymptotically large N it becomes virtually certain that the protocol will
abort.
Essentially, this means that Alice is restricted to the attacks considered in the
general protocol analysis in Section 9.5.4 – attacks in which she sends superpositions
of honest states. In fact, it is numerically verifiable that an optimal strategy for Alice
is to prepare
1√
2
(|00〉B|0〉A + |+ +〉B|1〉A) , (9.31)
which corresponds exactly to the operation given in Eq. (9.14). Since the overlap
between all adjacent states in S is 1/2, Eq. (9.25) implies that Alice can correctly
guess the value of c with probability 0.75. In fact, this argument shows that Alice’s
probability of guessing c is at most 0.75 for all non-test instances of OT within the
protocol.
9.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we introduced Semi-random OT and a general framework useful
for its study. We explicitly constructed undetectable cheating strategies available
to Alice and Bob and used them to lower bound the cheating probability pC of
any Semi-random OT protocol. Section 9.4 implies that the derived bounds are
directly transferable to standard 1-2 quantum OT, allowing us to reproduce the
known lower bound pC ≥ 2/3, or, if the states output by the honest protocol are
pure and symmetric, improve the bound to pC ≥ 0.749.
In applications more sensitive to sender dishonesty than receiver dishonesty (or
vice versa), our parametrisation of AOT and BOT in terms of the fidelity shows
explicitly how reductions in one party’s ability to cheat will impact the other’s
cheating probability. This relationship proves useful in the context of quantum
signatures, where it is desirable to have AOT ≈ 0.5 but the requirements on BOT are
less strict.
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Chapter 10
Secret-key quantum money
10.1 Introduction
Quantum money was the first example of a cryptographic protocol using quantum
mechanics to provide distinct advantages over all classical protocols. Originally
suggested by Weisner in 1970 [154], the basic aim of any quantum money scheme
is to enable a trusted authority, the bank, to provide untrusted users with finitely
re-usable, verifiable coins that cannot be forged. Verifiability ensures that honest
users can prove that the money they hold is genuine, while unforgeability restricts
the ability of an adversary to dishonestly fabricate additional coins.
These schemes are tangentially related to signature schemes, insofar as there are
potentially many participants sending/receiving tokens which must be unforgeable
and finitely transferable. However, there are also significant differences. Most no-
tably, the bank is a trusted participant of a quantum money scheme, whereas the
sender is untrusted in USS schemes. As such, for quantum money schemes, both
their construction and the types of dishonest behaviour available to an adversary
are markedly different to signatures. Nevertheless, many of the techniques used in
the security analysis of USS schemes are transferable.
10.2 Related work
Weisner’s original quantum money scheme contained two major drawbacks, namely:
verification required quantum communication between the holder and the bank; and
the security of the scheme was not rigorously defined or proved. Indeed, it was shown
in Refs. [171–173] that many variants of the scheme were vulnerable to so-called
“adaptive attacks” – attacks in which the adversary is allowed a number of auxiliary
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interactions with the bank before trying to forge a coin.
In 2012, Gavinsky [174] addressed both issues and presented a fully secure quan-
tum money scheme in which coins are verified using three rounds of classical com-
munication between the holder of the coin and the bank. The scheme was based on
hidden matching quantum retrieval games (QRGs), first introduced in Ref. [175].
Nevertheless, the scheme could not be considered practical, as the security analysis
did not include the effects of noise. This issue was addressed by Pastawski et al.
[176], in which a noise tolerant quantum money scheme with classical verification was
proposed that remains secure as long as the overall transmission fidelity is greater
than 1
2
+ 1√
8
≈ 85.4%. The scheme requires only two rounds of communication for
verification and is secure even against adaptive attacks. Following this, Ref. [177]
presented a simpler protocol, again based on hidden matching QRGs, in which the
verification procedure contained only a single round of communication and displayed
an increased noise tolerance of up to 12.5%, where noise is defined as the probability
of a single honest verifier measurement returning an incorrect outcome.
Beyond the secret-key quantum money schemes discussed above, there has also
been significant interest in public-key quantum money schemes, first proposed in
[171], offering computational security against quantum adversaries. Since then,
Farhi et al. [178] introduced the concepts of quantum state restoration and single-
copy tomography to further rule out a large class of seemingly promising schemes.
Following this result, Farhi et al. [179] suggested a scheme based on knot theory and
conjectured that it is secure against computationally bounded adversaries. However,
whether a secure public-key quantum money scheme exists without the use of or-
acles is an open question and, so far, the majority of schemes that were proposed
have subsequently been broken [180].
Our contributions
In this chapter, as always, we work in the information-theoretic security setting and
focus on secret-key quantum money schemes with classical verification. We present
a family of schemes, based on hidden matching quantum retrieval games (QRGs),
which display a number of benefits over previous proposals. First, our schemes
are more noise/error tolerant than all previous proposals; our schemes can tolerate
noise up to 23%, which we conjecture reaches 25% asymptotically as the dimension
of the underlying hidden matching states is increased. Furthermore, we prove that
25% is the maximum tolerable noise for a wide class of quantum money schemes
with classical verification, meaning our schemes are almost optimally noise tolerant.
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We use methods in semi-definite programming to prove security in a substantially
different manner to previous proposals [174, 177], leading to two main advantages:
first, coin verification involves only a constant number of states (with respect to
coin size), thereby allowing for smaller coins; second, the re-usability of coins within
our scheme grows linearly with the size of the coin, which is known to be optimal.
Finally, we discuss how our schemes can be implemented in practice using a coherent
state encoding, while also showing that they remain secure even in the presence of
limited detection efficiency. The work presented in this chapter has been published
in Ref. [181] with minor modifications.
10.3 Definitions
In this section we state various definitions that are needed to introduce our quantum
money schemes. We consider the case of quantum money “mini-schemes” in which
the bank creates only a single quantum coin and the adversary attempts to use this
coin to forge another copy. It has been shown in Ref. [182] that by adding a classical
serial number to each coin, a secure full quantum money scheme can be created
directly from the secure mini-scheme, and so the two are essentially equivalent.
Definition 10.1. A quantum money mini-scheme with classical verification consists
of an algorithm, Bank, which creates a quantum coin $ and a verification protocol
Ver, which is a classical protocol run between a holder H of $ and the bank B,
designed to verify the authenticity of the coin. The final output of this protocol is
a bit b ∈ {0, 1} sent by the bank, which corresponds to whether the coin is valid or
not. Denote by VerBH($) this final bit. The scheme must satisfy two properties to be
secure:
• Correctness: The scheme is -correct if for every honest holder, we have
P[VerBH($) = 1] ≥ 1− .
• Unforgeability: Coins in the scheme are -unforgeable if for any quantum
adversary who has interacted a finite and bounded number of times with the
bank and holds a valid coin $, the probability that she can produce two coins
$1 and $2 that are verified by an honest user satisfies
P
[
VerBH($1) = 1 ∧ VerBH($2) = 1
] ≤ ,
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where H is any honest holder.
The first property guarantees that all honest participants can prove the coins
they own are valid, while the second property guarantees that a dishonest adver-
sary cannot forge the coins. The definition covers adaptive attacks by allowing the
adversary to interact with the bank (via the verification procedure) a finite number
of times before attempting to forge the coin.
The schemes presented in this chapter are based on quantum retrieval games
(QRGs), which we have mentioned but not formally introduced. A QRG is a protocol
performed between two parties, Alice and Bob, and can be seen as a generalisation
of state discrimination. Alice holds an n-bit string x, selected at random according
to a probability distribution p(x), which she encodes into a quantum state ρx. She
sends the state to Bob, whose goal is to provide a correct answer to a given question
about x. Mathematically, a question is modelled as a relation: if X is the set of
possible values x can take, and if A is the set of possible answers, the relation σ
is a subset of X × A. If (x, a) ∈ σ, this means that, given x, the answer a is a
correct answer to the “question” σ. Formally, a quantum retrieval game is defined
as follows.
Definition 10.2. Let X and A be the sets of inputs and answers respectively. Let
σ ⊂ X × A be a relation and {p(x), ρx} an ensemble of states and their a priori
probabilities. Then the tuple G = (X,A, {p(x), ρx}, σ) is called a quantum retrieval
game. If Bob may choose to find an answer to one of a finite number of distinct
relations σ1, ..., σk, then we write the game as G = (X,A, {p(x), ρx}, σ1, ..., σk).
A particularly useful class of QRGs are the hidden matching QRGs [174, 177,
183], in which the relations are defined by matchings. A matching M on the set
[n] := {1, 2, ..., n}, where n is an even number, is a partitioning of the set into n/2
disjoint pairs of numbers1. A matching can be visualised as a graph with n nodes,
where edges define the elements in the matching, as illustrated in Fig. 10.1. In
general, there are 1 × 3 × . . . × (n − 1) = (n − 1)!! distinct matchings of any set
containing n elements. For our purposes, we focus on sets of matchings where no
two matchings in the set contain a common element. We call such sets pairwise
disjoint. The maximum number of pairwise disjoint matchings is n− 1, since if we
consider the element 1 ∈ [n], it must be paired in each matching with a distinct
integer less than or equal to n.
1More precisely, this is actually the definition of a perfect matching.
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Definition 10.3. A maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings, R, is a set of
pairwise disjoint matchings on [n] such that |R| := n− 1.
A matching on the set [n] can be equivalently represented as a graph with n
nodes, with each each element (i, j) of the matching identified with an edge in the
graph. Maximal pairwise disjoint sets of matchings for n = 4, 6, and 8 are illustrated
in Fig. 10.1.
Figure 10.1: Maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings for (a) n = 4, (b) n = 6 and (c) n = 8.
Colour is used to represent each matching within the maximal pairwise disjoint set.
In hidden matching QRGs the set of possible inputs is the set of all n-bit strings,
each chosen with equal probability, where n is an even number. Alice encodes her
input into the n-dimensional pure state
|φx〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉 (10.1)
where xi is the i-th bit of the string x. Note that this state corresponds to a O(log2 n)
qubit state, so that the number of qubits needed in the scheme scales favourably
with n.
The relations in this game are defined by the matchings: given a matching, the
correct answers are the ones which correctly identify the parity of the bits connected
by an edge in the matching. For example, if (1, 2) is an element of the matching,
the measurement should output x1 ⊕ x2. Formally, given a perfect matching M1,
the set of answers is given by
A =
{
(i, j, b) : i, j ∈ {1, ..., n}, b ∈ {0, 1}}
and the corresponding relation is
σ1 = {(x, i, j, b) : xi ⊕ xj = b and (i, j) ∈M1}.
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Bob is able to find a correct answer to any matching of his choice with certainty
simply by measuring in the basis
B = { 1√
2
(|i〉 ± |j〉)}, with (i, j) ∈M. (10.2)
This is because the outcome 1√
2
(|i〉+ |j〉) can only occur if xi⊕xj = 0, and similarly
1√
2
(|i〉 − |j〉) can only occur if xi ⊕ xj = 1.
Previous quantum money schemes based on hidden matching QRGs have used
only two matchings for verification. In the following section, we generalise these
schemes to the case of an arbitrary number of matchings and show that this allows
us to significantly increase the noise tolerance of the resulting schemes.
10.4 Quantum money scheme
Here we present a quantum money scheme which is secure even in the presence of
up to 23% noise. As in Ref. [177], the verification protocol requires only one round
of classical communication.
In this scheme, the bank randomly chooses a number of n-bit classical strings and
encodes each of them into the hidden matching states, given by Eq. (10.1). Essen-
tially, the coin is a collection of these independent quantum states, and each of the
quantum states can be thought of as an instance of a QRG. We assume that there is
a maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings on [n], known to all participants, which
we call R. This set specifies the n− 1 possible relations defined within each QRG,
and each state in the coin represents a QRG. To verify a coin, the holder will pick a
small selection of the states from the coin and randomly choose a relation for each.
The holder will perform the appropriate measurement (defined by Eq. (10.2)) to get
an answer for each QRG under each chosen relation. The holder then sends these
answers to the bank which returns whether more than a specified fraction of the
answers are correct or not. If they are, the coin is accepted as valid; otherwise, it is
rejected. The scheme is formally defined below and illustrated in Figs. 10.2 and 10.3.
Bank Algorithm
1. The bank independently and randomly chooses q n-bit strings which we will
call x1, ..., xq.
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2. For i ∈ [q], the bank creates φxi := |φxi〉〈φxi |, where
|φxi〉 := 1√
n
n∑
j=1
(−1)xij |j〉.
For each i we define the QRG Gi = (Si, Ai, {φxi}xi , σ1, ..., σn−1), where R =
{σ1, ..., σn−1} is a maximal pairwise disjoint set of matchings known to all
participants in the scheme.
3. The bank creates the classical binary register, r, and initialises it to 0q.
4. The bank creates the counter variable s and initialises it to 0.
5. The pair ($, r) = (
⊗q
i=1 φxi , r) is the coin for the mini-scheme. The bank keeps
the counter s in order to keep track of the number of verification attempts.
Ver Algorithm
1. The holder of the coin randomly chooses a subset of indices, L ⊂ [q] such that
ri = 0 for each i ∈ L. The indices i ∈ L specify the selection of games Gi
which will be used as tests in the verification procedure. For each i ∈ L, the
holder sets the corresponding bit of r to be 1 so that this game cannot be used
in future verifications.
2. For each i ∈ L, the holder picks a relation σ′i at random from R and applies
the appropriate measurement to obtain outcome di.
3. The holder sends all triplets (i, σ′i, di) to the bank.
4. The bank checks that s < T , where T is the pre-defined maximum number
of allowed verifications for the coin. If s = T , the bank declares the coin as
invalid.
5. For each i, the bank checks whether the answer is correct by comparing
(i, σ′i, di) to the secret xi values. The bank accepts the coin as valid if and
only if more than l(c− δ) of the answers are correct, where c is a correctness
parameter of the protocol, l = |L|, and δ is a small positive constant.
6. The bank updates s to s+ 1.
We say that an instance of the verification algorithm has been passed/failed if the
final output by the bank is “valid”/“invalid” respectively. Coins can be verified at
most T times until the Hamming weight of r is greater than T l, at which point the
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coin is returned to the bank to be refreshed. We choose T to be small but linear in
q. Any such choice would be acceptable but, for the sake of definiteness, in what
follows we set T := q/(1000l). We note that having T scale linearly with q is optimal
for any quantum money scheme [174] and that this is an improvement over previous
protocols (for example those in Refs. [174, 177]).
The noise of the protocol is defined as the probability that an honest verifier
obtains an incorrect outcome when making the honest measurement on a single
QRG state (i.e. in step 2 of the verification procedure). In the ideal setting we can
set c = 1, since an honest participant in possession of a correct state will always get
a correct answer to a relation. Of course, in practice system imperfections inevitably
lead to errors so that even when all participants are honest, it is not certain that the
holder’s measurement will return a correct answer. Thus, in the presence of errors,
we must have c < 1, and the smallest value of c for which we can retain security
determines the noise tolerance of the protocol.
Choose: initialize:
x1 = 01011011, r = 0q,
x2 = 11000010, s = 0.
...
xq = 10101110.
($, r) = (ρx1 ⊗ · · · ⊗ ρxq , r)
Figure 10.2: Schematic illustration of the Bank algorithm for n = 8. The bank selects q 8-bit
strings and initializes the q-bit register r to the zero string. The bank creates the corresponding
hidden matching states and sends these, together with r, to the holder of the coin.
We note that this scheme requires the bank to maintain a small classical database
to record the number of times the verification protocol has been run – i.e. the
bank’s database is “non-static”, and must be updated after each run of verification.
Although this requirement demands more from the bank than completely static
database models, we believe the requirement is both minimal and realistic, and
allows significant simplifications to the security analysis.
Nevertheless, in some cases it may be desirable for the bank to have a completely
static database – for example in applications in which the bank consists of many
small decentralised branches. In such a scenario, attacks targeting multiple branch
locations may be able to compromise security by gaining additional verification
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r : 0 0 1 0 . . .
$ : ρx1 ρx2 HHρx3 ρx4 . . .
M : σ′1 - - σ′4 . . .
→ d1 - - d4 . . .
→ (1, σ′1, d1) (4, σ′4, d4) . . .
x : x1 x4 . . .
Check: X/× X/× . . .
s→ s+ 1
{(i, σ′i, di)}
Figure 10.3: Schematic showing the verification algorithm. The verifier selects a sample
{ρx1 , ρx4 , . . .} of the states contained within the coin which have an r value of 0. He randomly
chooses matching measurements and applies them to get classical measurement outcomes which
he sends to the bank, together with the index of the state and the matching chosen. The bank
checks these against its secret strings, as well as checking s < T . Finally, the bank declares an
output based on the number of incorrect outcomes.
attempts. To provide safeguards against these types of attack, our scheme could be
modified in two different ways.
The simplest method would be to assume that all bank branches have access to
a single common database, thereby preventing verifiers from performing too many
verification attempts on a single coin. Alternatively, we could add an additional
round of classical communication to the verification protocol, similarly to Ref. [174],
in which the bank selects the states to be used in the verification protocol. The effect
would be to transform our scheme into one which uses a fully static database, but
still retains the same level of noise tolerance. Security of this modified scheme can be
proved by directly applying the arguments in Ref. [174] to show that the additional
verification attempts do not (significantly) help the adversary2.
10.4.1 Security
In this section we prove that the scheme defined above is secure according to Defi-
nition 10.1.
Correctness
Correctness of the scheme follows simply from the Hoeffding bound [58]. In the
honest case, if the holder of a coin has probability c of getting a correct answer
for each of the l QRGs selected in the verification protocol, then his probability of
2We are able to apply the arguments in Ref. [174] because, although our scheme uses more
than two matchings, when taken pairwise any two matchings within our scheme are independent.
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getting fewer than (c− δ)l correct answers overall is bounded by
P(Honest Fail) ≤ e−2lδ2 . (10.3)
Based on the security analysis in the following section, we choose δ to be half of the
gap between the error rate an honest participant expects and the minimum error
rate the adversary can achieve. I.e. we set δ := (emin − β)/2, where emin is the
minimum error rate achievable by the adversary (derived below in Eq. (10.27)), and
β := 1− c is the error rate expected in an honest run of the protocol.
Unforgeability
We assume the adversary is in possession of a valid coin and first address a simple
forging strategy available to the adversary based on manipulating the r register
attached to the coin. The adversary is allowed to set at most q/1000 of the r
register entries to 1. She creates ($1, r1) and ($2, r2) to send to the two honest
verifiers, Ver1 and Ver2 respectively. If she sets r1(i) = 1 and r2(i) = 0, she can
be certain that Ver1 will not select the i’th state to test, and so can forward the
perfect state to Ver2. In this way, q/1000 of the states in the coins sent to each
verifier will be perfect, and will not cause errors. The remaining positions must
have r register values of 0 for both verifiers. Similarly, the adversary is able to
use the auxiliary verification attempts to her advantage. We make a worst-case
assumption and assume that the adversary gets full knowledge of every state used
in an auxiliary verification attempt. Since there are at most T attempts allowed,
each of which involve l states, the adversary knows the identity of at most q/1000
of the states. Since the states are prepared independently, this knowledge does not
provide any information on the remaining states.
$1: r = 1 r = 0 Aux. Ver r = 0 and no Aux. Ver
1
1000 ’th
1
1000 ’th
1
1000 ’th
$2: r = 0 r = 1 Aux. Ver r = 0 and no Aux. Ver
Figure 10.4: Representation of the states within the quantum coins sent to the verifiers. The first
block on the far left represents all states for which the adversary set r = 1 for Ver1, and r = 0
for Ver2. The adversary knows that Ver1 cannot select these states for testing, and so is able to
forward on the perfect states to Ver2. The second block of states represents the same, but with
the roles of the verifiers reversed. The Aux. Ver states in the diagram are the ones that we assume
are known to the adversary via auxiliary verifications. The remaining states in white are the ones
we consider below – those states for which the r register is zero for both verifiers, and which have
not been used in auxiliary verifications.
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The combined effect of the above two strategies is that the adversary is able to
exactly replicate q/500 of the states in the coin, as shown in Fig. 10.4. To prove
coins are unforgeable, we consider the remaining 997q/1000 states for which the
r register is zero for both verifiers, and for which the adversary has no auxiliary
information. In reference to Fig. 10.4, we refer to these states as the white states,
and start by considering a single such state, φxi := |φxi〉 〈φxi |, contained in the coin.
For simplicity, we drop the superscript on the n-bit strings xi in all that follows.
The idea behind the proof is to relate the probability that the forger can use
a single white state to create two states that pass the verification test of the two
honest verifiers, to the average fidelity of these two states with the original state
|φx〉. The maximisation of this average fidelity corresponds to the optimal attack,
which can be cast as a semi-definite program. By focusing on the dual program,
we can upper bound the value of the semi-definite program and therefore bound
the forging probability of the adversary. Lastly, we show that coherent attacks on
multiple states cannot help the adversary to forge.
Since the adversary has a valid coin, she holds the unknown state
|φx〉 = 1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉. (10.4)
From this state, the adversary wishes to create two states, ηx and τx, which, when
measured by the honest verifiers, will give the correct answer to a randomly chosen
relation in R. At this stage we ignore any auxiliary verification attempts available
to her. Consider the normalised state sent to Ver1,
ηx =
n∑
i,j=1
aij|i〉〈j|. (10.5)
Suppose the verifier chooses to measure using the matching Mα =
{(i1, j1), ..., (in/2, jn/2)}, where α ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}. To find a correct answer to
the relation σα defined by this matching, an honest verifier will apply the measure-
ment with projectors in the set {|+ikjk〉 〈+ikjk | , |−ikjk〉 〈−ikjk | : k = 1, ..., n/2},
where |±ikjk〉 := 1√2(|ik〉 ± |jk〉). An incorrect result is obtained whenever the veri-
fier finds an incorrect value for xik ⊕xjk , which happens whenever the measurement
outcome is one of the form
1√
2
(|i〉 − (−1)xi⊕xj |j〉). (10.6)
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This happens with probability
pα,xVer1 =
1
2
1− n/2∑
k=1
(−1)xik⊕xjkaikjk + (−1)xik⊕xjkajkik
 . (10.7)
Thus, the probability of an incorrect answer to σα is given by a subset of the off-
diagonal elements of the density matrix ηx. The off-diagonal elements occurring are
exactly those with indices paired by the matchingMα. Since the set of relations form
a maximal pairwise disjoint set, the off-diagonal matrix elements appearing in the
error probability for different relations will all be distinct. Therefore, averaging over
all possible relations that could be chosen by the verifier allows us to significantly
simplify the adversary’s error probability, which becomes
pxVer1 =
1
n− 1
n−1∑
α=1
pα,xVer1 =
1
2(n− 1)
(
n−
n∑
i,j=1
(−1)xi⊕xjaij
)
=
n
2(n− 1)(1− Fx),
(10.8)
where we have defined
Fx := 〈φx|ηx|φx〉 = 1
n
∑
i,j
(−1)xi⊕xjaij. (10.9)
Since the adversary does not know the secret string x, rather than holding the state
in Eq. (10.4), she instead holds a mixture over the possible x values. We define
F := 1
2n
∑
x Fx and take an average over x values to get
pVer1 =
1
2n
∑
x
pxVer1 =
1
2n
∑
x
n
2(n− 1) (1− Fx) =
n
2(n− 1) (1− F ) . (10.10)
Essentially then, to successfully forge a coin, the adversary is trying to create two
states, ηx and τx, which both have a high fidelity with the original state |φx〉. Let’s
define Gx = 〈φx|τx|φx〉, and G := 12n
∑
xGx. For the purpose of forging, the ad-
versary needs both Ver1 and Ver2 to accept the coin she sends, which requires her
to make both error probabilities as small as possible. From the above result, we
can relate this to maximising the average fidelity of the states ηx and τx with the
original state. This problem can be cast as a semi-definite program as follows.
Let Ψ : L(X ) → L(Y ⊗ Z) be a physical channel taking states in Hilbert space
X to states in the Hilbert space Y ⊗ Z, where both Y and Z are isomorphic to X .
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We want to find the channel that maximises
F =
1
2n
2n∑
x=1
〈φx|ηx|φx〉+ 〈φx|τx|φx〉
2
, (10.11)
where ηx = TrZ [Ψ(|φx〉〈φx|)] and τx = TrY [Ψ(|φx〉〈φx|)]. In other words, ηx is the
reduced state of the channel output representing the state held by Ver1, and τx is
the reduced state of the channel output representing the state held by Ver2. This
maximisation is subject to Ψ being a completely positive trace preserving linear
map. To express this maximisation in the standard form of a semi-definite program,
we express the channel as an operator using the Choi representation. We fix the
preferred basis to be {|i〉}i=1,...,n, the basis used to define the hidden matching states
in the ensemble. Given this choice, the Choi operator corresponding to the channel
Ψ is an operator J(Ψ) in L(X ⊗ Y ⊗ Z), given by
J(Ψ) =
n∑
i,j=1
|i〉〈j|X ⊗Ψ(|i〉〈j|)YZ (10.12)
Using the facts that 〈φx|i〉 = 〈i|φx〉 for all states in the ensemble, and that Ψ is a
linear map, it can be shown that
TrXYZ
[(
φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z
)
J(Ψ)
]
= 〈φx|ηx|φx〉Y , (10.13)
and similarly that
TrXYZ
[(
φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx
)
J(Ψ)
]
= 〈φx|τx|φx〉Z , (10.14)
where here, for ease of notation, we have used the superscript to denote the relevant
Hilbert space. With this we can rewrite the problem in Eq. (10.11) as the problem
of finding the operator J(Ψ) which maximises
1
2n+1
2n∑
x=1
TrXYZ
[(
(φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z) + (φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx )
)
J(Ψ)
]
. (10.15)
The conditions that the channel must be completely positive and trace preserving
lead to the conditions that J(Ψ) must be positive semidefinite and TrYZ(J(Ψ)) =
1X . Written in standard form, the semidefinite program corresponding to the max-
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imum average fidelity is given by
Maximise: 〈Q(n), X〉
subject to: TrYZ(X) = 1X
X ≥ 0,
(10.16)
where
Q(n) =
1
2n+1
2n∑
x=1
(
(φXx ⊗ φYx ⊗ 1Z) + (φXx ⊗ 1Y ⊗ φZx )
)
. (10.17)
The dual problem is simply
Minimise: Tr(Y )
subject to: 1YZ ⊗ Y ≥ Q(n)
Y ∈ Herm(X ),
(10.18)
since 〈1X , Y 〉 = Tr(Y ) and the adjoint of the partial trace is the extension by the
identity. The dual problem approaches the optimal value from above, so any feasible
point (i.e. any operator Y that satisfies the constraints of the dual problem) gives
us an upper bound on the maximum average fidelity. A feasible point can easily be
found in terms of the matrix Q(n) as
Y = ||Q(n)||∞1X (10.19)
so that we arrive at the following upper bound on the average fidelity:
F ≤ n||Q(n)||∞. (10.20)
Thus, for quantum money protocols using states of dimension n and a maximal
disjoint set of matchings, we can upper bound the error probability of the adversary
in terms of the operator norm of Q(n). Computing this norm for different values of
n leads to the bound
F ≤ 1
2
+
1
n
(10.21)
which we have verified numerically for n ≤ 14 and we conjecture holds for any n.
From now on, we simply assume that n ≤ 14. The analysis above enables us to
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restrict the achievable error probabilities for the two verifiers on a single game as
pVer1 =
n
2(n− 1) (1− F )
pVer2 =
n
2(n− 1) (1−G)
(10.22)
subject to
1
2
(F +G) ≤ 1
2
+
1
n
, (10.23)
which leads to
pVer1 + pVer2 ≥
1
2
− 1
2(n− 1) . (10.24)
Until now, we have considered only a single white state out of the l games used in
the verification protocol. Let us now consider l such games, and let p(i)Verj be the
error probability for honest verifier j on the i’th run of the verification protocol. We
claim that when we have l independent white states (in the sense that each xi is
chosen independently), it is still the case that
p
(i)
Ver1 + p
(i)
Ver2 ≥
1
2
− 1
2(n− 1) (10.25)
for all i, regardless of the outcomes of previous measurements made by the verifiers.
Though intuitively reasonable, this claim is far from trivial, but can be proved using
a teleportation argument due to Croke and Kent [55] (See Appendix B) so that,
essentially, we can imagine the adversary acts independently on each game in the
verification protocol. Therefore, on each and every white state, at least one verifier
must have an error probability of at least
1
2
(p
(i)
Ver1 + p
(i)
Ver2) =
1
4
− 1
4(n− 1) . (10.26)
Overall, if we include the effects of r register manipulation and auxiliary verifications,
at least one verifier, say Ver1, must have an average error probability over all l games
of at least
emin =
997
999
(
1
4
− 1
4(n− 1)
)
≈ 1
4
− 1
4(n− 1) (10.27)
Using Hoeffding’s inequality, the probability of both verifiers accepting the coin can
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be bounded as
P(Both Ver1 and Ver2 generate outcome “Valid”)
≤ P(Ver1 generates outcome “Valid”)
≤ e−2lδ2 ,
(10.28)
where δ = (emin − β)/2, as above. As long as β < emin, the Hoeffding bound can
be used to show that it becomes exponentially unlikely for both verifiers to pass the
verification protocol. By increasing the maximum noise tolerance of the protocol
we increase the size of δ, thereby allowing smaller sample sizes in the verification
protocol, which increases the re-usability of coins. If we choose n = 4, our scheme
would be able to tolerate 16.6% noise, and for n = 14 it can tolerate up to 23%
noise. This concludes the proof of security against forging.
In the next section, we prove an upper bound on the error tolerance achievable
for a general class of classical verification quantum money schemes, and show this
bound limits to 25% as the dimension of the underlying states is increased. This
implies that our protocols are nearly optimal in terms of error tolerance. When
proving this result, we assume only that the coin is a collection of quantum states
each identified with a secret classical string, and that to verify the coin the holder
must declare a number of single bit values which can be checked against the classical
record.
10.5 Maximum achievable noise tolerance
Suppose we have a scheme in which the coin consists of many independently chosen
n-dimensional pure quantum states, φx = |φx〉〈φx|, with x ∈ X and where x is a
classical bit string chosen according to some probability distribution. To verify each
state, the holder performs some POVM,Mx = {M corx ,M incx }, to ascertain one bit of
information about each of the states used in the verification protocol. The bit values
resulting from the measurement outcomes are checked against a classical record to
verify whether the coin is genuine or not.
Lemma 10.4. For any quantum money scheme of the above type, the maximum
tolerable noise, emax, must be less than
emax ≤ 1
2
− 1
4
n+ 2
n+ 1
. (10.29)
Proof. We prove this by explicitly illustrating a strategy available to the ad-
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versary. The adversary holds the unknown state φx, which lives in Hilbert space
H. She extends the state to φx ⊗ Φ, where Φ = 1n1n, and symmetrises the system.
Specifically, she performs the mapping
φx ⊗ Φ→ S2(φx ⊗ Φ)S2, (10.30)
where S2 is the projector onto H2+, the symmetric subspace of H⊗2, and where the
state on the right hand side is not normalised. The resulting normalised state of
each clone is [184]
ηx = vφx + (1− v)Φ, (10.31)
where v := 1
2
n+2
n+1
. By the correctness requirement of quantum money schemes, an
honest measurement on the correct state should always give a correct answer so that
the coin is declared valid, i.e.
Tr(M corx φx) = 1. (10.32)
We further assume that, without access to the state φx, the adversary has no in-
formation on x and can do no better than to guess randomly. This means her
probability of declaring a correct bit value is 1/2, i.e.3
Tr(M corx Φ) = 1/2. (10.33)
Both honest verifiers hold the state ηx. Using Eqs. (10.32) and (10.33), the proba-
bility that an honest verifier gets a correct measurement outcome is
Tr(M corx ηx) = vTr(M
cor
x φx) + (1− v)Tr(M corx Φ)
= v +
(1− v)
2
.
(10.34)
Expressing v in terms of the dimension of the system shows that this strategy (which
is always available to the adversary) leads to the honest verifiers finding an error
3Note that this assumption holds for all hidden matching quantum money schemes considered,
and for any scheme in which the verification protocol involves declaring many single bit values
which are later checked. Nevertheless, there may be protocols in which the verification protocol
involves checking many m-bit outcomes, in which case the more reasonable assumption would be
Tr(M corx Φ) = 1/2
m.
To our knowledge such a scheme does not exist, but if higher error tolerance is desired our proof
suggests looking into such schemes.
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rate of
emax =
1
2
− 1
4
n+ 2
n+ 1
, (10.35)
and so for any such scheme to be secure an honest participant must expect an error
rate less than emax in an honest run of the protocol.
Our analysis shows that for any scheme with n = 4 the tolerable noise is at most
20%, which complements our results in Section 10.4.1 where we described a protocol
with n = 4 which tolerated noise up to 16.6%. For n = 14, the bound in this section
shows that any such scheme has a noise tolerance of at most 23.3%. For n = 14,
our protocol can achieve an error tolerance of 23.03%, and so it is nearly optimal.
As we increase the dimension of the quantum states used for the coins, the upper
bound on the tolerable noise approaches 25% which coincides with our conjecture
for the tolerable noise in our protocols above.
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Figure 10.5: Plot showing the theoretical bound on protocol noise tolerance (dotted line) and
the noise tolerance achieved by the protocols in Section 10.4 (bold line) as the dimension of the
underlying systems increase.
10.6 Experimental implementation
The protocol presented in Section 10.4 gives rise to three main technical challenges
when one considers experimental implementations, namely: the security analysis
provided does not account for losses; the bank requires a source of complex, high-
dimensional states; and the protocol requires that the coin holders have the ability
to store states in quantum memory. In this section we address the first two issues so
181
that a proof-of-principle implementation of the verification algorithm of the quantum
money schemes could be performed with current technology.
10.6.1 Detector losses
Here we tackle the first of the issues, and consider an implementation in which the
verifiers use imperfect detectors with efficiency η. We assume that all detector losses
are random and cannot be manipulated by the adversary. In this chapter we do not
consider channel loss, as we assume that coin transfers occur over short distances,
meaning channel losses are less relevant. Nevertheless, many of the methods pre-
sented here would remain valid in the presence of small channel loss with only minor
modifications necessary. Note that detectors are employed by the holder and not
the bank.
To incorporate detector loss, it is necessary to modify the verification protocol,
previously stated in Section 10.4, so that it becomes
Ver Algorithm
1. The holder randomly chooses a subset of indices, L ⊂ [q], with l = |L|, such
that ri = 0 for each i ∈ |. The indices i ∈ L specify the selection of games Gi
which will be used as tests for the verification procedure. For each i ∈ L, the
holder then sets the corresponding bit of r to be 1 so that this game cannot
be used in future verifications.
2. For each i ∈ L, the holder picks a relation σ′i at random from R and applies
the appropriate measurement to get answer di. If there is no measurement
outcome we say the measurement was unsuccessful and set di = ∅. We define
the number of successful measurement outcomes to be l′.
3. If l′ < lmin := (η − )l, where  > 0 is a small security parameter, the verifier
aborts the protocol.
4. The holder sends all triplets (i, σ′i, di) to the bank.
5. The bank checks that s < T , where T is the pre-defined maximum number
of allowed verifications for the coin. If s = T , the bank declares the coin as
invalid.
6. For each i, the bank checks whether the answer is correct by comparing
(i, σ′i, di) to the secret xi values. The bank ignores those outcomes for which
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di = ∅, and accepts the coin as valid only if more than l′(c− δ) of the answers
are correct, where c = 1 − β is a measure of the channel correctness and δ is
a small positive constant.
7. The bank updates s to s+ 1.
Correctness
Correctness of the scheme follows from Hoeffding’s inequality. When all participants
are honest, it is exponentially unlikely for l′ to be less than lmin, so the protocol will
not abort, except with a negligible probability. If the protocol does not abort, the
verifier has at least lmin successful measurement outcomes, each with an independent
probability c of being correct. Overall, the probability of the verification failing is
bounded by
P(Ver fails) ≤ exp [−2lminδ2]+ exp[−2l2], (10.36)
where now δ = (e′min−β)/2, with e′min derived in Eq. (10.40) below as the minimum
average error rate achievable by the adversary.
Unforgeability
Since the protocol now includes detector losses, the adversary may not have to
send states to each verifier for each game in the verification protocol, and she could
attempt to hide losses arising from her strategy in the losses arising from detector
inefficiency. As a consequence, the set of strategies available to the adversary is
increased, and we must make sure our arguments in Section 10.4.1 still apply.
Let U1 and U2 be q-bit strings representing whether or not the adversary sent a
state to Ver1 and Ver2 respectively, for each of the q games created by the bank. An
entry of 1 means the adversary sent a state to the verifier, while an entry of 0 means
the adversary did not send a state to the verifier. We want to show that, in order for
the protocol not to abort, W (Ui) ≥ γq, where γ := 1 − 3η and W is the Hamming
weight. Suppose W (Ui) = γq. Then, in Step 1 of the verification protocol, Veri
takes a sample, Vi, consisting of l of the entries of Ui. Hoeffding’s inequality gives
P
(
W (Vi) ≤ (γ + 
η
)l
)
≥ 1− exp[−2 
2
η2
l]. (10.37)
If W (Vi) ≤ (γ + η )l, then the probability of at least lmin successful measurement
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outcomes is given by
P
(
At least lmin succ. meas. | W (Vi) ≤ (γ + 
η
)l
)
≤ exp[−2l2]. (10.38)
The probability of the protocol proceeding past Step 3 of verification is therefore
P (No Abort|W (Ui) = γq) ≤ exp[−2 
2
η2
l] + exp[−22l]. (10.39)
In what follows we assume W (Ui) ≥ γq, since otherwise the above shows that the
verifiers will abort with near certainty. This means the adversary is able to use any
strategy that leads to channel losses of at most 3
η
for each verifier, as these can be
hidden within the normal fluctuations of detector loss. Suppose there is a strategy
which gives at least (1− 3
η
)q states to each verifier, and which leads to an average
error probability (on only the states tested) of e′min for at least one of the verifiers.
Then, there is a strategy which gives q states to each verifier, and leads to an average
error probability for at least one of the verifiers of (1− 3
η
)e′min +
3
2η
(the adversary
simply sends the maximally mixed state to each verifier in place of the 3
η
losses).
Since this strategy falls under the scope of the analysis in Section 10.4.1, we know
that the resulting error rate must be at least emin, which means
e′min ≥
emin − 32η
1− 3
η
. (10.40)
The parameter  can be chosen to be arbitrarily small by increasing the sample size
l. As such, the protocol is able to handle arbitrarily large detector losses, and leads
to noise tolerance that can be kept arbitrarily close to the noise tolerance derived
for the case of perfect detectors.
Each verifier tests at least lmin states, and at least one verifier expects an error
rate of e′min. The probability of this verifier passing the test is bounded as
P (Error rate < e′min − δ) ≤ exp[−2lminδ2]. (10.41)
Combining Eqs. (10.39) and (10.41), the probability that the adversary is able to
forge a coin is given by
P (Forgery) ≤ exp[−2 
2
η2
l] + exp[−2l2] + exp[−2lminδ2] (10.42)
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10.6.2 Coherent state implementation
In this section we tackle the second issue arising when considering experimental re-
alisations of the scheme – the bank must create hidden matching states of the form
in Eq. (10.1), which are high-dimensional states of high complexity. The implemen-
tation of hidden matching quantum retrieval games has been studied extensively
in Ref. [183], where the coherent state mapping defined in Ref. [185] was used to
approximate each hidden matching state by a sequence of n coherent states of the
form
|α, x〉 = e− |α|
2
2
∞∑
k=0
αk
k!
(a†x)
n |0〉 =
n⊗
i=1
∣∣∣∣(−1)xi α√n
〉
, (10.43)
where
a†x =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xib†i (10.44)
and {b†1, b†2, . . . , b†n} are the creation operators of the n modes. We call each sequence
of coherent states a block, so that a single block is used to approximate a hidden
matching state. As outlined in Ref. [183], Bob’s measurement can then be performed
using linear optics circuits and single-photon detectors.
In the absence of a phase reference, the phase of each block is randomised, which
implies that each block is equivalent to a classical mixture of number states [91].
More specifically, writing α = eiθ|α|, we have
∫ 2pi
0
dθ
2pi
|α, x〉〈α, x| = e−|α|2
∞∑
k=0
|α|2k
k!
|k〉〈k|x, (10.45)
where |k〉〈k|x is a state of k photons in the mode a†x. Thus, the probability of ob-
taining a particular number of photons depends only on α, which is a free parameter
within the coherent state mapping. We consider the following three cases:
Zero photons in the block
In this case the state emitted is simply the vacuum state. If the adversary chooses
to forward a state on to the verifiers, she can do no better than to induce a 50%
error rate, and it is simple to show that it is never beneficial for her to do so. This
scenario can therefore be considered a “source” loss, as opposed to a channel or
detector loss. Crucially, since these losses are not controllable by the adversary,
they can be treated in the same manner as detector losses in Section 10.6.1 simply
by including the source loss into the detector loss parameter, η. The probability of
zero photons being emitted is p0 = e−|α|
2 .
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One photon in the block
In this case, the state emitted is equivalent to the ideal hidden matching state in
Eq. (10.1) since
|1〉x = a†x |0〉 =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
b†i |0〉 =
1√
n
n∑
i=1
(−1)xi |i〉 , (10.46)
where |i〉 is a single-photon state in the mode bi. Therefore, whenever the bank’s
source emits a single-photon, the analysis in Section 10.4.1 applies. The probability
of one photon being emitted is p1 = |α|2e−|α|2 .
More than one photon in the block
In this case we assume the worst case scenario: whenever the source emits more
than one photon to represent a hidden matching state, the adversary can perfectly
forge that state. The resulting error rate for the adversary is e′min(
p1
p1+p2+
), where
p2+ = 1− p0 − p1. For small |α|, p2+ ≈ |α|42 , while p1 ≈ |α|2, so that p2+  p1 and
the adversary’s error probability is almost unchanged by using coherent states.
10.7 Conclusion
We presented a family of unconditionally secure classical verification quantum money
schemes which are tolerant to noise up to 23%, and which we conjecture tolerate
noise up to 25%. We further proved that 25% is the maximum noise tolerance
achievable for a wide class of quantum money schemes, including all classical verifi-
cation secret-key schemes previously proposed. The security of our schemes depends
on the difference between maximum tolerable noise and expected noise, meaning the
increase in maximum tolerable noise increases the efficiency of our scheme, allowing
for smaller, more re-usable coins. The techniques we use to prove security differ
considerably to previous papers, and the re-usability of our coins is optimal [174] in
that it scales linearly with the number of qubits in the coin. This is a significant
improvement when compared to Ref. [177], in which the re-usability scales as q1/3,
and Ref. [174], in which re-usability scales as q1/4, where q is the total number of
qubits in the coin. With realistic assumptions on experimental equipment, we ex-
pect that, using n = 8, a coin containing 109 qubits would use l = 18, 000 states for
each verification, and would be re-usable T = 100 times for a security level of 10−6.
Lastly, we suggested methods of adapting our techniques to facilitate experimental
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implementations of the scheme. We show that the schemes can be implemented
using weak coherent states even in the presence of limited detector efficiency.
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Chapter 11
Conclusion
For thousands of years signatures have fulfilled an essential role in safeguarding the
integrity, authenticity and transferability of communications. With the explosion of
information technologies, the importance and prevalence of signatures has increased
tremendously, and it is hard to imagine a future in which some form of signature
is not used to secure communications. As time progresses, inevitable technological
advances result in schemes that must provide security against ever more powerful
adversaries if they are to remain useful. Quantum computers are particularly rele-
vant to the present day, since they threaten to render digital signature schemes such
as RSA, DSA and ECDSA obsolete.
In this thesis we have focused on USS schemes – signature schemes designed
to provide security against even the most powerful adversary. We have looked at
both quantum USS schemes, in which security guarantees are derived from the laws
of quantum mechanics, and classical USS schemes, who’s security relies only on
mathematical arguments. The cost of such a high security level is that USS schemes
are much less efficient than signature schemes providing lower levels of security, and
require a set-up phase to distribute secret key amongst all protocol participants.
The latter requirement means that USS schemes will not be a suitable replacement
for many core applications of digital signatures, but should instead be viewed as a
complement to existing QKD networks. In such networks, high security is clearly
valued and each node already has the ability to generate and distribute a secret key.
In Chapter 6 we described and analysed the first quantum USS scheme that is
both unconditionally secure and experimentally realisable. The scheme was more
efficient than previous quantum USS schemes, and benefitted from many similarities
to QKD making it cheap and simple to implement in existing QKD networks. Inter-
estingly, we also found that the scheme could be performed over channels too noisy
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for QKD. The scheme was then extended in Chapter 7 to make it measurement-
device-independent, thereby adding a further layer of real-world security.
Quantum mechanics opens up vast new possibilities for cryptographic and com-
munication technologies. However, its use is often expensive and leads to additional
complexities that make experimental implementations difficult or impossible with
current technology. Therefore, it is both interesting and important to ascertain ex-
actly what advantages quantum mechanics provides for a given task. In Chapter
8 we presented a classical USS scheme, the hash scheme, which enjoys all of the
benefits of quantum USS schemes as well as being hugely more efficient. In fact, the
scheme is so efficient that it could realistically be used to sign real-world data. The
scheme extends classical authentication techniques to also provide transferability.
Since QKD already uses classical authentication as a sub-protocol, this again means
that the scheme can be easily implemented in an existing QKD network, requiring
no new hardware and only minimal software modifications.
Unfortunately for quantum USS schemes, the hash scheme means that there
are no known advantages in directly using quantum mechanics to construct USS
schemes. Nevertheless, all USS schemes are reliant on unconditionally secure key
distribution, and they provide a set of useful security guarantees essential to many
communications. As such, all USS schemes should be thought of as an excellent
application of the quantum technology QKD.
In Chapters 9 and 10 we departed from the direct study of USS schemes, and
instead explored two related quantum protocols – oblivious transfer and quantum
money. Motivated by the close connection between USS schemes and oblivious
transfer, we extended the bounds on what is known to be impossible in stand-
alone 1-out-of-2 oblivious transfer. Due to the importance of oblivious transfer in
multiparty computations, we believe the resulting bounds are interesting, and hope
that they will help to shed light on the potential applications of imperfect oblivious
transfer.
Lastly, in Chapter 10 we described and analysed a new secret-key quantum
money scheme that is more error-tolerant than all previous schemes. We further
showed that the error-tolerance achieved is essentially optimal for a wide class of
secret-key quantum money schemes. Continuing the theme of searching for practical
quantum protocols, we described methods by which our scheme can be reformulated
into one which is both secure and experimentally implementable. This paves the
way for the first experimental demonstration of quantum coin creation, transmission
and verification.
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In the years to come, quantum mechanics will undoubtedly continue to play a
central role in the fields of communications, computing and cryptography. The ad-
vantages offered by quantum technologies over purely classical ones is remarkable,
but these additional powers are not gained without cost. Many existing crypto-
graphic protocols designed to protect important services will need to be updated to
provide resilience against powerful quantum adversaries. This thesis has focused on
one such protocol, that of signing information. Overall, we hope that the results
contained in this thesis have helped to explore, consolidate and clarify the role and
potential applications of USS schemes in the post-quantum era.
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Appendix A
A.1 Finite-size estimates
In order to calculate the min-entropy in Eq. (6.2), we must estimate the three
quantities s−X,0, s
−
X,1 and φ
+
X,1. The method used to estimate these quantities is
described in Ref. [114]. For completeness, we provide an overview of their arguments
here.
Recall that s−X,0 and s
−
X,1 are estimates of the number of counts (sent and mea-
sured in the X basis) containing zero and one photon respectively. φ+X,1 is an estimate
of the phase error rate in the X basis counts coming from single-photon pulses. Un-
fortunately, these quantities are not directly observable, and as such the aim of this
section is to show how they can be estimated using observed statistics.
Recall that the X basis raw key is generated by randomly selecting a sample of
bits from the total of all X basis counts collected. Across all X basis counts, the
exact number of counts corresponding to each intensity level is known, and from this
the expected number of each intensity level going into the raw key can be derived.
In the asymptotic limit of infinitely many X basis counts in the raw key, the true
number of counts at each intensity level will tend to the expected number of counts
at each intensity level. As such, we can lower bound sX,0 as
sX,0 ≥ τ0
u2 − u3
(
u2e
u3n∗X,u3
pu3
− u3e
u2n∗X,u2
pu2
)
, (A.1)
where n∗X,ui is the expected number of X basis counts coming from pulses with inten-
sity ui, and τn :=
∑
ui
puie
−uiunk/n!. In the finite setting the true number of counts
at each intensity level, nX,ui , cannot be set to the expected value. Nevertheless we
are able to bound nX,ui from above and below with high probability. Specifically, if
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the raw key contains L+ k counts, Hoeffding’s inequalities [58] give
n−X,ui := n
∗
X,ui
− δ(L+ k, PE) ≤ nX,ui
n+X,ui := n
∗
X,ui
+ δ(L+ k, PE) ≥ nX,ui .
(A.2)
These bounds each hold with probability at least 1 − PE, where δ(L + k, PE) :=√
(L+ k) ln(1/PE)/2. Replacing the n∗X,ui in Eq. (A.1) by the corresponding worst-
case finite-size estimate leads to a finite-size lower bound on sX,0, which we call s−X,0,
and which holds with probability at least 1− 2PE.
Similarly, we can bound s−X,1 as
s−X,1 ≥
u1τ1
u1(u2 − u3)− (u22 − u23)
[
eu2n−X,u2
pu2
− e
u3n+X,u3
pu3
+
u22 − u23
u21
(
s−X,0
τ0
− e
u1n+X,u1
pu1
)]
.
(A.3)
The X basis phase errors are not directly observed in the protocol. Instead, we
relate φ+X,1 to the bit error rate in the Z basis. As in Appendix B of [114], we have
φ+X,1 ≤
v+Z,1
s−Z,1
+ γ
(
α1,
v+Z,1
s−Z,1
, s−Z,1, s
−
X,1
)
, (A.4)
where α1 is such that 0 < α1 < ,  is the smoothing parameter in the smooth min-
entropy, v+Z,1 is the upper bound on the number of errors in Z basis counts coming
from single photon pulses, and
γ(a, b, c, d) :=
√
(c+ d)(1− b)b
cd ln 2
log
[
c+ d
cd(1− b)b
1
a2
]
. (A.5)
All quantities on the right hand side of Eq. (A.4) are known, except v+Z,1 which we
can find as
v+Z,1 ≤
τ1
u2 − u3
(
eu2m+Z,u2
pu2
− e
u3m−Z,u3
pu3
)
, (A.6)
where the m±Z,ui are the upper and lower bounds on the true number of bit errors
coming from Z basis counts of intensity ui. These quantities are found similarly to
Eq. (A.2).
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A.2 Proofs of Lemmas 6.2 and 6.3
Proof of Lemma 6.2. To prove the lemma we will show that for any τ ′XF ∈ B(τXF ),
and any sub-normalised σ′F , there exists a classical τXF ∈ B(τXF ) and sub-
normalised σF such that
Hmin(τXF |σF ) ≥ Hmin(τ ′XF |σ′F ). (A.7)
Since the smooth min-entropy Hmin(X|F )τ involves a maximisation over all states
-close to τXF (see Eqs. 3.16 and 3.18) the result then follows.
For any τ ′XF ∈ B(τXF ), choose τXF := EXF (τ ′XF ), where EXF denotes the
projection onto the {|x〉 |f〉}x,f basis. We first show that τXF ∈ B(τXF ), and then
show Eq. (A.7). Since τXF is classical in the {|x〉 |f〉}x,f basis, EXF (τXF ) = τXF .
Therefore,
P (τXF , τXF ) = P
(EXF (τ ′XF ), EXF (τXF )) ≤ P (τ ′XF , τXF ) ≤ , (A.8)
where the first inequality follows from the monotonicity of the purified distance,
and the second inequality follows because τ ′XF ∈ B(τXF ). This shows that τXF ∈
B(τXF ).
To prove Eq. (A.7), recall Definition 3.8 which says
Hmin(τ
′
XF |σ′F ) := sup{λ ∈ R : τ ′XF ≤ 2−λ1X ⊗ σ′F}. (A.9)
We σF := EF (σ′F ), where F is the projection onto the {|f〉} basis. Applying EXF to
both sides of τ ′XF ≤ 2−λ1X ⊗ σ′F gives
2−λ1X ⊗ σ′F − τ ′XF ≥ 0⇒ 2−λ1X ⊗ σF − τXF ≥ 0. (A.10)
Equivalently, Eq. (A.10) shows that Hmin(τXF |σF ) ≥ Hmin(τ ′XF |σ′F ), from which
the result follows.
Proof of Lemma 6.3. Let X be the set of all n-bit strings and let Srx := {x′ ∈ X :
d(x, x′) ≤ r}, where d is the Hamming distance. When using F to guess X, Eve’s
average probability of making fewer than r mistakes is at most
qr =
∑
f
QF (f) max
x˜
∑
x′∈Srx˜
QX|F=f (x′), (A.11)
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where QF is the marginal distribution of QXF . This can be understood as follows.
Eve is successful in making fewer than r errors if Eve guesses x˜, and X = x∗
such that x∗ ∈ Srx˜. In other words, given Eve’s guess is x˜, she is successful if the
event Ex˜ = {X = x∗ : x∗ ∈ Srx˜} occurs. Therefore, for each fixed F = f , Eve’s
optimal strategy is to guess the value x˜ for which the probability of Ex˜|f occuring is
maximal. The conditional probability that x∗ ∈ Srx˜, given F = f , can be written as
P(Ex˜|F = f) =
∑
x′∈Srx˜ QX|F=f (x
′), hence Eq. (A.11). Continuing, we have
qr =
∑
f
QF (f) max
x˜
∑
x′∈Srx˜
QX|F=f (x′)
≤
∑
f
QF (f)
∑
x′∈Srx˜
max
x
QX|F=f (x)
= brn
∑
f
QF (f) max
x
QX|F=f (x)
= brn2
−Hmin(X|F ),
(A.12)
where the second equality uses |Srx˜| = brn, and the final equality uses the that fact
that, on classical states, Hmin(X|F ) = − log2
∑
f QF (f) maxxQX|F=f (x), as in Ref.
[80]. This proves the lemma.
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Appendix B
Overview of teleportation strategy
In Section 10.4.1 we claimed that the adversary cannot use coherent attacks on mul-
tiple states in order to beat the bound given in Eq. (10.24), even when conditioned
on the states chosen by the bank, and on the outcomes of previous measurement
results found by the verifiers. In this section we formally prove our claim using a
teleportation argument similar to the one introduced by Croke and Kent in Ref.
[55], so that each game can essentially be viewed as independent of all others.
In order to apply the teleportation argument, we must first introduce a modified
individual setting, in which the adversary is allowed an additional ability. We show
that this modification does not help the adversary to cheat. We then show that any
coherent strategy can be transformed into a modified individual strategy. Therefore,
any coherent strategy cannot beat the bounds proved for the unmodified individual
case, as claimed.
Modified individual attacks
In the individual setting, the verifiers each receive a single hidden matching state
and apply the verification protocol to test its authenticity. As specified by the
protocol, the verifiers randomly choose to measure the state they receive using one
of the matching measurements. We include this random choice of matching into the
mathematical description of the measurement, and group the outcomes to be either
“correct” or “incorrect”. It can be shown that if the bank creates φx = |φx〉 〈φx|, the
verifiers measurement is described by the POVM
Γx = {Γcor,x,Γinc,x} = n
2(n− 1)
{
n− 2
n
I+ φx, I− φx
}
. (B.1)
Suppose now the adversary has the additional power of being able to force the
verifiers to apply a correction unitary (which will be the teleportation corrections)
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to their measurement outcomes before they are sent to the bank. The adversary
must specify the correction operation before sending the states to the verifiers, and,
crucially, the correction operation is such that it is simply a permutation of the set
of hidden matching states. For example, suppose the teleportation operation takes
input |φx〉 and outputs |φx′〉, with correction operator C. In this case, before sending
the states, the adversary will tell the verifiers that they must apply correction C to
their measurement outcomes. In effect then, the verifiers will measure
Γx′ = {Γcor,x′ ,Γinc,x′} = n
2(n− 1)
{
n− 2
n
I+ φx′ , I− φx′
}
, (B.2)
since the correction applied to Γinc,x′ is Γinc,x. On average, given φx, it is not possible
for the adversary to create two states, ηx and τx, such that Tr[Γinc,x
′
(ηx + τx)] < p,
where p := pVer1 + pVer2 . If it were possible, then it would imply that the adversary
can clone φx′ better than what is allowed by quantum mechanics (and our argu-
ments in Section 10.4.1). This is because if the adversary was given φx′ he could
easily transform it to φx by applying C, and then perform the strategy to get two
copies with a fidelity higher than the bound proved in Section 10.4.1. Therefore the
additional power given to the adversary does not allow her to decrease the value of
pVer1 + pVer2 .
Coherent strategy
We now consider the case of N games created by the bank. The bank creates
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx1〉 〈φx1|A ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2|B . (B.3)
The X1 and A registers contain the first N − 1 secret strings selected by the bank
and the corresponding hidden matching states, respectively. The X2 and B registers
contain the N ’th secret string selected by the bank and its corresponding hidden
matching state. Only the A and B registers are accessible to the adversary. We
assume for a contradiction that there exists a strategy available to the adversary
such that, conditional on having obtained specific values in
1. The X1 register, and
2. The verifiers’ outcomes in previous measurements,
then the value of pVer1 + pVer2 in the N ’th game is decreased below the bound in Eq.
(10.24).
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We describe this strategy as follows – upon receiving the states from the bank,
the adversary applies the unitary operation SABC so that the state becomes
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2
⊗ SABC
(
|φx1〉 〈φx1|A ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2|B ⊗ |0〉 〈0|C
)
S†ABC
=
1
2Nn
∑
x1,x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|AA′BB′C′ .
(B.4)
The A,A′ registers are the spaces that contain the states that will be sent to Ver1
and Ver2 (resp.) for the first N − 1 games. The B,B′ registers are the spaces that
contain the states that will be sent to Ver1 and Ver2 (resp.) for the N ’th game. The
C registers are auxiliary registers held by the adversary. We assume that the bank
measures the X1 register, and gets a state, x1, which satisfies condition (1) of the
strategy. The state held by the adversary is then
1
2n
∑
x2
|Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2| . (B.5)
The adversary gives the A,A′, B,B′ parts of the state to the verifiers. The honest
verifiers will first make measurements on systems A,A′ and a possible post measure-
ment state is
1
2n
∑
x2
ax1x2ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′ . (B.6)
We assume that ΠAA′ is a measurement outcome satisfying condition (2) of the
strategy, so that the error probabilities on the N ’th game are decreased. Here ax1x2
is the normalisation term, ax1x2 = 1/Tr
[
ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′
]
.
The verifiers now each measure Γx2 , as defined in Eq. (B.2), on their B system.
By assumption, the strategy then gives
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′
]
+ ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′
]]
< p.
(B.7)
We now aim to prove that this leads to a contradiction.
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Teleportation strategy
Supposing the above strategy exists, we explore what this enables the adversary to
do in the individual case in the hopes of finding a contradiction. We suppose the
bank creates
1
2n
∑
x2
|x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2|B (B.8)
and sends the B part to the adversary. The adversary can simulate the above strat-
egy locally, by creating |x1〉, |φx1〉 and the maximally mixed state on n dimensions
|Φ〉. After relabelling the registers, the adversary holds the state
1
2n
∑
x2
|x1〉 〈x1|X1 ⊗ |x2〉 〈x2|X2 ⊗ |φx1〉 〈φx1 |A
⊗ |φx2〉 〈φx2|D ⊗ |0〉 〈0|C ⊗ |Φ〉 〈Φ|BE .
(B.9)
To simulate the strategy in the previous section, the adversary applies S to the
A, B and C registers, followed by a measurement on the resulting A,A′ registers.
Conditional on measurement outcome ΠAA′ , she then applies a generalised Bell
measurement on the D and E registers in order to teleport the unknown state |φx2〉
into the B register which was acted on by S (modulo a teleportation correction). If
the appropriate measurement outcome is not found, the adversary does not perform
the Bell measurement and instead starts again. The resulting state is
1
2n
∑
x2
ax1x′2ΠAA′
∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2∣∣∣Π†AA′ . (B.10)
Notice the state contains x′2 since the Bell measurement does not faithfully teleport
the state, and a correction is required which we have not performed. If the dimension
of the hidden matching states is a power of two, the correction operators are simply
tensor products of the Pauli operators [186]. Crucially, all corrections define a
bijective mapping between x′2 and x2, so that as x2 cycles over all possible values
so does x′2, and the probabilities are not affected (all corrections are equally likely,
which must be the case so that information is not communicated faster than light).
The state in Eq. (B.10) is the same as the state in Eq. (B.6), but the measure-
ments applied by the verifiers are correlated with the X2 register held by the bank.
Therefore, the verifiers failure probabilities are not the same when measuring the
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two states. Measurements on the state in Eq. (B.6) leads to a failure probability of
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′
]
+ ax1x2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′ |Ψx1x2〉 〈Ψx1x2|Π†AA′
]]
,
(B.11)
while measurements on the state in Eq. (B.10) lead to a failure probability of
1
2n
∑
x2
[
ax1x′2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B ΠAA′
∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2∣∣∣Π†AA′]
+ ax1x′2Tr
[
Γinc,x2B′ ΠAA′
∣∣∣Ψx1x′2〉〈Ψx1x′2∣∣∣Π†AA′]
]
.
(B.12)
The difference being the appearance of x′2 in the second expression. Nevertheless,
the two can be made equal if the verifiers are forced to apply the teleportation
correction unitary to their measurement outcomes. In effect, this correction relabels
the measurement outcomes so that Γinc,x2 → Γinc,x′2 . Following this correction, the
two expressions (B.11) and (B.12) are equal. This shows that the assumption in Eq.
(B.7) leads to a contradiction, since it shows an individual attack in the modified
scenario can achieve an error probability lower than p, but we know that the error
probabilities achievable in the modified individual scenario are the same as for the
unmodified individual scenario, hence the contradiction with our results in Section
10.4.1.
199
References
[1] Petros Wallden et al. “Quantum digital signatures with quantum-key-
distribution components”. Physical Review A 91 (2015), p. 042304.
[2] Werner Heisenberg. “Über den anschaulichen Inhalt der quantentheoretischen
Kinematik und Mechanik”. Zeitschrift für Physik 43.3-4 (1927), pp. 172–198.
[3] Howard Percy Robertson. “The uncertainty principle”. Physical Review 34.1
(1929), p. 163.
[4] Albert Einstein, Boris Podolsky, and Nathan Rosen. “Can quantum-
mechanical description of physical reality be considered complete?” Physical
Review 47.10 (1935), p. 777.
[5] John Stewart Bell. Speakable and unspeakable in quantum mechanics: Col-
lected papers on quantum philosophy. Cambridge university press, 2004.
[6] Claude Elwood Shannon. “A mathematical theory of communication”. ACM
SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing and Communications Review 5.1 (2001),
pp. 3–55.
[7] C Shannon. “Communication theory of secrecy systems”. Bell syst. Tech. J.
28 (1949), pp. 656–715.
[8] Whitfield Diffie and Martin E Hellman. “New directions in cryptography”.
IEEE Trans. Inform. Theory 22.6 (1976), pp. 644–654.
[9] Ronald L Rivest. Cryptography, Handbook of theoretical computer science
(vol. A): algorithms and complexity. 1991.
[10] Charles H Bennett and Gilles Brassard. “Quantum cryptography: Public key
distribution and coin tossing”. New York, USA: IEEE, 1984, pp. 175–179.
[11] Charles H. Bennett et al. “Quantum cryptography, or unforgeable subway
tokens”. Advances in Cryptology: Proceedings of Crypto ’82, Santa Barbara.
Berlin: Plenum Press, 1983, pp. 267–275.
200
[12] Ronald L Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Len Adleman. “A method for obtain-
ing digital signatures and public-key cryptosystems”. Communications of the
ACM 21.2 (1978), pp. 120–126.
[13] Taher ElGamal. “A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on
discrete logarithms”. Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in Cryptology,
LNCS, Santa Barbara, USA, 1984. Vol. 196. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer,
1985, pp. 10–18. isbn: 3540156585.
[14] Don Johnson, Alfred Menezes, and Scott Vanstone. “The elliptic curve digital
signature algorithm (ECDSA)”. Int. J. Inf. Sec. 1.1 (2001), pp. 36–63. issn:
1615-5262.
[15] Peter W Shor. “Polynomial-time algorithms for prime factorization and dis-
crete logarithms on a quantum computer”. SIAM J. Sci. Statist. Comput.
26.5 (1997), pp. 1484–1509. issn: 0097-5397.
[16] Amos Fiat and Adi Shamir. “How to prove yourself: Practical solutions to
identification and signature problems”. Conference on the Theory and Appli-
cation of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer. 1986, pp. 186–194.
[17] Richard Lindner and Chris Peikert. “Better key sizes (and attacks) for LWE-
based encryption”. Cryptographers’ Track at the RSA Conference. Springer.
2011, pp. 319–339.
[18] Damien Stehlé and Ron Steinfeld. “Making NTRU as secure as worst-case
problems over ideal lattices”. Annual International Conference on the Theory
and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer. 2011, pp. 27–47.
[19] Léo Ducas et al. “Lattice signatures and bimodal gaussians”. Advances in
Cryptology–CRYPTO 2013. Springer, 2013, pp. 40–56.
[20] Daniel J. Bernstein, Johannes Buchmann, and Erik Dahmen. (Eds.) Post-
quantum cryptography. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer Science and Business Me-
dia, 2009. isbn: 3540887024.
[21] Aviad Kipnis, Jacques Patarin, and Louis Goubin. “Unbalanced oil and vine-
gar signature schemes”. International Conference on the Theory and Appli-
cations of Cryptographic Techniques. Springer. 1999, pp. 206–222.
[22] Jintai Ding and Dieter Schmidt. “Rainbow, a new multivariable polynomial
signature scheme”. International Conference on Applied Cryptography and
Network Security. Springer. 2005, pp. 164–175.
201
[23] Robert J McEliece. “A public-key cryptosystem based on algebraic”. Coding
Thv 4244 (1978), pp. 114–116.
[24] Valerii Denisovich Goppa. “A new class of linear correcting codes”. Problemy
Peredachi Informatsii 6.3 (1970), pp. 24–30.
[25] Ralph Merkle. “A certified digital signature”. Advances in Cryptol-
ogy—CRYPTO’89 Proceedings. Springer. 1990, pp. 218–238.
[26] ETSI White Paper. “Quantum Safe Cryptography and Security; An introduc-
tion, benefits, enablers and challenges". 2015.
[27] Johannes Buchmann, Erik Dahmen, and Andreas Hülsing. “XMSS-a prac-
tical forward secure signature scheme based on minimal security assump-
tions”. International Workshop on Post-Quantum Cryptography. Springer.
2011, pp. 117–129.
[28] Daniel J Bernstein et al. “SPHINCS: practical stateless hash-based signa-
tures”. Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of
Cryptographic Techniques. Springer. 2015, pp. 368–397.
[29] Howard Barnum et al. “Authentication of quantum messages”. Proceeings of
The 43rd Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science,
Vancouver, BC, Canada, 2002. New York, USA: IEEE, Nov. 2002, pp. 449–
458. isbn: 0769518222.
[30] Xin Lu and Dengguo Feng. “Quantum digital signature based on quantum
one-way functions”. The 7th International Conference on Advanced Commu-
nication Technology, 2005, ICACT 2005. Vol. 1. IEEE. 2005, pp. 514–517.
[31] Mark N Wegman and J Lawrence Carter. “New hash functions and their use
in authentication and set equality”. Journal of computer and system sciences
22.3 (1981), pp. 265–279.
[32] Gilbert S Vernam. Secret signaling system. US Patent 1,310,719. 1919.
[33] Colleen M Swanson and Douglas R Stinson. “Unconditionally secure signa-
ture schemes revisited”. Information Theoretic Security, Proceedings of ICITS
2011, LNCS, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. Vol. 6673. Berlin, Heidelberg:
Springer, 2011, pp. 100–116. isbn: 3642207278.
[34] Juan Miguel Arrazola, Petros Wallden, and Erika Andersson. “Multiparty
Quantum Signature Schemes”. Quantum Information and Computation 5
(2015), pp. 0435–0464.
202
[35] John Rompel. “One-way functions are necessary and sufficient for secure sig-
natures”. Proceedings of the twenty-second annual ACM symposium on The-
ory of computing. ACM. 1990, pp. 387–394.
[36] Leslie Lamport. Constructing digital signatures from a one-way function. Re-
port. Technical Report CSL-98, SRI International Palo Alto, 1979.
[37] David Chaum and Sandra Roijakkers. “Unconditionally-secure digital signa-
tures”. Advances in Cryptology-CRYPTO’90, LNCS, Santa Barbara, USA,
1990. Vol. 537. Berlin, Heidelberg: Springer, 1991, pp. 206–214. isbn:
3540545085.
[38] David Chaum. “The dining cryptographers problem: Unconditional sender
and recipient untraceability”. J. Crypt. 1.1 (1988), pp. 65–75. issn: 0933-
2790.
[39] Birgit Pfitzmann and Michael Waidner. Information-theoretic pseudosigna-
tures and byzantine agreement for t ≥ n/3. Technical Report RZ 2882
(90830), IBM Research, 1996.
[40] Goichiro Hanaoka et al. “Unconditionally secure digital signature schemes
admitting transferability”. ASIACRYPT 2000. Springer, 2000, pp. 130–142.
[41] Junji Shikata et al. “Security notions for unconditionally secure signature
schemes”. EUROCRYPT 2002. Springer, 2002, pp. 434–449.
[42] Goichiro Hanaoka, Junji Shikata, and Yuliang Zheng. “Efficient uncondition-
ally secure digital signatures”. IEICE transactions on fundamentals of elec-
tronics, communications and computer sciences 87.1 (2004), pp. 120–130.
[43] Matthias Fitzi, Stefan Wolf, and Jürg Wullschleger. “Pseudo-signatures,
broadcast, and multi-party computation from correlated randomness”. An-
nual International Cryptology Conference. Springer. 2004, pp. 562–578.
[44] Elham Kashefi and Iordanis Kerenidis. “Statistical zero-knowledge and quan-
tum one-way functions”. J. Theor. Comp. Sci. 378.1 (2007), pp. 101–116.
issn: 0304-3975.
[45] Harry Buhrman et al. “Quantum Fingerprinting”. Physical Review Letters 87
(16 2001), p. 167902. doi: 10.1103/PhysRevLetters87.167902.
[46] D Gavinsky and T Ito. “Quantum fingerprints that keep secrets”. J. Quant.
Inf. Comp. 13 (2013), pp. 583–606.
203
[47] Alexander Semenovich Holevo. “Bounds for the quantity of information trans-
mitted by a quantum communication channel”. Prob. Inf. Trans. 9.3 (1973),
pp. 177–183. issn: 0555-2923.
[48] Michael A Nielsen and Isaac L Chuang. Quantum computation and quantum
information. Cambridge university press, 2010.
[49] Daniel Gottesman and Isaac Chuang. “Quantum digital signatures”. arXiv
preprint quant-ph/0105032 (2001).
[50] Erika Andersson, Marcos Curty, and Igor Jex. “Experimentally realizable
quantum comparison of coherent states and its applications”. Physical Review
A 74.2 (2006), p. 022304.
[51] Patrick Clarke et al. “Experimental demonstration of quantum digital signa-
tures using phase-encoded coherent states of light”. Nature Communications
3 (2012), p. 1174.
[52] Vedran Dunjko, Petros Wallden, and Erika Andersson. “Quantum digital sig-
natures without quantum memory”. Physical Review Letters 112.4 (2014),
p. 040502.
[53] Robert Collins et al. “Realization of quantum digital signatures without the
requirement of quantum memory”. Physical Review Letters 113.4 (2014),
p. 040502.
[54] Leslie Lamport, Robert Shostak, and Marshall Pease. “The Byzantine gener-
als problem”. ACM Trans. Prog. Lang. Syst. (TOPLAS) 4.3 (1982), pp. 382–
401. issn: 0164-0925.
[55] Sarah Croke and Adrian Kent. “Security details for bit commitment by trans-
mitting measurement outcomes”. Physical Review A 86.5 (2012), p. 052309.
[56] Mark N Wegman and J Lawrence Carter. “New hash functions and their use
in authentication and set equality”. J. Comp. Syst. Sci. 22.3 (1981), pp. 265–
279. issn: 0022-0000.
[57] Petros Wallden, Vedran Dunjko, and Erika Andersson. “Minimum-cost quan-
tum measurements for quantum information”. Journal of Physics A: Mathe-
matical and Theoretical 47.12 (2014), p. 125303.
[58] Wassily Hoeffding. “Probability inequalities for sums of bounded random vari-
ables”. Journal of the American statistical association 58.301 (1963), pp. 13–
30.
204
[59] Ross J Donaldson et al. “Experimental demonstration of kilometer-range
quantum digital signatures”. Physical Review A 93.1 (2016), p. 012329.
[60] Dominic Mayers. “Quantum key distribution and string oblivious transfer in
noisy channels”. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer. 1996,
pp. 343–357.
[61] Matthew F Pusey, Jonathan Barrett, and Terry Rudolph. “On the reality of
the quantum state”. Nature Physics 8.6 (2012), pp. 475–478.
[62] Vašek Chvátal. “The tail of the hypergeometric distribution”. Discrete Math-
ematics 25.3 (1979), pp. 285–287.
[63] Artur K Ekert. “Quantum cryptography based on Bell’s theorem”. Physical
Review Letters 67.6 (1991), p. 661.
[64] Renato Renner and Stefan Wolf. “Simple and tight bounds for information
reconciliation and privacy amplification”. International Conference on the
Theory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer.
2005, pp. 199–216.
[65] Marco Tomamichel, Roger Colbeck, and Renato Renner. “Duality between
smooth min-and max-entropies”. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory
56.9 (2010), pp. 4674–4681.
[66] Carl Wilhelm Helstrom. Quantum detection and estimation theory. Academic
press, 1976.
[67] Renato Renner. “Security of quantum key distribution”. International Journal
of Quantum Information 6.01 (2008), pp. 1–127.
[68] Christopher A Fuchs and Jeroen Van De Graaf. “Cryptographic distinguisha-
bility measures for quantum-mechanical states”. IEEE Transactions on In-
formation Theory 45.4 (1999), pp. 1216–1227.
[69] Mark M Wilde. “From classical to quantum Shannon theory”. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1106.1445 (2011).
[70] Benjamin Schumacher. “Quantum coding”. Physical Review A 51.4 (1995),
p. 2738.
[71] Michał Horodecki, Jonathan Oppenheim, and Andreas Winter. “Quantum
state merging and negative information”. Communications in Mathematical
Physics 269.1 (2007), pp. 107–136.
205
[72] Renato Renner and Robert König. “Universally composable privacy ampli-
fication against quantum adversaries”. Theory of Cryptography Conference.
Springer. 2005, pp. 407–425.
[73] Marco Tomamichel and Masahito Hayashi. “A hierarchy of information quan-
tities for finite block length analysis of quantum tasks”. IEEE Transactions
on Information Theory 59.11 (2013), pp. 7693–7710.
[74] Igor Devetak and Andreas Winter. “Classical data compression with quantum
side information”. Physical Review A 68.4 (2003), p. 042301.
[75] David Slepian and Jack Wolf. “Noiseless coding of correlated information
sources”. IEEE Transactions on information Theory 19.4 (1973), pp. 471–
480.
[76] Igor Devetak and Andreas Winter. “Distillation of secret key and entangle-
ment from quantum states”. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A:
Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Sciences. Vol. 461. 2053. The Royal
Society. 2005, pp. 207–235.
[77] Imre Csiszár and Janos Korner. “Broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages”. IEEE transactions on information theory 24.3 (1978), pp. 339–348.
[78] Alfréd Rényi et al. “On measures of entropy and information”. Proceedings
of the fourth Berkeley symposium on mathematical statistics and probability.
Vol. 1. 1961, pp. 547–561.
[79] Marco Tomamichel. “A framework for non-asymptotic quantum information
theory”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1203.2142 (2012).
[80] Robert Konig, Renato Renner, and Christian Schaffner. “The operational
meaning of min-and max-entropy”. IEEE Transactions on Information theory
55.9 (2009), pp. 4337–4347.
[81] Koenraad MR Audenaert. “A sharp continuity estimate for the von Neumann
entropy”. Journal of Physics A: Mathematical and Theoretical 40.28 (2007),
p. 8127.
[82] John Watrous. “Theory of Quantum Information lecture notes”.
https://cs.uwaterloo.ca/watrous/˜LectureNotes.html (2008).
[83] Charles H Bennett et al. “Generalized privacy amplification”. IEEE Transac-
tions on Information Theory 41.6 (1995), pp. 1915–1923.
206
[84] Joseph M Renes and Renato Renner. “One-shot classical data compression
with quantum side information and the distillation of common random-
ness or secret keys”. IEEE Transactions on Information Theory 58.3 (2012),
pp. 1985–1991.
[85] Normand J Beaudry and Renato Renner. “An intuitive proof of the data
processing inequality”. Quantum Information & Computation 12.5-6 (2012),
pp. 432–441.
[86] Isidore I Hirschman. “A note on entropy”. American journal of mathematics
79.1 (1957), pp. 152–156.
[87] David Deutsch. “Uncertainty in quantum measurements”. Physical Review
Letters 50.9 (1983), p. 631.
[88] Marco Tomamichel and Renato Renner. “Uncertainty relation for smooth
entropies”. Physical Review Letters 106.11 (2011), p. 110506.
[89] Marco Tomamichel et al. “Tight finite-key analysis for quantum cryptogra-
phy”. Nature Communications 3 (2012), p. 634.
[90] Stephanie Wehner and Andreas Winter. “Entropic uncertainty relations: a
survey”. New Journal of Physics 12.2 (2010), p. 025009.
[91] Gilles Brassard et al. “Security aspects of practical quantum cryptography”.
International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic
Techniques. Springer. 2000, pp. 289–299.
[92] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Xiongfeng Ma, and Kai Chen. “Decoy state quantum key
distribution”. Physical Review Letters 94.23 (2005), p. 230504.
[93] Daniel Gottesman et al. “Security of quantum key distribution with imperfect
devices”. Information Theory, 2004. ISIT 2004. Proceedings. International
Symposium on. IEEE. 2004, p. 136.
[94] Jonathan Katz and Yehuda Lindell. Introduction to modern cryptography.
CRC press, 2014.
[95] Edgar N Gilbert, F Jessie MacWilliams, and Neil JA Sloane. “Codes which
detect deception”. Bell System Technical Journal 53.3 (1974), pp. 405–424.
[96] Douglas R. Stinson. “Universal hashing and authentication codes”. Designs,
Codes and Cryptography 4.3 (1994), pp. 369–380.
[97] Bert den Boer. “A Simple and Key-Economical Unconditional Authentication
Scheme.” Journal of Computer Security 2.1 (1993), pp. 65–71.
207
[98] Jürgen Bierbrauer et al. “On families of hash functions via geometric codes
and concatenation”. Annual International Cryptology Conference. Springer.
1993, pp. 331–342.
[99] Hugo Krawczyk. “LFSR-based hashing and authentication”. Annual Interna-
tional Cryptology Conference. Springer. 1994, pp. 129–139.
[100] Aysajan Abidin and Jan-Åke Larsson. “New universal hash functions”. West-
ern European Workshop on Research in Cryptology. Springer. 2011, pp. 99–
108.
[101] David Chaum, Claude Crépeau, and Ivan Damgard. “Multiparty uncondi-
tionally secure protocols”. Proceedings of the twentieth annual ACM sympo-
sium on Theory of computing. ACM. 1988, pp. 11–19.
[102] Oded Goldrcich and Ronen Vainish. “How to solve any protocol problem-
an efficiency improvement”. Conference on the Theory and Application of
Cryptographic Techniques. Springer. 1987, pp. 73–86.
[103] Joe Kilian. “Founding crytpography on oblivious transfer”. Proceedings of
the twentieth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing. ACM. 1988,
pp. 20–31.
[104] Dominic Mayers. “Unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is im-
possible”. Physical Review Letters 78.17 (1997), p. 3414.
[105] Hoi-Kwong Lo. “Insecurity of quantum secure computations”. Physical Review
A 56.2 (1997), p. 1154.
[106] André Chailloux, Gus Gutoski, and Jamie Sikora. “Optimal bounds for semi-
honest quantum oblivious transfer”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1310.3262 (2013).
[107] Matthias Fitzi, Nicolas Gisin, and Ueli Maurer. “Quantum solution to
the Byzantine agreement problem”. Physical Review Letters 87.21 (2001),
p. 217901.
[108] Hua-Lei Yin, Yao Fu, and Zeng-Bing Chen. “Practical quantum digital sig-
nature”. Physical Review A 93.3 (2016), p. 032316.
[109] Hua-Lei Yin et al. “Experimental Quantum Digital Signature over 102 km”.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1608.01086 (2016).
[110] Ryan Amiri et al. “Secure quantum signatures using insecure quantum chan-
nels”. Physical Review A 93.3 (2016), p. 032325.
208
[111] GL Roberts et al. “Experimental measurement-device-independent quantum
digital signatures”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1703.00493 (2017).
[112] Torben Pryds Pedersen. “Non-interactive and information-theoretic se-
cure verifiable secret sharing”. Annual International Cryptology Conference.
Springer. 1991, pp. 129–140.
[113] Tian-Yin Wang et al. “Security of quantum digital signatures for classical
messages”. Scientific reports 5 (2015).
[114] Charles Ci Wen Lim et al. “Concise security bounds for practical decoy-state
quantum key distribution”. Physical Review A 89.2 (2014), p. 022307.
[115] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Hoi Fung Chau, and Mohammed Ardehali. “Efficient quantum
key distribution scheme and a proof of its unconditional security”. Journal of
Cryptology 18.2 (2005), pp. 133–165.
[116] Normand J Beaudry, Tobias Moroder, and Norbert Lütkenhaus. “Squash-
ing models for optical measurements in quantum communication”. Physical
review letters 101.9 (2008), p. 093601.
[117] Marco Tomamichel and Anthony Leverrier. “A rigorous and complete
proof of finite key security of quantum key distribution”. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1506.08458 (2015).
[118] Robert J Serfling. “Probability inequalities for the sum in sampling without
replacement”. The Annals of Statistics (1974), pp. 39–48.
[119] Marco Tomamichel et al. “Fundamental finite key limits for information rec-
onciliation in quantum key distribution”. Information Theory (ISIT), 2014
IEEE International Symposium on. IEEE. 2014, pp. 1469–1473.
[120] Valerio Scarani and Renato Renner. “Quantum cryptography with finite re-
sources: Unconditional security bound for discrete-variable protocols with
one-way postprocessing”. Physical Review Letters 100.20 (2008), p. 200501.
[121] Marco Lucamarini et al. “Efficient decoy-state quantum key distribution with
quantified security”. Optics express 21.21 (2013), pp. 24550–24565.
[122] Robert J Collins et al. “Experimental transmission of quantum digital sig-
natures over 90 km of installed optical fiber using a differential phase shift
quantum key distribution system”. Optics Letters 41.21 (2016), pp. 4883–
4886.
209
[123] J. Robert Collins et al. “Experimental demonstration of quantum digital
signatures over 43dB channel loss using differential phase shift quantum key
distribution”. Scientific Reports 7 (2017), p. 3235.
[124] Raymond YQ Cai and Valerio Scarani. “Finite-key analysis for practical im-
plementations of quantum key distribution”. New Journal of Physics 11.4
(2009), p. 045024.
[125] Kyo Inoue, Edo Waks, and Yoshihisa Yamamoto. “Differential phase shift
quantum key distribution”. Physical Review Letters 89.3 (2002), p. 037902.
[126] Kai Wen, Kiyoshi Tamaki, and Yoshihisa Yamamoto. “Unconditional security
of single-photon differential phase shift quantum key distribution”. Physical
Review Letters 103.17 (2009), p. 170503.
[127] Kiyoshi Tamaki, Masato Koashi, and Go Kato. “Unconditional security of
coherent-state-based differential phase shift quantum key distribution pro-
tocol with block-wise phase randomization”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1208.1995
(2012).
[128] Eleni Diamanti. “Security and implementation of differential phase shift
quantum key distribution systems”. PhD thesis. Stanford University, 2006.
[129] Chi-Hang Fred Fung et al. “Phase-remapping attack in practical quantum-
key-distribution systems”. Physical Review A 75.3 (2007), p. 032314.
[130] Feihu Xu, Bing Qi, and Hoi-Kwong Lo. “Experimental demonstration of
phase-remapping attack in a practical quantum key distribution system”.
New Journal of Physics 12.11 (2010), p. 113026.
[131] Bing Qi et al. “Time-shift attack in practical quantum cryptosystems”. arXiv
preprint quant-ph/0512080 (2005).
[132] Yi Zhao et al. “Quantum hacking: Experimental demonstration of time-shift
attack against practical quantum-key-distribution systems”. Physical Review
A 78.4 (2008), p. 042333.
[133] Lars Lydersen et al. “Hacking commercial quantum cryptography systems by
tailored bright illumination”. Nature photonics 4.10 (2010), pp. 686–689.
[134] I Gerhardt et al. “Full-field implementation of a perfect eavesdropper on a
quantum cryptography system.” Nature Communications 2 (2010), pp. 349–
349.
210
[135] Nicolas Gisin, Stefano Pironio, and Nicolas Sangouard. “Proposal for imple-
menting device-independent quantum key distribution based on a heralded
qubit amplifier”. Physical Review Letters 105.7 (2010), p. 070501.
[136] Marcos Curty and Tobias Moroder. “Heralded-qubit amplifiers for practi-
cal device-independent quantum key distribution”. Physical Review A 84.1
(2011), p. 010304.
[137] Ittoop Vergheese Puthoor et al. “Measurement-device-independent quantum
digital signatures”. Physical Review A 94.2 (2016), p. 022328.
[138] Hoi-Kwong Lo, Marcos Curty, and Bing Qi. “Measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution”. Physical Review Letters 108.13
(2012), p. 130503.
[139] Eli Biham, Bruno Huttner, and Tal Mor. “Quantum cryptographic network
based on quantum memories”. Physical Review A 54.4 (1996), p. 2651.
[140] Marcos Curty et al. “Finite-key analysis for measurement-device-independent
quantum key distribution”. Nature Communications 5 (2014).
[141] Masahiro Takeoka, Saikat Guha, and Mark M Wilde. “Fundamental rate-
loss tradeoff for optical quantum key distribution”. Nature Communications
5 (2014).
[142] LC Comandar et al. “Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabil-
ities using optically seeded lasers”. Nature Photonics (2016).
[143] F Marsili et al. “Detecting single infrared photons with 93% system effi-
ciency”. Nature Photonics 7.3 (2013), pp. 210–214.
[144] Rupert Ursin et al. “Entanglement-based quantum communication over 144
km”. Nature physics 3.7 (2007), pp. 481–486.
[145] LC Comandar et al. “Quantum key distribution without detector vulnerabil-
ities using optically seeded lasers”. Nature Photonics (2016).
[146] Lucian C Comandar et al. “Gigahertz-gated InGaAs/InP single-photon detec-
tor with detection efficiency exceeding 55% at 1550 nm”. Journal of Applied
Physics 117.8 (2015), p. 083109.
[147] Adi Shamir. “How to share a secret”. Communications of the ACM 22.11
(1979), pp. 612–613.
[148] Ryan Amiri et al. “Unconditionally secure signatures”. Cryptology ePrint
Archive,(Report 2016/739) (2016).
211
[149] Mustafa Atici and D Stinson. “Universal hashing and multiple authentica-
tion”. Advances in Cryptology—CRYPTO’96. Springer. 1996, pp. 16–30.
[150] Aysajan Abidin and Jan-Åke Larsson. “New universal hash functions”. West-
ern European Workshop on Research in Cryptology. Springer. 2011, pp. 99–
108.
[151] M Lucamarini et al. “Efficient decoy-state quantum key distribution with
quantified security”. Optics express 21.21 (2013), pp. 24550–24565.
[152] Yishay Mansour, Noam Nisan, and Prasoon Tiwari. “The computational com-
plexity of universal hashing”. Theoretical Computer Science 107.1 (1993),
pp. 121–133.
[153] Ryan Amiri, Petros Wallden, and Erika Andersson. “Almost tight lower
bounds for 1-out-of-2 quantum oblivious transfer”. Manuscript submitted ().
[154] Stephen Wiesner. “Conjugate coding”. ACM Sigact News 15.1 (1983), pp. 78–
88.
[155] Shimon Even, Oded Goldreich, and Abraham Lempel. “A randomized proto-
col for signing contracts”. Communications of the ACM 28.6 (1985), pp. 637–
647.
[156] Michael O Rabin. “How To Exchange Secrets with Oblivious Transfer.” IACR
Cryptology ePrint Archive 2005 (2005), p. 187.
[157] Claude Crépeau. “Equivalence between two flavours of oblivious transfers”.
Conference on the Theory and Application of Cryptographic Techniques.
Springer. 1987, pp. 350–354.
[158] Gilles Brassard and Claude Crépeau. “Oblivious transfers and privacy ampli-
fication”. International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryp-
tographic Techniques. Springer. 1997, pp. 334–347.
[159] Gilles Brassard, Claude Crépeau, and Stefan Wolf. “Oblivious transfers and
privacy amplification”. Journal of Cryptology 16.4 (2003), pp. 219–237.
[160] Ivan B Damgård et al. “Cryptography in the bounded-quantum-storage
model”. SIAM Journal on Computing 37.6 (2008), pp. 1865–1890.
[161] Alexei Kitaev. “Quantum coin-flipping”. Talk at QIP (2003).
[162] Carlos Mochon. “Quantum weak coin flipping with arbitrarily small bias”.
arXiv preprint arXiv:0711.4114 (2007).
212
[163] André Chailloux and Iordanis Kerenidis. “Optimal quantum strong coin flip-
ping”. Foundations of Computer Science, 2009. FOCS’09. 50th Annual IEEE
Symposium on. IEEE. 2009, pp. 527–533.
[164] André Chailloux and Iordanis Kerenidis. “Optimal bounds for quantum bit
commitment”. Foundations of Computer Science (FOCS), 2011 IEEE 52nd
Annual Symposium on. IEEE. 2011, pp. 354–362.
[165] André Chailloux, Iordanis Kerenidis, and Jamie Sikora. “Lower bounds for
quantum oblivious transfer”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1007.1875 (2010).
[166] André Chailloux, Iordanis Kerenidis, and Jamie Sikora. “Lower bounds for
quantum oblivious transfer”. arXiv preprint arXiv:1007.1875 (2010).
[167] Louis Salvail, Christian Schaffner, and Miroslava Sotáková. “On the power
of two-party quantum cryptography”. International Conference on the The-
ory and Application of Cryptology and Information Security. Springer. 2009,
pp. 70–87.
[168] Paul Hausladen and William K Wootters. “A pretty good measurement
for distinguishing quantum states”. Journal of Modern Optics 41.12 (1994),
pp. 2385–2390.
[169] Koenraad MR Audenaert and Milán Mosonyi. “Upper bounds on the error
probabilities and asymptotic error exponents in quantum multiple state dis-
crimination”. Journal of Mathematical Physics 55.10 (2014), p. 102201.
[170] Armin Uhlmann. “The “transition probability" in the state space of a*-
algebra”. Reports on Mathematical Physics 9.2 (1976), pp. 273–279.
[171] Scott Aaronson. “Quantum copy-protection and quantum money”. Computa-
tional Complexity, 2009. CCC’09. 24th Annual IEEE Conference on. IEEE.
2009, pp. 229–242.
[172] Andrew Lutomirski. “An online attack against Wiesner’s quantum money”.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1010.0256 (2010).
[173] Aharon Brodutch et al. “An adaptive attack on Wiesner’s quantum money”.
Quantum Information and Computation 16 (11&12 2016), pp. 1048–1070.
[174] Dmitry Gavinsky. “Quantum money with classical verification”. Computa-
tional Complexity (CCC), 2012 IEEE 27th Annual Conference on. IEEE.
2012, pp. 42–52.
213
[175] Ziv Bar-Yossef, Thathachar S Jayram, and Iordanis Kerenidis. “Exponential
separation of quantum and classical one-way communication complexity”.
Proceedings of the thirty-sixth annual ACM symposium on Theory of com-
puting. ACM. 2004, pp. 128–137.
[176] Fernando Pastawski et al. “Unforgeable noise-tolerant quantum tokens”. Pro-
ceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109.40 (2012), pp. 16079–16082.
[177] Marios Georgiou and Iordanis Kerenidis. “New Constructions for Quantum
Money”. LIPIcs-Leibniz International Proceedings in Informatics. Vol. 44.
Schloss Dagstuhl-Leibniz-Zentrum fuer Informatik. 2015.
[178] Edward Farhi et al. “Quantum state restoration and single-copy tomography
for ground states of hamiltonians”. Physical Review Letters 105.19 (2010),
p. 190503.
[179] Edward Farhi et al. “Quantum money from knots”. Proceedings of the 3rd In-
novations in Theoretical Computer Science Conference. ACM. 2012, pp. 276–
289.
[180] Andrew Lutomirski et al. “Breaking and making quantum money: toward
a new quantum cryptographic protocol”. arXiv preprint arXiv:0912.3825
(2009).
[181] Ryan Amiri and Juan Miguel Arrazola. “Quantum money with nearly optimal
error tolerance”. Physical Review A 95.6 (2017), p. 062334.
[182] Scott Aaronson and Paul Christiano. “Quantum money from hidden sub-
spaces”. Proceedings of the forty-fourth annual ACM symposium on Theory
of computing. ACM. 2012, pp. 41–60.
[183] Juan Miguel Arrazola, Markos Karasamanis, and Norbert Lütkenhaus. “Prac-
tical quantum retrieval games”. Physical Review A 93.6 (2016), p. 062311.
[184] Michael Keyl and Reinhard FWerner. “Optimal cloning of pure states, testing
single clones”. Journal of Mathematical Physics 40.7 (1999), pp. 3283–3299.
[185] Juan Miguel Arrazola and Norbert Lütkenhaus. “Quantum communication
with coherent states and linear optics”. Physical Review A 90.4 (2014),
p. 042335.
[186] Gustavo Rigolin. “Quantum teleportation of an arbitrary two-qubit state and
its relation to multipartite entanglement”. Physical Review A 71.3 (2005),
p. 032303.
214
